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Chapter 1
Introduction
"MiFID has changed European capital markets in many ways. It has brought greater competi-
tion between trading venues and between investment firms both on trading costs and execution
services. It has also contributed to substantial investments in technology for trading and plat-
forms. [. . . ] Still, there is scope to bring more clarity to some definitions and further harmonise
rules and supervisory practices. In other areas, such as market quality (price formation) and
integrity, the impact of the Directive is not yet apparent, since evidence remains fairly contro-
versial and inconclusive."
Centre of European Policy Studies (2011)
Chapter Overview. In this chapter, I introduce the main ideas that motivate this thesis.
In particular, Section 1.1 briefly wraps up the most important points with regard to
background and motivation. Section 1.2 presents my research questions and Section
1.3 gives an overview of the remaining structure.
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1.1 Motivation
THE introduction of the European Markets in Financial Instruments Directive(MiFID) on November 1, 2007, has significantly altered European equity mar-
kets. MiFID is part of the European Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) and replaced
the Investment Services Directive (ISD) which was established in 1993.1 The overall goal
of MiFID is to establish fair, transparent, and efficient equity trading in Europe. Top pri-
ority within this goal is investor protection and an improvement of market quality by
fostering competition between trading venues. An important step towards increased
competition in the context of MiFID was the abolishment of the so-called Concentra-
tion Rule as well as the proliferation of new alternative trading venues. Before MiFID,
the Concentration Rule systematically favored traditional exchanges, as for instance
the London Stock Exchange (LSE) or Deutsche Boerse and thus created high market
entrance barriers for new trading venues. For example, the concentration rule forced
investment firms to route particular orders, such as orders of retail investors, to a regu-
lated exchange.
After November 2007, MiFID allows different types of trading venues to compete for
order flow in European equity markets. As a consequence, order flow and liquid-
ity become fragmented across various trading venues.2 Besides traditional regulated
exchanges, the Directive distinguishes between so-called Multilateral Trading Facilities
(MTFs), such as Chi-X, BATS, or Turquoise, and systematic internalizers (SI), such as
Goldman Sachs International.3 MiFID defines traditional exchanges as regulated mar-
kets where market prices are formed by matching a multitude of buys and sells ac-
cording to a specific set of trading rules. MTFs are defined similar, but MTFs do not
provide particular services which have to be covered by traditional exchanges.4 There
1MiFID consists of a framework Directive (Directive 2004/39/EC), an Implementing Directive (Directive
2006/73/EC), and an Implementing Regulation (Regulation No. 1287/2006). It was also adopted by
Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway. Section 2.1 in Chapter 2 gives a detailed overview of MiFID.
2See http://mifiddatabase.esma.europa.eu/ for a complete list of all MTFs, SIs, and regulated
markets operating in the EU (European Union).
3Due to data availability, this thesis covers the year 2009 when BATS and Chi-X were still competitors. In
November 2011, BATS Europe acquired Chi-X and combined the trading venues.
4This thesis focuses on the competition between traditional exchanges and MTFs. Therefore, I do not
discuss SI’s in detail. For further information about SI’s please see, European Commission (2010).
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is for instance no listing process at MTFs and they are also not capable of changing the
regulatory framework for particular asset classes or single stocks, meaning a change in
trading rules or changes in listing requirements. Besides other factors, these are reasons
for MTFs having a relative cost advantage compared to traditional exchanges.
Once MTFs entered the market, they complied with heterogeneous desires of different
trading clientele, such as trading speed, anonymity, or innovative fee schedules which
quickly lead to the fragmentation of order flow and liquidity. Intuitively, the probability
of order execution should decrease if demand and supply are separated across various
platforms. Especially theoretical works of market microstructure point to this problem.
Pagano (1989a), Pagano (1989b), and Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) study the effect of
so-called network externalities, ı.e., liquidity spirals. Their findings suggest that order
flow should concentrate on a single platform to increase the probability of order execu-
tion. At the same time, liquidity on this platform increases even more through positive
network externalities, because other market participants route new orders to the trad-
ing platform with the relatively highest level of liquidity and therefore order execution.
Theoretical findings of market microstructure thus contradict the idea and objectives of
MiFID because it does not – unlike US regulation – enforce price-time priority across
different markets.5
In this regard, MiFID builds upon the self-regulation forces of the market itself. The reg-
ulators argue that increased inter-market competition may reduce the quasi-monopoly
power of traditional exchanges and thus decrease transaction costs and inspire trading
venues to develop new services (European Commission, 2010). As a result, European
equity trading has become more fragmented since the introduction of MiFID. Market
statistics underline this development accordingly.6 Within the fragmented European
trading landscape, UK blue chip stocks are the most fragmented equities. For exam-
ple, LSE’s market share in FTSE 100 constituents decreased continuously from close to
100% in 2007 to just 43% in June 2011.7
5In the US, equity markets are electronically linked by technology via the Inter-market Trading System
(ITS) and private low latency communication linkages.The Regulation National Market System (RegNMS)
specifically forces trading venues to execute orders by the best available price (RegNMS, Rule 611(1)).
6See Figures 2.1 and 2.2.
7For detailed statistics on European equity market fragmentation, see http://fragmentation.
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One motivation for this thesis stems from the obvious contradiction between market
microstructure theory and MiFID’s goals to increase competition and thus fragmenta-
tion in the European equity trading. Another major motivation is connected to a more
practical issue. The – de facto – continuously increasing competitive pressure on tra-
ditional exchanges from alternative trading platforms such as MTFs, raises questions
about the contribution of different trading platforms to overall market efficiency. Due to
technological progress, the market environment for equity trading has changed tremen-
dously over the past years. This fact also leads to new scientific questions, especially
with regard to geographical centralization of liquidity and order flow. The new, MiFID
induced competition leads to a fragmentation of order flow and liquidity in European
equity markets. Yet, potential negative effects of market fragmentation may today be al-
leviated by modern information and communication technology where various trading
venues can virtually be integrated. Investors may for instance use Smart Order Routing
(SOR) technologies which guarantee best execution across trading venues within mil-
liseconds (Foucault and Menkveld (2008)). Nevertheless, having a multitude of trading
venues which are virtually connected still leaves the question whether individual trad-
ing venues actually contribute to overall market quality and efficiency.
Therefore, this thesis strives to analyze the newly evolved competition between tradi-
tional exchanges and MTFs in the aftermath of MiFID. One major focus herein is the in-
fluence of the continuously increasing market fragmentation on trading intensity and
market quality. To address this question, I focus on the UK equity market which ex-
hibits the largest degree of fragmentation within Europe. In empirical analyses, I com-
pare order book data of the LSE and the three largest European MTFs – Chi-X, BATS,
and Turquoise – in 2009. The availability of this data allows me not only to analyze the
influence of market fragmentation on market quality, but also to address competition
between these trading venues. To identify potential changes, I compare the role which
these trading venues play in a fragmented market environment in an (a) intraday analy-
sis and (b) over time. I compare different time periods and trading circumstances which
may influence market participants’ choice of a trading venue. Another important as-
fidessa.com.
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pect of my thesis is the influence of different market participants on trading venues,
trading intensity, and market quality. Regarding market participants, it is important to
note that algorithmic and high-frequency trading (HFT) participants have gained large
influence in recent years. Due to the particular focus on low latency and innovative fee
structures on MTFs, the share of those “modern” market participants is thought to be
higher on MTFs compared to traditional exchanges. Consequently, I also consider the
influence of these modern market participants on the trading venues.
5
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1.2 Research Outline
The focus of my thesis is to analyze the effects of regulatory changes in the European
trading landscape. I particularly concentrate on the influence of order flow fragmenta-
tion and competition among trading venues on overall market quality after the intro-
duction of MiFID in November 2007. Market quality, i. e. , the capability of a market to
match buy and sell orders, plays a crucial role in capital allocation and is thus of major
importance for the economy as a whole. Yet, it is not possible to define market quality
by only one single measure. Liquidity probably plays the most important role for mar-
ket quality because it indicates where market participants prefer to route their orders
to. Empirical market microstructure literature offers a large variety of different mar-
ket quality measures which also include several liquidity measures. The availability of
tick-size trade and quote data allows me to apply various of these measures – liquidity
and other measures – to investigate my first research question:
Research Question 1: Does increased fragmentation and thus increased competition
among trading venues improve overall market quality under MiFID?
My goal is to identify potential changes in market quality on the four largest UK trad-
ing venues – according to trading volume – over 2009. My data set covers on a mil-
lisecond basis all changes up to the third level of the order book on each of the four
trading venues: LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. The overall size of my data set sums
up to approximately 2.71 billion data points. To study the impact of increased market
fragmentation on market quality, I measure liquidity and several other market quality
measures on each trading venue and compare these measures over time. My idea is to
compare two periods which exhibit considerably different levels of market fragmenta-
tion. Consequently, I compare two different quarters (Q1 and Q4) of 2009.
However, I am not only interested in the influence of market fragmentation on market
quality and competition over time. For a single trading venue, Admati and Pfleiderer
(1988) explain theoretically why trading tends to be concentrated at particular peri-
ods within the trading day. In contrast, evidence on intraday trading patterns in more
6
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than one market are very scarce. Only few scholars, as for instance Werner and Klei-
don (1996), compare intraday trading patterns in a two-market scenario. On the basis
of multiple fragmented European trading landscape, I formulate my second research
question:
Research Question 2: How are order flow and liquidity connected during the trading
day in a multiple fragmented market environment? Does one market dominate others
in specific periods of trading?
To analyze this research question, I calculate various intraday trading patterns for each
trading venue and compare them with one another. To capture the impact of market
fragmentation on changes in intraday trading patterns, I calculate the patterns for Q1
and Q4 of 2009. This allows me to study changes in intraday patterns over time. I
address research questions 1 and 2 in my empirical analysis in Chapter 5.
Additionally, I am not only interested to compare market quality on MTFs and tradi-
tional exchanges, but to further address the question how specific types of market par-
ticipants act in the fragmented trading landscape. The proliferation of electronic equity
trading has spurred technological developments which lead to a continuous increase of
trading speed and thus to a new category of market participants. In today’s equity mar-
kets, algorithmic and high-frequency traders account for a large share in daily trading
volume.8 Competition between traditional exchanges and MTFs in combination with
the new high-frequency trading clientele that emerged along with MTFs are a second
main focus of my thesis. I attempt to identify the behavior of these new market partic-
ipants in particular market situations and thus their impact on market quality on the
LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise.
The literature attributes many positive effects to the appearance of MTFs and HFT.
Several scholars argue for instance, that increased competition from alternative trad-
8See http://hft.thomsonreuters.com/ for details on HFT trading volume in European markets.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) refers to HFT as «[. . . ] professional traders acting in
a proprietary capacity that engage in strategies that generate a large number of trades on a daily basis [. . . ]
characteristics often attributed to proprietary firms engaged in HFT are [. . . ] the use of extraordinarily high-
speed and sophisticated computer programs for generating, routing, and executing orders [. . . ] very short time-
frames for establishing and liquidating positions [. . . ] ending the trading day in as close to a flat position as
possible» (U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, 2010, p. 45).
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ing platforms on regulated markets leads to an overall increase in market quality (e.g.,
O’Hara and Ye, 2011). Other academic studies contradict the wide spread argument of
practitioners that MTFs would free-ride on traditional exchanges price formation. Con-
trarily, they find that MTFs often lead in price discovery and information based trading
(e.g., Hoffmann, 2010; Riordan et al., 2011; Jung and Katzschner, 2012). Other scholars
attribute market maker qualities to HFT. They find that HFT is particularly active on
MTFs where they act as new multi-venue market makers (Menkveld, 2011b; Kirilenko
et al., 2011).
Yet, these arguments lead to new questions about the competitive relationship of tradi-
tional exchanges and MTFs, especially when looking at the HFT trading clientele. Even
if both type of trading venues – regulated markets and MTFs – may undergo similar
regulatory requirements, the trading clientele on these venues is much more flexible
with regard to regulation. HFTs may for instance act as market makers but they are not
obliged to follow the regulatory requirements such as traditional market makers, i. e. ,
liquidity provision according to the rule book of a traditional exchange. Also regulators
point out concerns that liquidity provision by HFT may not be granted as stable over
time «[. . . ] But unlike an OTC market maker, a proprietary firm typically does not trade di-
rectly with customers. The proprietary firm therefore may not have ongoing relationships with
customers that can pressure the proprietary trader to provide liquidity in tough trading con-
ditions or less actively traded stocks[. . . ]» (U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, 2010,
p. 50). But not only the trading behavior of HFT may effect the competitive environ-
ment of regulated markets and MTFs. Also traditional supplementary functions and
services of regulated markets (e.g., circuit breakers or market surveillance) may attract
order flow of market participants especially in certain market situations. Therefore, the
second empirical part of my thesis concentrates on the following research questions:
Research Question 3: How do different market conditions influence the order routing
behavior of market participants in a fragmented market environment?
Research Question 4: What is the influence of market participants’ order routing be-
havior on market quality?
8
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Many papers, which are related to my thesis, measure the effect of fragmentation on
market quality over time periods that predominantly reflect normal trading conditions.
Therefore, I deliberately investigate abnormal market conditions, i. e. , high price un-
certainty or increased inventory risk, with regard to research questions 3 and 4. I also
concentrate on the competitive environment of the LSE and the three MTFs when price
uncertainty is high and when market conditions are unfavorable for market making. I
analyze the contribution to price discovery of each platform in such market conditions
because it is an essential aspect of a high-quality market structure to withstand such
periods of serious distress and price uncertainty.
9
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1.3 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis consists of seven chapters. The remainder of this thesis is structured as
follows. Chapter 2 provides details about the European financial market regulation
history as well as a brief outlook on upcoming regulatory changes. I particularly ad-
dress the creation and implementation process of MiFID, which has lead to increased
market fragmentation of European equity markets. This chapter also points out details
about the U.K. equity trading landscape and its development in recent history. I ad-
dress different market structures, major developments at the LSE, and developments
with regard to MTFs. Chapter 3 describes theoretical and empirical work, which is
closely related to this thesis. I concentrate on three areas of market microstructure:
First, the literature addressing competition in fragmented markets, second the litera-
ture about intraday trading patterns of market quality measures, and third, the litera-
ture addressing the influence of financial market innovation on market fragmentation.
Chapter 4 outlines data selection and data processing as well as the employed method-
ology. Chapters 5 and 6 represent the main research chapters of my thesis.9 Chapter
5 examines the influence of increasing fragmentation on market quality and intraday
trading patterns over 2009. Chapter 6 focuses on the order routing behavior of market
participants in a fragmented market environment. I particularly focus on competition
and price discovery during abnormal market conditions. Chapter 7 summarizes and
concludes the thesis. It also provides an outlook which addresses future research areas.
9Both Chapters are based on the joined working papers “Intraday Trading Patterns in Fragmented Markets -
A Post MiFID Analysis” and “The Role of Traditional Exchanges in Fragmented Markets”, with Hans-Peter
Burghof and Martin Wagener. The results of these joint working papers have been presented at
• The 15th Annual Conference of the Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, SGF (Zurich,
Switzerland).
• The 51st Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Finance Association (New Orleans, USA).
• The 61st Annual Meeting of the Midwest Finance Association (New Orleans, USA).
The results of these joint working papers have also been accepted at
• The 48th Annual Meeting of the Eastern Finance Association (Boston, USA).
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Foundations
“The aim of securities market regulation is to ensure proper disclosure and enforcement via a
complex set of intermediaries and institutions. This is achieved not only via legislation, but also
by stimulating a process of competition between intermediaries on the basis of reputation and
allowing the market to take responsibility for part of the regulatory and enforcement work.”
European Investment Bank (2001)
Chapter Overview. This chapter gives a detailed discussion on the Markets in Finan-
cial Instruments Directive (MiFID) which became effective on November 1, 2007. Mi-
FID aims to create a level playing field for new alternative trading venues, traditional
exchanges, and market participants by the implementation of a single European leg-
islation which holds for all member countries. The main goals are to foster investor
protection, competition, and market quality. In a second part, this chapter discusses
details about the UK equity market structure and its evolution over time. In particular,
I address the development of the LSE as well as the changing landscape in European
equity trading due to the emergence of MTFs.
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2.1 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
THE process of matching supply and demand in a financial market that finally cu-mulates into a price is mainly influenced by two factors. First, market design of
trading venues and second the regulatory framework. Both individually influence in-
vestor behavior, i.e., their trading strategies, but also competition in financial markets.
While market design is to a large extent under the responsibility of a private financial
institution which operates the trading venue, the regulatory framework is under public
responsibility. For both groups, private and public, it is important to understand that
even little changes in the set-up of trading rules or the regulatory environment may
have severe implications on the efficiency of a market and thus on economic growth
and social welfare. With the introduction of MiFID more than little changes altered the
equity market trading landscape across Europe and it is therefore particularly interest-
ing to address the implications of MiFID on the European equity market.
MiFID was adopted by the European Council and the European Parliament on April 21,
2004, and it was implemented in all 27 (now 28) member countries as well as Iceland,
Liechtenstein, and Norway on November 1, 2007. As the cornerstone of the European
Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan, MiFID has the overall objective to foster
competition in order to create a fair, transparent, efficient, and integrated European
financial market. MiFID provides a regulatory environment that aspires for increasing
investor protection and the provision of new services and markets through competition.
Implementation process. The FSAP was initially published in May 1999 and arose
from an initiative of the European Council which was held in Cardiff in June 1998.
With the introduction of the Euro ahead in January 1999, the European Council «invited
the Commission to table a framework for action [. . . ] to improve the single market in financial
services» (European Commission, 1999, p. 3). The FSAP contains 42 articles related to
the harmonization of financial services markets within the European Union. It is not
only focused on particular sectors of the financial domain, but intends to overcome
remaining cross-border barriers within the whole financial service industry through
12
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its complementary set of proposed articles. In particular, the FSAP pursuits a single
wholesale market, an open and safe financial retail services market, and intelligent rules
and supervision (European Commission, 1999). Within the FSAP, MiFID is its most
important achievement. It consists of a framework Directive (Directive 2004/39/EC),
an Implementing Directive (Directive 2006/73/EC), and an Implementing Regulation
(Regulation No 1287/2006) (European Commission, 2010, p. 5).
MiFID replaced the Investment Services Directive (ISD, Council Directive 93/22/EEC)
which was introduced in 1993 and implemented in 1995. The ISD was a first step to-
wards harmonization of European financial markets. Its main idea was to deliver a
first set of standards to investment firms which provide services or plan to establish
branches in member states of the EU, however under a home country’s authorization
and supervision. Even though the ISD aimed for harmonization it also allowed for mar-
ket entrance barriers within the financial market. Article 14(3) of the ISD particularly
allowed that «a member state may require that transactions[. . . ] be carried out on a regulated
market». This rule, also know as the Concentration Rule, created a quasi-monopoly
position for national exchanges because it required retail orders to be executed on a
regulated market only (European Commission, 1993). Davis et al. (2005) show that the
Concentration Rule has heavily influenced the development of several European finan-
cial markets, e.g., France, Italy, and Spain. Other countries, such as Germany, favored
their traditional exchanges by additional regulations such as the Default Rule. It contem-
plated that financial intermediaries execute customer orders on a traditional exchange
unless investors explicitly recall an exchange execution (Gomber and Gsell, 2006).
The establishment of these rules indicates that the ISD was not a proper framework
to establish a single European market in investment services. National authorities still
had the possibility to impose rules and restrict financial services of foreign member
state investment firms. Additionally, the scope of investment activities to which the
ISD may be applied was too narrow. New products and financial services for all types
of investors appeared and grew considerably over time. Yet, the ISD only applied to
firms providing «investment services for third parties on a professional basis» (European
Commission, 1993, Art. 2(1)).
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Date Description
May 1993 Adoption of the ISD (Council Directive 93/22/EEC)
July 1995 ISD comes into effect
June 1998 Cardif European Council invites European Commission to
prepare a “framework for action” for a single European fi-
nancial market
May 1999 European Commission publishes the FSAP
March 2000 European Council agrees on the FSAP in Lisbon
November 2002 European Commission completes draft on the revision of
the ISD which from then on becomes MiFID
April 2004 European Parliament approves MiFID framework Direc-
tive (Directive 2004/39/EC)
2004 - 2005 Consultation process by CESR
August 2006 European Commission passes the Implementing Directive
(Directive 2006/73/EC) and the Implementing Regulation
(Regulation No 1287/2006)
November 2007 MiFID comes into full effect in all EU member states
TABLE 2.1: Timeline of important steps towards the implementation of MiFID.
The lack of a single European legislative framework, together with a growing aware-
ness that technology in the financial services sector had developed significantly, led the
EU to rethink their financial sector regulation. As a result, MiFID abolished the options
for member states to favor their incumbent market when routing orders. It also al-
lowed other types of trading venues to compete for order flow with regulated markets
and thus aimed to intensify the harmonization within the European financial market
for both professional and retail investors. Table 2.1 gives an overview of the relevant
events which are connected to the implementation of MiFID.
The legislative implementation of MiFID follows the Lamfalussy process which is named
after Baron Lamfalussy, the chairman of the “Committee of Wise Men” that devised the
standard legislative implementation process. The Lamfalussy process was proposed in
2001 in order to accelerate the development of European financial services legislation
and to enable experts to participate in the legislative process (Lamfalussy et al., 2001).
The law-making approach of Lamfalussy contemplates four different levels. Level 1
includes the preparation of a Framework Directive – MiFID itself – which includes
guiding principles and requirements. It was adopted by the European Commission
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and the European Council in April 2004. Level 2 includes measures which deal with
details of how MiFID works in practice. For instance, organizational requirements and
operating conditions for investment firms which are stated in the Implementing Direc-
tive or record-keeping obligations for investment firms, transaction reporting, market
transparency measures, and further definitions which are stated in the Implementing
Regulation.1 Those measures were subsequently formulated during the Level 1 im-
plementation by the European Commission with the advice provided by the European
Securities Committee. The European Commission released draft versions of both Level
2 documents on February 2006 and passed the Implementing Directive and the Imple-
menting Regulation on August 2006. Level 3 supports these legislative processes and
the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) holds an important role in do-
ing so. It assists in a consistent implementation and application of the Level 1 and Level
2 legislative measures across EU Member States by developing recommendations, in-
terpretative guidelines, and common standards. Level 4 deals with the supervision of
MiFID and its enforcement. Here, the European Commission controls whether Member
States comply with Level 1 and Level 2 legislation and, if appropriate, it becomes active
to ensure that the Levels are properly implemented.
MiFID details. Through the implementation of a single legislation within the Eu-
ropean Economic Area (EEA), MiFID intends to create a level playing field for in-
vestment firms, trading venues, and investors in order to eventually improve mar-
ket quality. To achieve this goal, MiFID is based on the following three main pillars:
Market Access, Transparency, and Best Execution.
1. Market Access: By taking away the option of national authorities to favor their
incumbent market via the Concentration Rule, MiFID introduced competition be-
tween trading venues. In particular, MiFID allows three trading platforms to com-
pete with one another.
1In the context of European legislative instruments, a Directive requires its adoption and implementation
by each EU Member State before it can have direct effect as a matter of national law and leaves thus
some flexibility in the way the Directive is transposed into national law. In contrast to the Directive,
a Regulation has direct effect in each EU Member State without the need for national-level legislative
implementation.
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• Regulated Markets: A regulated market is specified as »[. . . ] a multilateral
system operated and/or managed by a market operator, which brings together or fa-
cilitates the bringing together of multiple third-party buying and selling interests in
financial instruments – in the system and in accordance with its non-discretionary
rules – in a way that results in a contract, in respect of the financial instruments
admitted to trading under its rules and/or systems [. . . ]« (European Commission
Directive, 2004, Article 4(14)). Traditional exchanges, which match buy and
sell orders through a limit order book or through dealers, belong to this cat-
egory. They are liable to a set of transparent and non-discretionary rules and
procedures that provide fair and orderly trading.
• Multilateral Trading Facilities: A multilateral trading facility is specified as
»[. . . ] a multilateral system, operated by an investment firm or a market operator,
which brings together multiple third-party buying and selling interests in financial
instruments – in the system and in accordance with non-discretionary rules – in
a way that results in a contract [. . . ]« (European Commission Directive, 2004,
Article 4(15)). Within this definition, an “investment firm” is defined as »[. . . ]
any legal person whose regular occupation or business is the provision of one or
more investment services to third parties and/or the performance of one or more in-
vestment activities on a professional basis.« (European Commission Directive,
2004, Article 4(1)). This definition reveals that MTFs cannot create or change
trading rules or listing requirements of asset classes or stocks like a regu-
lated market. However, they may offer trading in stocks which are listed at
regulated markets, just like regulated markets.
MTFs mainly emerged through joint-ventures of large investment firms
which used to trade large positions aside of regulated markets even before
MiFID.2 MTFs may thus receive order flow from their owners or founders,
which already generates a certain amount of liquidity. However, they should
2For instance, Chi-X Europe was established in 2007 by Instinet, a subsidiary of Nomura Holdings and
its ownership was eventually broadened to a consortium of major global financial institutions such as
BNP Paribas, Citadel, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Fortis, GETCO Europe Ltd, Goldman Sachs, Merrill
Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Optiver, Societe Generale, and UBS.
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attract order flow from outside investors in order to grow. To do so, MTFs
based their business model on the needs of new types of investors that
emerged along with regulatory changes over the past decade: algorithmic
and high-frequency traders. By offering low-latency trading infrastructures,
innovative fee schedules, and order types, MTFs successfully managed to
take away a large bite of market share from regulated markets. Currently, all
European blue chip stocks can be traded on MTFs.
• Systematic Internalizers: A systematic internalizer is specified as »[. . . ] an in-
vestment firm which, on an organized, frequent and systematic basis, deals on own
account by executing client orders outside a regulated market or an MTF« (Eu-
ropean Commission Directive, 2004, Article 4(7)). Large investment firms
which match and execute their client orders internally belong to this cate-
gory of trading venues. However, these trading venues are out of scope in
my thesis. I focus on competition between regulated markets and MTFs for
several reasons. First and most importantly, both are the main players in
the European equity trading landscape. Second, they are fairly similar and
hence comparable in terms of MiFID regulatory definitions. And third, they
are obliged to the same amount of transparency with regard to quotes and
prices. Further discussions are therefore limited to these two types of mar-
kets.3
2. Transparency: With an increasing number of trading venues, liquidity becomes
fragmented and thus does information about available prices, quotes, and or-
der book volumes. Therefore, the “Transparency” pillar is responsible for pre-
and post-trade transparency requirements for equity trading on regulated mar-
kets and MTFs in order to guarantee a transparent flow of information in the
market (European Commission Directive, 2004, Articles (29-30) and (44-45)). Pre-
trade transparency rules require trading venues to continuously publish their or-
der books – at least partially – by showing best bid and ask prices together with
the volumes of trading interest at these prices. MiFID also allows competent au-
3See Gomber and Pierron (2010) for further insights into SI and OTC trading.
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thorities, i.e., operators of regulated markets and MTFs, to waive certain pre-trade
transparency requirements for shares based on a certain market model or the type
and size of certain orders (European Commission Regulation, 2006, Articles (18)
and (20)).4 Particularly, MTFs but also regulated markets have used these waivers
to create new services for their clientele, as for instance the execution of trades
that are large-in-scale or trades with completely hidden liquidity, known as dark
pools.5 Also new order types such as iceberg orders, where only a part of the
order volume is visible in the order book or hidden limit orders are the outcome
of these waivers. Post-trade transparency rules include the publication of price,
volume and time of all trades that occurred in all listed shares of a trading venue.
These post-trade requirements hold also for trades which are executed outside
of a regulated market or MTF. However, if trades are of large scale they may be
subject to a deferred publication (European Commission Regulation, 2006, Article
(28)).
3. Best Execution: The best execution rule sets the framework for investment firms
and brokers to execute customer orders. In particular, whenever an intermediary
executes a customer order it must »[. . . ] take all reasonable steps to obtain [. . . ] the
best possible result for their clients taking into account price, costs, speed, likelihood of ex-
ecution and settlement, size, nature or any other consideration relevant to the execution
of the order.« (European Commission Directive, 2004, Article 21(1)). If a client does
not give a specific instruction to the investment firm where to execute the order,
this broad definition gives investment firms the possibility to decide themselves
where to route the order to. However, investment firms have to »[. . . ] monitor the
effectiveness of their order execution arrangements and execution policy in order to iden-
tify and, where appropriate, correct any deficiencies. In particular, they shall assess, on a
regular basis, whether the execution venues included in the order execution policy provide
4There are four waivers of MiFID pre-trade transparency: Reference price waiver, negotiated trade waiver,
order management facility waiver, and large-in-scale trade waiver. For details about the individual waivers,
see (European Commission Regulation, 2006, Article (18) and (20)).
5Generally, dark pools are part of MTFs and follow a price taker model, i.e., within these trading venues
large block trades are closed at prices fixed in other trading venues, typically traditional regulated
markets. But also regulated markets started to create dark pools to attract additional trading volume.
The LSE opened their dark pool unit “Baikal Global Limited” in 2008.
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for the best possible result for the client or whether they need to make changes to their ex-
ecution arrangements.« (European Commission Directive, 2004, Article 21(4)). Ad-
ditionally, they are required to prove on request that they executed client orders
in accordance with this order execution policy (European Commission Directive,
2004, Article 21(5)). Yet, this definition leaves investment firms with the freedom
to decide on the number of trading venues they include into their best execution
policy and it does not compel investment firms to observe prices at all European
trading venues at any possible cost (Gomber and Gsell, 2006). Hence, it is still
difficult for investors to properly assess the quality of order execution.
MiFID’s aftermath. Since its implementation in November 2007, MiFID has been the
cornerstone of Europe’s capital markets regulation. Three years after it became appli-
cable the European Commission released a public consultation paper to collect various
opinions about MiFID induced changes in European financial markets, as well as ideas
for potential improvement of the regulatory framework. The consultation paper ad-
dressed all different groups which are affected by MiFID, including professional mar-
ket participants, investors, national governments, national competent authorities, and
academics (European Commission, 2010). The European Commission states that, de-
spite great challenges and negative influences of the financial crisis, MiFID has success-
fully contributed to increased competition between trading venues and the fostering
of innovation within the financial services industry (European Commission, 2010, pp.
5-7). Additionally, transparency requirements and hence investor protection have been
significantly improved. Due to greater competition among trading venues, there is evi-
dence that implicit and explicit trading costs have been reduced and trading speed has
been accelerated. Investors have now the possibility to benefit from a more integrated
European market for financial services because investment firms and trading venues
offer their services on a pan-European level (European Commission, 2010, pp. 5-7).
However, not all benefits have reached investors as envisaged since its inception. In
an environment where technological progress and macroeconomic events are rapidely
changing the level playing field, the regulatory framework needs continuous improve-
19
Chapter 2 Foundations
ment. To incorporate the lessons-learned from the global financial crisis, new evolving
flash-crashes, the extensive use of dark liquidity, the explosively increasing volume of
derivatives, and to address further shortcomings of the original directive, the EC started
a consultation process which will lead to a second updated version of MiFID – MiFID
II – which probably will come into effect in 2015. MiFID II aims to:6
• harmonize existing regulatory differences between trading platforms and over-
the-counter trading,
• provide an improved regulatory framework for best execution also with regard
to other financial instruments, not only stocks,
• and tackle difficulties which emerged through technological developments in
trading, i.e., algorithmic and high-frequency trading.
My thesis aims to contribute to this ongoing debate of MiFID II by providing empirical
evidence on market quality and market coordination on regulated markets and MTFs.
I concentrate on abnormal market conditions which may influence the order routing
behavior of market participants and particularly the engagement of HFT market par-
ticipants.
6For a detailed overview of current MiFID II developments, please refer to Ferrarini and Moloney (2012).
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2.2 U.K. Equity Trading Landscape
The UK equity market and particularly London have a long lasting tradition as a global
financial center and thus they have always been exposed to developments and changes
regarding financial markets, no matter whether they were of regulatory or technolog-
ical nature. Therefore, the UK equity market with its internationally well-known blue
chip stock index FTSE 100 is well suited for my analysis. With 29.1% in 2009, the UK eq-
uity market exhibited the highest share of equity trading volume within Europe.7 Even
more important is that fact that the FTSE 100 is the most fragmented index within Eu-
rope, i.e., trading of its constituents is most scattered across multiple platforms within
Europe compared to other indices.8 The FTSE 100 is an index which stems from a for-
mer joint venture between the Financial Times and the LSE. It is an arithmetic value-
weighted index that lists the largest 100 companies from the UK according to market
capitalization. The index started on January 3, 1984 at the base level of 1000 and reached
its highest value (6950.60) to date on December 30, 1999. It is now maintained by the
FTSE Group, a subsidiary of the London Stock Exchange Group.9
Before I outline particular developments of the UK equity market, it is necessary to
address basic trading structures, i.e., the difference between the two major market mi-
crostructures: Dealer markets vs. Order-driven markets.
I. Dealer markets vs. Order-driven markets
Dealer Markets. Dealer markets or also called quote-driven markets were the pre-
dominant microstructure of exchange architecture around the world until the mid
1990s. Trading in dealer markets is typically organized by a market maker.10 He is
7Compare Equity Market Report 2009 of the Federation of European Exchanges (FESE), http://www.
fese.eu/.
8For detailed statistics on European equity market fragmentation, see http://fragmentation.
fidessa.com/.
9For further details about the index, see http://www.ftse.com/.
10Depending on the trading venue, there are quite some synonyms, e.g., dealer, designated sponsor, spe-
cialist, quality liquidity provider. However, they all do the same job. In my thesis I stick with the term
market maker.
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contractually obliged with the stock exchange to quote bid and ask prices up to a cer-
tain volume of the universe of stocks which he is registered for. Other market partici-
pants are able to buy and sell stocks during the trading day only from him. If a market
participant would like to acquire a stock which is currently not in the market maker’s
inventory, the market maker has the contractual obligation to short sell the stock. For
continuously providing liquidity to the market and as a compensation for their inven-
tory risk, market makers earn the difference between quoted bid and ask prices in case
of a transaction. Usually, there is a contractual cap for this commission. If a stock ex-
change allows several market makers to compete for order flow with one another, the
competition is mainly based on bid-ask spreads which are then being reduced through
competitive forces.11
Order-driven Markets. With the introduction of fully electronic trading systems at
most major exchanges until the mid 1990s, the advantages of an order-driven market
architecture appeared.12 Today, almost all major exchanges operate their main trading
system as a centralized order-driven order book. However, there are many exchanges
that combine market maker and order-driven trading and grant market makers addi-
tional access to their exchange. Market makers are often responsible for less liquid
stocks where a limit-order trading system might be disadvantageous. However, in the
presence of many market participants and large trading volumes a limit-order driven
market structure may offer several benefits. Here, market participants may act as quasi-
market makers and indirectly provide liquidity to the order book. By stating their de-
sire to buy or sell a certain quantity of a stock at a certain price through a limit order,
they fill the limit order book and provide liquidity. Yet, market participants using limit
orders have to be aware of the execution risk, since their limits may not be reached if the
market is moving in the other direction or too many other market participants placed
their limits in front of them.13 From the existing limit orders in the book, market partic-
11See Breuer and Burghof (2012) for a detailed literature overview of dealer markets and order-driven
markets.
12Jain (2005) provides a detailed overview of international exchanges and their switch to fully electronic
trading systems.
13Usually, order-driven markets have a strict price-time priority for incoming limit orders.
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ipants may also choose to buy or sell a stock directly at the best available price by using
a market order. The market order is executed immediately, however, it is associated
with a price risk depending on the depth of the limit order book where it is executed
against. Another benefit of an order-driven market structure is that market participants
may observe trading interests of others when looking at the order book and thus get a
better feeling of the market.14 Besides market and limit orders, an order-driven market
offers even more types of different orders which market participants may use. Some of
them will be outlined more detailed in Subsection III.
II. Major Developments at the LSE
SEAQ. Compared to other large international exchanges, the LSE abandoned its cen-
tury old tradition of face-to-face dealing with the introduction of electronic trading
quite early, along with the deregulatory changes of the Big Bang on October 27th, 1986.
The main goal of these long awaited UK equity market reforms, known as Big Bang,
was to increase competition among market makers and reduce overall execution costs
at the LSE. These far-reaching reforms transformed the UK stock market thoroughly
(Clemons and Weber, 1990). The whole reform process was mainly influenced by tech-
nological change, i.e., the introduction of an open, electronic screen-based quotation
system, called the Stock Exchange Automated Quotation system (SEAQ). With this
technological progress many of the regulatory relaxations became – at least to a far
extent – possible because it considerably eased market surveillance.
Associated with the Big Bang were four major reforms that had a strong influence on
the UK equity trading landscape. First, fixed minimum scale broker-dealer commis-
sions were eliminated. Second, an electronic screen-based quotation system was intro-
duced. SEAQ was based on the US exchange system NASDAQ, where market makers
could electronically quote their prices (bid and ask) and compete in the system with one
another. Market maker’s quotes always had to hold for a minimum quantity of stocks
for which they were registered. If the quantity that a market maker quotes prices for
14Granting order book information usually becomes a business case for trading venues, where market
participants pay to receive this superior information.
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exceeds the minimum quotation quantity, he was obliged to execute incoming orders
up to the quoted amount of stocks. While quotes and competition between market
makers were displayed automatically on SEAQ, order execution was still conducted
via phone and trades were then reported on SEAQ. Third, dual capacity operations
were introduced. Before Big Bang, investment firms could either participate in trading
as a broker to manage buys and sells for their clients or as a market maker. On SEAQ,
acting in both functions for a single investment firm became legal and most investment
firms henceforth operated in the dual-capacity. The fourth major reform was to increase
competition by opening the exchange for new member firms that could participate in
trading (Clemons and Weber, 1990, pp. 44-45).
SETS. In October 1997, the LSE conducted another major market reform and intro-
duced the Stock Exchange Trading System (SETS), which is an order-driven trading
system. Initially, SETS was only introduced for its most liquid FTSE 100 constituents,
however later, also FTSE 250 constituents were shifted to SETS. The previous dealer-
based SEAQ was allowed to continue in parallel. SETS was from now on the official
trading system and market makers were now longer obliged to provide bid and ask
quotes on the new trading system. Yet, market makers were still allowed to voluntarily
provide quotes over the telephone and execute trades off-exchange, i.e., off the SETS or-
der book. The main reason for this technological market development was competitive
pressure from all different sides. For instance, other international exchanges tried to
gain market share in European equities traded on the LSE. Also alternative electronic
trading networks became a serious competition after UK regulation allowed market
makers to provide their quotes on such networks. Here, quotes were often better then
on the LSE.15 Also the ISD, as outlined in section 2.1, created additional competitive
pressure as it allowed other European automated order matching systems to compete
with national exchanges without permission of regulatory authorities in the respective
country (ISD, Article 15.4, Council Directive 93/22/EEC).
15See Naik and Yadav (1999) for an overview of the effects of the SETS market reform.
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TradeElect and further steps. In June 2007, the LSE launched its new electronic trad-
ing system TradElect. Instead of adapting its existing technology, the LSE replaced its
technology completely in order to improve trading speed and market efficiency. This
large investment was mainly driven by the latest developments of high-frequency mar-
ket participants which account for a continuously increasing share in international eq-
uity trading. «[. . . ] The introduction of TradElect, the culmination of a four year investment
in next generation technology, will deliver a step change in trading capabilities to the London
market. As high-frequency algorithmic traders look globally for pools of liquidity in which to
find alpha opportunities, TradElect sets new benchmarks in terms of system capacity and per-
formance[. . . ]».16 TradElect enables market participants to execute trades in roughly ten
milliseconds, which is a commonly known benchmark for algorithmic trading.
To further improve its competitive position, the LSE took several strategic decisions.17
A large one was the merger with Borsa Italiana in October 2007. Another large strategic
decision was made on December 21, 2009, when the LSE and Turquoise merged parts
of their businesses and created a new MTF which offers its services under the name of
Turquoise. The dark pool unit of the LSE, known as Baikal Global Limited, was incor-
porated into Turquoise. The new venture is owned by LSEs’ and Turquoises’ sharehold-
ers, who are mainly global investment banking clients of the LSE.18 LSE’s ownership is
now 51% (Gresse, 2011). To cope with increased speed competition from MTFs, the LSE
bought MilleniumIT in September 2009. MillenniumIT provides the LSE with a high
performance trading technology that allows very low latency order execution.19
16See London Stock Exchange (2007), http://www.londonstockexchange.
com/about-the-exchange/media-relations/press-releases/2007/
londonstockexchangesnewtradingsystemgoeslive.htm.
17See also table 2.2 for an overview of important events at the LSE.
18See London Stock Exchange (2009b), http://www.londonstockexchange.
com/about-the-exchange/media-relations/press-releases/2009/
londonstockexchangeandglobalinvestmentbankstopartnerinpaneuropeantradingventure.
htm.
19See the next subsection for further details about MilleniumIT.
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III. Competition between the LSE and MTFs
MTF Development. The increasing market fragmentation is not only a consequence
of regulatory changes induced by MiFID. Especially technological progress and the
emergence of HFT considerably lead to the rise of MTFs. These alternative trading
venues seem to provide better solutions to speed sensitive market participants com-
pared to traditional exchanges. MTFs invested from scratch into newest and fasted
trading technology to offer a surrounding which attracts HFT order flow, e.g. a high
throughput rate combined with innovative customized fee models and order types. A
high throughput rate, i.e., the average message number that is processed by a system
in a given time, is particularly important for algorithmic trading strategies which are
based on fast order submissions and cancellations.
Besides the early technological orientation of MTFs, they also benefit from cost ad-
vantages compared to regulated markets. These cost advantages mainly results from
regulatory differences to traditional exchanges. MTFs have, for instance, lower market
surveillance requirements compared to traditional exchanges. Also the absence of a
listing department – with all strings attached to it – reduces MTFs’ expenses.
Another important influence to the increasing growth of MTFs is associated to their
ownership structure from which MTFs may receive a significant share of routed or-
ders. Apparently, major investment banks see a lot of potential in creating competition
with traditional exchanges. During 2009, Chi-X, the largest European MTF, was owned
by a consortium of large investment banks, including BNP Paribas, Citadel, Citigroup,
Credit Suisse, Fortis, GETCO Europe Ltd, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stan-
ley, Nomura Holding, Optiver, Societe Generale, and UBS. Obviously, instead of sup-
porting their competitors, these institutes benefit from routing their orders to a trading
venue where they hold shares of. Some of the same players also set up Turquoise in
2007 to compete head-to-head with domestic stock exchanges in Europe, in particular
the LSE (e.g., Citi Group, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch,
Morgan Stanley, and UBS). BATS Europe is owned by BATS Global Markets, an invest-
ment firm based in Kansas City, Missouri, USA. Also the ownership structure of the
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Date Description
October 1986 Big Bang, deregulatory changes & introducation of SEAQ at
the LSE
October 1997 Introduction of SETS at the LSE
March 2007 Chi-X begins trading in 5 Dutch stocks and 5 German stocks
April 2007 Chi-X extents trading to all DAX 30 and AEX 25 con-
stituents
June 2007 Chi-X begins trading in 11 FTSE 100 stocks & introduction
of TradElect at the LSE
June 2007 Chi-X begins trading in all FTSE 100 stocks
October 2007 Chi-X extends trading to all CAC 40 stocks
October 2007 LSE acquires Borsa Italiana
August 2008 Pan-European trading platform Turquoise launched
October 2008 Launch of BATS Europe which trading LSE, Euronext and
Deutsche Boerse stocks
September 2009 LSE acquires MilleniumIT
December 2009 LSE’s darkpool Baikal merges with Turquoise
February 2011 BATS Global Markets acquires Chi-X Europe
TABLE 2.2: Important events at the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise.
American mother-company reveals numerous large investment banks such Citi Group,
Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, and, Merrill Lynch.
Table 2.2 outlines the most important steps of the UK trading landscape with regard to
the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. After having discussed the major developments
of the LSE in the previous section, I now address its three major MTF competitors.
Chi-X was the first MTF that traded European equities. It started in March 2007 with
a small set of German and Dutch stocks, but soon offered trading in the full set of
DAX 30 and AEX 25 constituents right after the trial period. In August 2007, Chi-X also
traded all FTSE 100 constituents and soon after that all CAC 40 stocks. BATS Europe
operated the BATS trading platform during this time and offered trading in all FTSE 100
constituents in October 2007, while Turquoise started trading these and other European
stocks already in August 2007.
Trading model and trading speed. The competition for order flow between tradi-
tional exchanges and MTFs is mainly based on trading costs and execution speed. In
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general, the LSE and the three MTFs exhibit the same trading model. They are orga-
nized as fully electronic limit order books. During my observation period, continuous
trading opens at 8:00 and closes at 16:30 GMT on all platforms.
On the LSE, FTSE 100 constituents are traded on the Stock Exchange Trading System
(SETS) but as mentioned in the previous section dealers may still provide liquidity
off book. Unlike MTFs, trading at the LSE starts with a 10-minute opening auction
and ends with a 10-minute closing auction prior and post continuous trading hours.
Besides regular market and limit orders which represent visible liquidity, all trading
venues offer further order types that are related to hidden liquidity. For example, mar-
ket participants may submit iceberg orders or fully hidden limit orders. Iceberg orders
are a type of limit order that display only a small peak of their actual volume. Thus,
market participants do not have to reveal directly, whether they want to buy or sell a
large position. The same accounts for fully hidden limit orders. They are not visible at
all to any market participant. However, fully hidden limit orders have to meet the large-
in-scale considerations of MiFID in order to be waived from pre-trade transparency as
mentioned in Section 2.1.20 On all four trading platforms, orders are executed accord-
ing to a strict price-visibility-time priority. Thus, visible orders which are submitted
to the order book with the same price as an iceberg or hidden order will be executed
with priority. The LSE was the last trading venue that introduced fully hidden liquidity
towards the end of 2009 (London Stock Exchange, 2009a).21
While MTFs have created their trading model to suit speed-sensitive investors, tradi-
tional exchanges had to adjust for this new traders clientele (see LSE’s investments in
Table 2.2). HFT has flourished over the past years and with them the need for faster
trading technologies.22 Several scholars argue that low latency leads to increased liq-
uidity and thus to better chances for order placement at the right time (Riordan and
20In order to determine whether an order is large in scale compared to a normal order, the ESMA reviews
orders on a yearly basis and sets the standard for normal orders, see also http://mifiddatabase.
esma.europa.eu.
21The LSE introduced hidden liquidity not before the end of 2009. Therefore, I exclude all inside-the-
spread (hidden liquidity) executions of the LSE prior to December 2009 from my empirical analysis.
Apparently, these executions are data errors.
22To date, the trading volume of algorithmic and high frequency traders in most European blue chip
indices reaches between 40% to 60%, see http://hft.thomsonreuters.com/.
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Storkenmaier (2011)).23 Unlike to their human counterparts, algorithmic and high fre-
quency traders place, cancel, or execute a multitude of orders within milliseconds.
Even if MTFs concentrated from the very beginning on fast trading technology, this
does not exclude them from continuously updating their trading systems. Thus, dur-
ing 2009 all four trading venues were heavily investing in new technology with re-
gard to their trading infrastructure. While all MTFs offered round-trip latencies at the
end of 2008 in a range under 2 milliseconds, the technological race towards the sub-
millisecond area was pushed forward quickly during 2009.
Turquoise was the first platform to announce a series of upgrades to improve response
times and capacity on its platform. They claimed that upgrades will improve its maxi-
mum achievable throughput by 150% and reduce end-to-end response time latency to
below one millisecond.24 At the second anniversary of Chi-X on March 30, 2009, Chi-
X stated that their co-location latency is of 400 microseconds and internal latency of
350 microseconds.25 In June 2009, BATS Europe also claimed that «[. . . ] with an aver-
age round trip response of 380 microseconds, BATS Europe already delivers some of the fastest,
sustained response times in the industry with world-class, sustained low latency[. . . ]».26
With latencies of nearly 4.6 milliseconds at the end of 2008, the LSE had to react on
these heavy technology investments of its competitors. For this reason, the LSE bought
MilleniumIT in September 2009. MillenniumIT’s high performance technology pro-
vides the LSE with a highly scalable and very low latency in-house developed trading
system with quicker product speed to market.27 In comparison to the 2009 latencies,
LSE and Turquoise today offer latencies over their MilleniumIT co-location service plat-
form with an average 99 percentile latency round trip time of 125 microseconds for the
23For a discussion of the need for higher trading speed, see http://www.ftmandate.com/news/
fullstory.php/aid/2335/The_need_for_speed.html.
24See http://www.thetradenews.com/news/Asset_Classes/Equities/Turquoise_
upgrade_to_deliver_sub-millisecond_latency.aspx
25See http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20090330005118/en/
Chi-X-Europe-Celebrates-Anniversary
26Quote of BATS Chief Operating Officer Paul O’Donnell, BATS press release from June 2009. http://
cdn.batstrading.com/resources/press_releases/FixnetixBATSHosting_FINAL.pdf
27See, LSE press release 36/09 http://www.londonstockexchange.
com/about-the-exchange/media-relations/press-releases/2009/
london-stock-exchange-group-to-acquire-millenniumit-for-us30m-18m.htm
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London Stock Exchange Market and 100 microseconds for the Turquoise Cash Equity
market.28
Innovative fee models. Due to the increased frequency of order submission, cancel-
lation and execution, transaction costs may increase particularly for HFT. Therefore,
innovative fee models may attract these kind of traders which bring a large portion of
today’s trading volume. MTFs were among the first trading venues which focused on
HFT needs in their fee models. Hence, the price differences in trading fees between the
LSE and MTFs may also add to the shift away from the regulated market. During my
observation period the fee structure of all trading venues is subject to frequent changes,
except for Turquoise. Table 2.3 gives and overview of the fee schedules during 2009 on
the different platforms.
However, the innovation does not merely come with reduced fees compared to the
traditional exchange, but also with a new tariff system called “maker-taker”. At the be-
ginning of 2009, all platforms had installed a maker-taker tariff system.29 Maker-taker
tariff systems charge investors for aggressive (taker/market orders) orders that con-
sume liquidity from the order book, i.e., these orders are executed against outstanding
limit orders in the order book. For executed passive (maker/limit) orders that provide
liquidity to the order book, investors receive a rebate.
At the beginning of 2009, the LSE charged an investor between 0.45 bps and 0.75 bps
of the order volume for aggressive orders. Passive orders received a rebate of up to
0.40 bps. On September 1, 2009, the LSE lowered transaction fees and switched back
to a traditional fee scheme charging both aggressive and passive orders between 0.20
bps and 0.45 bps depending on the monthly trading volume of an investor.30 Chi-X and
28See LSE website, http://www.londonstockexchange.com/products-and-services/
connectivity/hosting/hosting.htm.
29The LSE quickly adopted the maker-taker tariff system to its fee model due to the competi-
tive pressure. Yet, it decided to switch back to the old-fashioned tariff system on Septem-
ber 1, 2009. See http://www.thetradenews.com/magazine/The_TRADE_Magazine/2007/
September/Both_sides_of_the_trade.aspx for a discussion about the competitive pressure of
maker-taker tariff systems.
30LSE chief Xavier Rolet said: “Maker-taker pricing relies on the concept that posting a passive order is a superior,
more valued kind of liquidity. We believe that passive and aggressive orders are equally valuable. We do not want
to favor one type of client over another.”, see http://www.finextra.com/news/fullstory.aspx?
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Trading Venue Market Order Rebate Date Add. Info
LSE 0.45 - 0.75 up to 0.40 Until
08/2009
Rebate depend-
ing on volume
LSE 0.20 - 0.45 no more rebates From
09/2009
Fee depending
on volume
Chi-X 0.30 0.20 Entire 2009 Regular fee
schedule
Chi-X 0.30 0.30 10/2009 Trade promotion,
rebate depending
on volume
BATS 0.30 0.20 From 01-
08/2009
Regular fee
schedule
BATS 0.20 0.40 09/2009 Trade promotion,
rebate depending
on volume
BATS 0.25 0.30 Starting
10/2009
Aggressive order
fee reduction
Turquoise 0.28 0.20 - 0.24 Entire 2009 Rebate depend-
ing on volume
TABLE 2.3: Fee models of the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise in 2009. All numbers are
refered to as basis points. The rebates are given for passive, liquidity providing orders and have
to be subtracted from market order fees.
BATS charged investors 0.30 bps for an aggressive and rebate an executed passive order
with 0.20 bps during 2009. However, both platforms offered special inverted pricing
promotions for investors during the year. Chi-X offered customers under certain vol-
ume conditions a free trade environment by offering a rebate of 0.30 bps on aggressive
orders in October 2009. BATS even subsidized trades by offering customers a 0.40 bps
rebate for executed passive orders while charging aggressive orders with only 0.20 bps
during September 2009. From October 2009, BATS lowered its constant tariff schedule
to 0.25 bps for aggressive orders while keeping the rebate for passive. On Turquoise,
investors pay 0.28 bps for an aggressive order and receive a rebate between 0.20 bps
and 0.24 bps for executed passive orders depending on the traded volume.31
newsitemid=21315.
31See, http://www.londonstockexchange.com/about-the-exchange/media-relations/
press-releases/2009/london-stock-exchange-introduces-new-orderbook-trading.
htm, http://www.thetradenews.com/asset-classes/equities/3673, http:
//www.chi-xeurope.com/trading-notices-pdfs/trading-notice-0183.pdf,
http://www.tradeturquoise.com/market_notices/tariff_Schedule.pdf.
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Increased HFT activity on MTFs (Menkveld, 2011b) may particularly be due to these re-
duced fee structures and innovative fee models that MTFs offer. HFT often uses passive,
liquidity providing orders to manage their inventory control (Kirilenko et al., 2011).
Low maker-taker fees consequently add to further increasing HFT trading profits.
Influence on market shares. The competitive factors outlined above, have strongly
influenced the distribution of trading volume in such a fragmented trading landscape.
Figure 2.1 displays the monthly share of electronic order book trading turnover of the
LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise from 2008 to 2012. The figure marks a continuous loss
in turnover of the LSE, formerly Europe’s largest trading venue also compared to other
national exchanges.32 Unfortunately, the Federation of European Securities Exchanges
(FESE) does not provide statistics for BATS and Turquoise before October 2008 and
January 2009, respectively. According to FESE, Chi-X captured the position as Europe’s
largest trading venue for the first time in August 2011. Almost in parallel, BATS Global
Markets, the owner of BATS Europe decided to acquire Chi-X Europe and the merger
was completed at the end of November 2011.33 Therefore, data in figure 2.1 on BATS
expires after 2011 and the turnover volume of the joint entity BATS Chi-X Europe is
listed as Chi-X after January 2012.
32See http://www.fese.be/en/.
33See BATS Chi-X Europe (2011).
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In order to get a detailed picture of my 2009 observation period, I calculate weekly
market shares of the four trading venues from the consolidated order book data that
I use throughout my thesis.34 During my observation period, the LSE, Chi-X, BATS,
and Turquoise account for roughly 99% of non-OTC trading volume in FTSE 100 con-
stituents.35 Figure 2.2 depicts the development of weekly market shares in FTSE 100
constituents traded on the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise between January 2 and
December 30, 2009. This figure is based on my data sample that consists of 69 FTSE 100
stocks.36
It shows a clear shift in market shares away from the LSE towards the three MTFs.
While LSE’s market share dropped from 74.8% in January 2009 to 57.6% at the end of
2009, Chi-X and BATS increased their share in trading volume. Chi-X, the largest Euro-
pean MTF during 2009, almost doubled its market share in FTSE 100 constituents from
14.7% to 27.3% over 2009. BATS’s market share more than quadrupled from 2.1% to
9.3%. Turquoise is the only trading venue which lost market shares during my obser-
vation period. Its share in trading volume decreased from 8.5% to 5.7% over the year.
34See Chapter 4 for further explanations.
35See http://fragmentation.fidessa.com for further details.
36See 4.1 for details of my sample selection.
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Related Work
“The last two decades have seen a tremendous growth in the academic literature now known
as market microstructure, the area of finance that is concerned with the process by which in-
vestors’ latent demands are ultimately translated into transactions. Interest in microstructure
and trading is not new but the recent literature is distinguished by theoretical rigor and exten-
sive empirical validation using new databases.”
Madhavan (2000)
Chapter Overview. This chapter contains theoretical and empirical work which is closely
related to my research questions. I focus mainly on three categories of research papers
which are all connected to market microstructure literature. The first category is ad-
dressed in Section 3.1 and deals with theoretical and empirical studies related to inter-
market competition. The second category, Section 3.2, covers intraday trading patterns
on different trading venues. The third and last category, Section 3.3, focuses on the in-
fluence of technological changes as well as new market participants and their influence
on the trading landscape.
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3.1 Intermarket Competition
THE relationship between fragmentation and market quality is ambiguous froma theoretical as well as from an empirical perspective. Intuitively, fragmentation
should have a detrimental effect on market quality through scattering order flow and
liquidity across various trading venues as this decreases the probability of matching
buy and sell orders. Yet, there are different aspects to be considered, as for instance the
effects of increased competition, which might mitigate negative effects stemming from
fragmentation. The following section gives an overview of both, theoretical and empir-
ical literature which address the manifold relationship between market fragmentation,
competition, and market quality.
I. Theoretical Literature
Particularly theoretical literature in market microstructure point to the problems which
are connected to a fragmented market environment. Mendelson (1987) theoretically
addresses the impact of fragmentation on market quality. He argues that compared
to a single market, multiple trading venues induce higher search and communication
costs for investors (Mendelson, 1987, p. 190). He models the influence of fragmentation
on market quality by using competitive and consolidated trading venues. His results
indicate that fragmented trading venues significantly reduce expected trading volume,
increase price variance, and lower expected trading profits for investors.
Literature also refers to positive effects of network externalities on liquidity, which
point to a centralization of trading. For example, Pagano (1989b) analyzes a two market
scenario with equal trading costs at both markets. He argues that when new traders
enter the market, they take into account the entry decision of others which will thus
shift trading to one market. This trading bias will lead to an increase in liquidity
on this particular market and thus trigger more trading to shift there. Additionally,
he states that fragmentation is welfare reducing. Contrarily, concentrated trading is
Pareto-improving given the assumption that search costs are zero.
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Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) study a multi-market scenario with a few large-scale in-
formed investors and many noise traders. They show that in equilibrium, noise traders
tend to choose the most liquid market and route their order towards it in order to ben-
efit from lower implicit trading costs. This will reversely attract more informed traders
who place their orders where many uninformed traders act so that they can hide their
superior information. As a consequence, liquidity increases on this trading venue.
Following the arguments of both, Pagano (1989b) and Chowdhry and Nanda (1991),
trading should best be centralized. Yet, despite higher search costs and positive net-
work externalities new trading venues keep appearing which calls for other theoretical
models that address this fact. Madhavan (1995) shows in his model that fragmenta-
tion is related to trade disclosure. Under the assumption that markets are not closely
connected and trade disclosure is not an obligation, market participants may actually
benefit from fragmentation. In his scenario, traders enjoy the advantage of hiding large
trades better than within a concentrated trading environment and market makers ben-
efit from reduced price competition. Yet, he also states that «[. . . ] fragmentation increases
price volatility and induces other distortions as well[. . . ]»(Madhavan, 1995, p. 581).
In summary, theoretical results are mixed and point to both, reasons why trading
should concentrate to increased market quality (e.g., search costs and network external-
ities) but also reasons why order flow may spread across trading venues (e.g., hiding
large positions and superior information).
II. Empirical Literature
From an empirical perspective, market fragmentation and competition are closely con-
nected and may have as well ambiguous effects on market quality. New trading venues
may force old trading venues to innovate in various ways. Increasing price pressure to
gain market share is just one factor. Yet, new trading venues often enter the market with
superior technology or better services compared to their long established competitors.
This increases the need to innovate for traditional trading venues in order not to lose
further market shares.
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Academic Article Markets Fragmentation
US Studies
Demsetz (1968) NYSE & Third Market +
Tinic (1972) NYSE & Third Market +
Hamilton (1979) NYSE & Third Market ~/+
Hasbrouck (1995) NYSE & Third Market ~
Easley et al. (1997) NYSE & CSE -
Battalio et al. (1997) NYSE & Third Market +
Boehmer & Boehmer (2003) NYSE & Several +
Bennett & Wei (2006) NYSE & NASDAQ -
O’Hara & Ye (2011) NYSE & Third Market +
EU Studies
Foucault & Menkveld (2008) AEX & LSE ~/+
Hengelbrock & Theissen (2009) Third Markets & Turquoise ~/+
Degreyse et al. (2011) Third Markets ~/+
Riordan et al. (2011) LSE & Third Markets +
Kohler & von Wyss (2012) AEX & LSE +
TABLE 3.1: Overview of related literature: Intermarket competition
Market microstructure literature offers a rich selection of studies which address these
ambiguous effects of fragmentation and competition on market quality. The following
section summarizes several empirical findings and concentrates hereby on the US and
Europe. Table 3.1 provides an overview of the studies which are presented below and
indicates whether the studies find positive, negative, or ambiguous effects of market
fragmentation on market quality.
US market studies. Early empirical studies that address competition between different
markets, find mixed results with a positive bias, speaking in favor of fragmentation.
Demsetz (1968), Tinic (1972), and Hamilton (1979) are among the first studies to deal
with fragmentation. They all concentrate on competition between the NYSE and US
regional exchanges. They use various stock samples, which are traded on the NYSE
and various third markets to address the effects, benefits, and costs of competition in
fragmented markets. A major result of these studies is that competition for order flow
leads to increased liquidity, which can be measured by decreasing quoted spreads. Yet,
Hamilton (1979) also mentions negative effects which may stem from fragmentation.
He finds that fragmented trading reduces trading efficiency at the reference market
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(NYSE) which is negative for the overall market. However the competition effect which
leads to a general larger market liquidity overrules the efficiency loss at NYSE.
In a more recent study, Bennett and Wei (2006) highlight further negative effects of
market fragmentation on quoted spreads and liquidity. Bennett and Wei (2006) concen-
trate on the effect that is associated from a listing switch from NASDAQ to NYSE. The
authors argue that NASDAQ traded stocks face a higher degree of order flow fragmen-
tation since they are traded by a large number of other trading venues. They find that
after switching the listing to NYSE, a stock’s order flow becomes more consolidated
and therefore experiences higher market quality measures as well as increased price
efficiency. In particular, the authors choose 39 US companies that voluntarily switch
their listings from NASDAQ to NYSE from 2002 to 2003. After switching to NYSE, the
authors find particular improvement in various liquidity measures and also a reduction
of short-term volatility. Their sample shows that particularly small cap stocks benefit
from a switch from NASDAQ to NYSE over proportionally.
Other scholars not only concentrate on the effects of implicit trading costs and liquidity
in fragmented markets. Hasbrouck (1995) addresses another interesting detail with re-
gard to intermarket competition. In a set of securities which are tradeable on multiple
markets, he develops an econometric approach to determine which market leads in the
price discovery process. He aims to find which market incorporates new, price affecting
information first. His sample covers the 30 stocks of the Dow Jones Industrial Average
from August until October 1993. These stocks are traded on the NYSE but also on other
US regional exchanges. He argues that a stock which is traded on several markets in-
corporates an implicit efficient price which is common to all markets. The sources of
variation in this efficient price are connected to the different markets. Thus, his devel-
oped measure called – “information share” – is defined as «...the proportion of the efficient
price innovation variance that can be attributed to a particular market». Put differently, he
measures the influence of a market on the variance in the random walk process the
stock price.1 His findings point to a larger information contribution of the NYSE with
1I apply this method in my empirical research part in Chapter 6. I discuss the details of this measure in
the methodology part in Section 4.2.3.
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a median information share of 92.7% compared to the other markets (Hasbrouck, 1995,
p. 1197). The findings of Hasbrouck (1995) underline the importance of the traditional
reference market which is also pointed out by Easley et al. (1996).
Easley et al. (1996) focus on the information content in fragmented markets. They argue
that competition may reduce the monopoly power of traditional exchanges and conse-
quently result in overall better execution and prices for traders. Yet, the authors argue
that liquidity is crucial for a market’s price discovery. Scattering liquidity across vari-
ous markets may restrict the ability of prices to aggregate information accordingly and
thus reduce overall market efficiency. They state that such a scenario may even worsen
if markets focus on competition of particular components of order flow. The authors
analyze a stock sample traded at the NYSE and the Cincinnati Stock Exchange (CSE)
during 1990. In these stocks, CSE dealers had retail order purchase agreements with
a NYSE broker firm, i.e., CSE dealers bought uninformed retail order flow from NYSE
brokers, which has been a common practice in the US since the late 1980ies (Easley et al.,
1996, p.812). The authors claim that this practice is used to ’cream-skim’ uninformed liq-
uidity from the NYSE. This increases adverse selection risk at the NYSE because their
amount of information based trades increases relatively. To cope with increased po-
tential risk of being adversely selected by informed traders, NYSE specialists will most
likely widen their spreads. This, however, will trigger decreasing welfare effects for
the market in general, since the NYSE represents the reference market for all other ex-
changes.
However, there are also several recent studies which address mainly positive effects of
market fragmentation to overall market quality, or they contradict the results of older
studies which show negative effects of market fragmentation:
Battalio et al. (1997) as well as Boehmer and Boehmer (2003) concentrate on the effects
of fragmentation on market quality when a new competitor enters the market. Battalio
et al. (1997) provide evidence that increased competition in NYSE listed stocks leads
towards smaller quoted and effective spreads. They use an event study approach to
analyze the effects of fragmentation on stocks that are additionally traded by a new
market maker firm (Bernhard L. Madoff Investment Securities) on NYSE that competes
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with existing market maker firms. Boehmer and Boehmer (2003) study the impact of
new NYSE trading activity in 30 ETFs which are listed and traded on the American
Stock Exchange (AMEX) as well as several other trading venues. After just a month,
NYSE captured more than 10.0% of overall trading volume, mainly drawn from AMEX.
The authors find a strong decrease in quoted and effective spreads on all exchanges
which trade the 30 ETFs. They also find no indication that increased competition affects
price discovery negatively in terms of adverse selection.
In a more recent study, O’Hara and Ye (2011) contradict the results of Bennett and Wei
(2006) who find that stocks benefit from a less fragmented trading environment if they
are listed at the NYSE. O’Hara and Ye (2011) argue that the results of Bennett and Wei
(2006) mainly stem from sample selection biases, as their sample consists mainly of
large cap stocks. Instead, the effects shown by Bennett and Wei (2006) may rather be
explained by different trading rules or corporate governance requirements between the
two exchanges (O’Hara and Ye, 2011, p. 469). Compared to the 39 voluntary switches
from NASDAQ to NYSE, O’Hara and Ye (2011) analyze the effects of market fragmen-
tation on 262 NASDAQ and NYSE listed stocks from January until June 2008. Their
overall result is that fragmentation does not harm market quality. They argue that mar-
ket fragmentation is pushing order flow competition particularly in less liquid stocks
which thus benefit from increasing fragmentation. Despite arguments which are in fa-
vor of a trading consolidation, e.g. network externalities, the authors claim that positive
effects of fragmentation on market quality prevail. As a main reason for this conclusion
they state that the US market – even being spatially apart – is virtually connected via
smart order routing technologies, a consolidated tape that aggregates quote and trade
information from various platforms, and trade-through protection rules.2
2In a fragmented market environment, it may happen that dealers execute an order at a price worse than
the best available quoted price in the consolidated market. Order executions which disregard price
priority are so called trade-throughs. Ideally, dealers should avoid trade-through violations because they
hinder market participant’s liquidity provision via limit orders. Yet, for various agency based reasons,
trade-through executions may economically be logical. Firstly, with regard to a dealer’s monitoring
costs and secondly, with regard to a dealer’s additional time that he may require for splitting an order
over several markets. In the US, Regulation NMS creates a consolidated tape of national best bid and
ask and to the same time prohibits trade-throughs for all exchange-listed stocks. In Europe a trade-
through prohibition does not exist. MiFID aims to control trade-through problems through extensive
pre- and post trade transparency requirements, see 2.1.
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In summary, empirical research papers which address US markets find mainly posi-
tive evidence of the influence of fragmentation on market quality. Particularly, implicit
transaction costs and thus liquidity experience a positive effect with decreasing quoted
and effective spreads (Battalio et al., 1997; Boehmer and Boehmer, 2003; O’Hara and Ye,
2011). Yet, fragmentation may also have a downside, as the risk of adverse selection
may increase and thus reduce overall welfare (e.g., Easley et al., 1996).
European market studies. In Europe, the history of literature addressing market frag-
mentation is not as extensive as in the US. Yet, a growing number of research papers
addresses the influence of MiFID induced competition on market quality and price dis-
covery.
Foucault and Menkveld (2008) analyze market quality even before the introduction of
MiFID. They concentrate on the Dutch stock market before and after the entry of a
competing limit order trading system of the LSE, called EuroSETS, in 2004. Before LSE’s
market entry, Dutch stocks were mainly traded on Euronext.3 Their sample includes 22
out of 25 stocks from the AEX index. Their main findings show a deeper consolidated
order book after the LSE’s market entry, as well as smaller trading cost for liquidity
consuming market orders. The authors also demonstrate that competition between
the two platforms quickly increases as Euronext reacts on the entry of EuroSETS with
a fee reduction on limit orders. Additionally, Foucault and Menkveld (2008) address
the problem of trade-troughs in a fragmented European trading landscape and argue
that a trade-through protection for market participants seems important because trade-
throughs reduce the profits of liquidity providers. They also point to other problems of
market fragmentation as for instance the one-sided advantages of market participants
who are able to use smart order routing systems.
Hengelbrock and Theissen (2009) analyze the market entry of Turquoise in 14 different
countries in August and September 2008. Their results from a cross-sectional regres-
sion model point out that Turquoise captures particularly high market shares in stocks
that can be associated with the following characteristics: Large market capitalization,
relatively high free float in shares, previously high bid-ask spread in the home market
3Amsterdam Stock Exchange and Paris Bourse merged in 2001.
43
Chapter 3 Related Work
(representing less liquid stocks), and low volatility. With regard to an improvement of
overall market quality after the entry of Turquoise, they find mixed results. Depending
on the panel size of their regression model, they find that spreads in the home market
may decline while spreads at Turquoise stay higher. In general, Turquoise managed to
take away market share from the home market without offering higher liquidity which,
according to the authors, represents a disciplinary effect on the home market.
Degryse et al. (2011) study the effect of MiFID induced fragmentation on order book
depth for a sample of 52 large and mid cap Dutch stocks from 2006 to 2009. They
argue that liquidity has different dimensions, i.e., global and local, and that not all
market participants may have access to global liquidity. They define global liquidity
by creating a consolidated order book based on individual order books of six trading
venues that account for 99% of the visible order flow in these 52 stocks (i.e., Euronext,
Deutsche Boerse, SIX, NASDAQ OMX, Chi-X, and BATS). They argue that market par-
ticipants with SOR technology have access to this kind of liquidity. Yet, without SOR
technology, market participants are left with only local liquidity from their home mar-
ket (Euronext). They find that global liquidity increases across trading venues with the
level of market fragmentation. However, local liquidity on the regulated home market,
Euronext Amsterdam, decreases by nearly 10% relative to a completely consolidated
market. They conclude that investors who only have access to Euronext Amsterdam
may be worse off due to the change in market quality.
Riordan et al. (2011) compare market quality in FTSE 100 constituents on the LSE,
Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise during two periods of 29 days each in 2009 and 2010. Their
results indicate that increasing fragmentation prompts an improvement of market qual-
ity on each trading venue. During their 2010 observation period, Chi-X and Turquoise
are more liquid – measured by quoted and effective spreads – than the home market
LSE. Similar to Degryse et al. (2011), the authors state that market participants may
benefit from trading on multiple platforms. Additionally, they find a shift in price dis-
covery away from the LSE towards MTFs over time. During their 2010 observation pe-
riod, prices ’move first’ on Chi-X. Overall, they provide evidence that MTFs contribute
positively to market overall quality.
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Kohler and von Wyss (2012) address similar research questions as Riordan et al. (2011)
for a final sample of 29 stocks listed on the Swiss exchange, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise.
Yet, they focus on a long-term sample, covering 20 months from November 2008 until
June 2010. The results of their multivariate regression models reveal no sign of market
quality deterioration in the aftermath of MiFID. In particular, they find that fragmenta-
tion is more pronounced for large cap stocks, i.e., MTFs exhibit a higher market share
in trading large cap firms.
In summary, scholars who address the influence of regulatory changes on the Euro-
pean equity market find that market fragmentation increased significantly after the
introduction of MiFID. Particularly MTFs captured a large share of order flow from
traditional, regulated markets, especially in large cap stocks (Hengelbrock and Theis-
sen, 2009; Kohler and von Wyss, 2012). Most studies attribute positive effects to market
fragmentation as for instance an increase in overall liquidity or a shift in price discovery
towards MTFs (Degryse et al., 2011; Riordan et al., 2011). However, the lack of a con-
solidated tape as in the US, which transparently displays best European bid and ask
prices, makes the overall liquidity increase become one-sided to market participants
that can actually afford trading in multiple markets via SOR (Degryse et al., 2011).
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3.2 Intraday Patterns
This section provides an overview of the main theoretical and empirical literature ad-
dressing intraday trading patterns in different markets. In general, most of the research
papers which address intraday patterns have their focus on a single market.4 Com-
pared to most other studies, I particularly concentrate on intraday trading patterns in
a multi-market scenario. In Chapter 5, I empirically compare intraday trading patterns
on four different markets that actively compete for order flow. My idea is to find out
whether a single market dominates others during particular times of the trading day
and also whether increased market fragmentation changes existing intraday patterns
over time. To provide a better overview, I also include my intraday results in Figure
3.1, which summarizes intraday results of other scholars.
I. Theoretical Literature
Theory points out that trading activity may not only concentrate geographically on in-
dividual trading venues but also during particular times within a trading day. The
models of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Brock and Kleidon (1992) provide theoret-
ical explanations for the existence of intraday trading patterns on individual trading
platforms.
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) focus on reciprocal strategic decisions of informed
traders, discretionary liquidity (noise) traders, and non-discretionary liquidity (noise)
traders. A major invention of their model is to distinguish between liquidity traders
that place their orders time-discretionary and other liquidity traders who just randomly
place their orders. They argue that intraday patterns in volume and price volatility arise
due to liquidity traders who deliberately choose to trade at discrete points during the
trading day. According to the authors, a liquidity trader with discretion of his order
placement will prefer to trade when “the market is thick”, i.e., a lot of volume is in the
book so that his trading activity has less effects on prices (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988,
4Werner and Kleidon (1996) are among the few authors that also compare intraday trading patterns of
cross listed securities in the UK and the US.
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p. 5). Their model shows that these periods also attract informed traders who try to
conceal their superior information in periods of high trading activity. This leads to an
increase of traded volume and price volatility at certain periods. According to the au-
thors, opening and the closing of the market may represent such distinctive clustering
points, due to intensive information arrival as well as portfolio rebalancing reasons.
Yet, the clustering of distinct liquidity traders may also appear during other periods of
the trading day, depending on the thickness of the order book.
Brock and Kleidon (1992) have a different focus in their model. They extend Merton
(1971) who studies portfolio positions in a continuous market. They argue that market
participants exhibit an increased and less elastic desire to trade at market opening and
closing compared to other periods within the trading day. At market opening, portfo-
lios have to be adjusted due to the arrival of new overnight information. Shortly be-
fore market closing, investors need to optimize their positions for the overnight period
which again triggers increased trading activity. This trading behavior creates U-shaped
patterns in traded volume. The authors also argue that spreads and volume are posi-
tively correlated. They justify larger spreads at open and close of the market because
market makers may price discriminate market participants who need to rebalance their
holdings during these periods.
II. Empirical Literature
Empirical literature on intraday patterns of trading intensity and market quality find
varying results which do not necessarily follow theoretical predictions. Figure 3.1 sum-
marizes empirical findings on intraday patterns of trading intensity, quoted spreads,
and information based of trading at the NYSE, NASDAQ, and the LSE.
Trading intensity. Intraday trading intensity measures predominantly follow an U-
shape on the NYSE and NASDAQ. Several authors argue that there is a strong
correlation between trading volume and volatility (Jain and Joh, 1988; Foster and
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Viswanathan, 1993). The authors point out that market uncertainty measured by in-
creased return volatility is significantly higher at market opening and closing which
thus leads to the U-shaped intraday patterns. McInish and Wood (1992) find a sig-
nificant inverse relationship between quoted spreads and trading activity, i.e., trading
activity increases while quoted spreads decrease during the trading day. Chan et al.
(1995) concentrate on NASDAQ stocks. Despite structural differences between NYSE
and NASDAQ, they also find trading to be most active at market opening and closing.
Results of intraday trading activity on the LSE is mixed. While Werner and Kleidon
(1996) and Klussmann and Hautsch (2011) also find U-shape patterns, Abhyankar et al.
(1997) and Cai et al. (2004) report a two-humped pattern for intraday volume and also
no direct correlation between trading volume and volatility. Yet, the sample periods
of Abhyankar et al. (1997) and Cai et al. (2004) are particularly small which may lead
to biased results. The authors cover merely Q1 of 1991 and March to May of 2001,
respectively.
Quoted spreads (liquidity). Empirical evidence on intraday quoted spreads is homo-
geneous across markets with increasing liquidity over the trading day. For example,
McInish and Wood (1992) report a crude reversed J-shaped pattern of quoted spreads
which is similar to empirical findings for the LSE. A slight exception holds for a sample
of NASDAQ stocks. Chan et al. (1995) find decreasing quoted spreads only at the close
of the market while liquidity changes little throughout the day. According to the au-
thors, diverging patterns on NYSE and NASDAQ can be explained by structural market
differences, i.e. NYSE is organized as a limit order market with specialists and NAS-
DAQ as a market maker market. A possible reason for the decrease in quoted spreads
on NASDAQ may be market maker inventory controls prior to market closing.
In a more recent study which is closely connected to my sample period, Klussmann and
Hautsch (2011) study high-frequency movements in returns, volatility, and liquidity at
the LSE from January 2007 until June 2008. The authors concentrate on the influence
of intraday news arrival on the aforementioned factors. Their sample covers 39 stocks
of the FTSE 100 which according to the authors represent roughly 70% of the FTSE 100
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Market Authors Trading Intensity Quoted Spreads Informed Trading 
NYSE 
Jain and Joh  
(1988) 
U-shaped 
n/a n/a 
McInish and Wood  
(1992) 
Crude J-shaped 
  
Crude reversed 
J-shaped 
Declining over  
the day 
Foster and Viswanathan 
(1993) 
U-shaped n/a Crude reversed  J-shaped 
NASDAQ Chan et al.  (1995) 
U-shaped Stable through day,  
but decreasing at  
market closing 
n/a 
LSE/MTFs 
Werner and Kleidon  
(1996) 
U-shaped Crude reversed  
J-shaped n/a 
Abhyankar et al  
(1997) 
2-humped Reversed  
J-shaped n/a 
Cai et al.  
(2004) 
2-humped Reversed  
J-shaped n/a 
Klußmann and Hautsch 
(2011) 
U-shaped Reversed  
J-shaped n/a 
Spankowski et al.  
(2011) 
LSE:  
U-shaped 
MTFs: 
Increasing over  
the day 
LSE & MTFs: 
Reversed  
J-shaped 
 
LSE and MTFs: 
Declining over  
the day 
 
 
FIGURE 3.1: Overview of related literature: Intraday patterns
market capitalization (Klussmann and Hautsch, 2011, p. 324). Similar to other studies,
they find decreasing spreads during the trading day and higher price uncertainty at
market opening and closing. They point out that intraday news arrival has a signifi-
cant influence on volatility and trading activity, but little influence on bid-ask spreads
(Klussmann and Hautsch, 2011, p. 336). They state that intraday news release decreases
continuously during the day and exhibits highest levels at market opening. This finding
may thus be connected to increased market uncertainty at the beginning of the trading
day.
Information content of trades. McInish and Wood (1992) and Foster and
Viswanathan (1993) find characteristic patterns for informed trading over the trading
day. The information content of trades peaks at market opening and decreases until
market close. This finding may be connected to Klussmann and Hautsch (2011) who
do not explicitly address adverse selection or information content in trades. However,
they find continuously decreasing intraday news arrival which thus may lead to a re-
duction in the information content of trades. McInish and Wood (1992) also address
the relationship between quoted spreads and information based trading. They define
unusual large trade sizes as information based trading and find a direct connection to
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wider spreads. Foster and Viswanathan (1993) argue that adverse selection costs are
high at market opening, fall during the trading day and increase before market closing.
They also provide evidence for a direct relationship between high adverse selection
costs and trading volume.
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3.3 Technology and Innovation in Equity Trading
The equity trading landscape has changed rapidly over the past decade. Not only that
most trading venues have replaced traditional floor trading with electronic limit order
books, but also external innovations such as new information and communication tech-
nology have contributed to this change. Today, trading venues may be spatially apart.
However, high speed internet connections and sophisticated order routing technolo-
gies, combined with new market participants who exploit latency below milliseconds,
virtually connect trading venues worldwide. While traditional exchanges had to adapt
to the digitalization of equity trading, MTFs were constructed from scratch to cope
with this new era of high-speed electronic trading. MTFs concentrated on the require-
ments of a new trading clientele which emerged along with technological innovation
and regulatory changes. Algorithmic and high frequency trading account for a large
share of daily trading volume at most of the major trading venues.5 This literature sec-
tion presents academic papers that have addressed these changes and their influence
on overall market quality and market fragmentation.
I. Theoretical Literature
Theoretical literature on competition between alternative trading venues or the influ-
ence of new high-speed market participants is quite scarce. Yet, Foucault et al. (2012)
address the effect of news arrival on trades and prices with special focus on HFT. They
develop a model that takes into account two different dimensions of an informed trad-
ing model: (1) accuracy and (2) speed. Their model includes an informed investor who
continuously receives news about the payoff of a risky security. This investor has both,
a greater information processing capacity and a higher speed of reaction to news than
regular market makers (Foucault et al., 2012, p.2). One of their main findings states
that adverse selection risk increases when informed investors have a speed advantage
5According to Bank of England, «HFT firms are believed to account for more than 70% of all trading volume
in US equities, 40% of volumes in US futures and 20% of volumes in US options. In Europe, HFTs account
for around 30-40% of volumes in equities and futures.»(Bank of England, 2010, p.17). See also http:
//hft.thomsonreuters.com/ for details on HFT activity in European blue chip indices which is
between 40% and 60%.
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because they can buy just in advance of positive news and sell in advance of negative
news. As a deduction of these findings, one could argue that uninformed traders will
face a higher risk of being adversely selected on MTFs as they are particularly attractive
for speed sensitive investors (Menkveld and Jovanovic, 2010, p. 2).
II. Empirical Literature
Also empirical work addresses MTFs’ contribution to price discovery or information
based trading. Hoffmann (2010) analyzes the impact of multi-dimensional best exe-
cution on liquidity supply for a sample of 67 French and German high volume stocks
traded on Chi-X, Euronext and Xetra. He argues that informed trading is more pro-
nounced on alternative trading venues and he finds a significant higher share of private
information on Chi-X compared to the two traditional trading venues. Also Riordan
et al. (2011) and Jung and Katzschner (2012) find in their UK and German data sets,
respectively, that MTFs lead in price discovery, which indicates more informed trad-
ing on those venues. Additionally, these authors find increasing market quality with
regards to overall liquidity levels.
Other scholars address further positive effects to HFT and algorithmic traders with
regard to overall market quality. Menkveld (2011b) argues that these new market par-
ticipants act through their trading strategies as new multi-venue market makers. He
analyzes the introduction of Chi-X on the Dutch equity market, where the MTF com-
petes for market share against the traditional trading venue NYSE Euronext. He finds
that HFT is active in both markets. Yet, on Chi-X, HFT accounts for the largest share
in trading. According to his paper, MTFs are particularly attractive to HFT for various
reasons. On the one hand, HFT can act as multi-venue market makers due to speed
sensitive environments which MTFs provide. On the other hand, MTFs offer lower fee
structures. He argues that the emergence of HFT and MTFs create price pressure on tra-
ditional trading venues and the increased competition triggers positive welfare effects
as for instance a reduction in bid-ask spreads.
Also Kirilenko et al. (2011) who study the effects of the May 2010 flash crash on NAS-
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DAQ, find that HFT account for a significant share of market making activity due to
their trading strategies. They often use passive, liquidity providing orders to manage
their target inventory levels (Kirilenko et al., 2011, p. 23). Interestingly, the authors con-
clude that HFT did not trigger the flash crash, but contributed to exacerbated market
volatility. Also Hendershott and Riordan (2009) support the finding that HFT fulfills
market making tasks. They investigate high-volume stocks that are traded on Xetra
during a short three week sample period in January 2008. Similar to Kirilenko et al.
(2011), they address positive effects to HFT. In general, HFT seems to submit smaller
orders than other market participants and continuously monitors the market. HFT con-
sumes liquidity when it is cheap and supplies liquidity when it is expensive, which thus
might be interpreted as market making activity that levels out liquidity differences over
time.
Pagnotta and Philippon (2012) focus on competition in speed between the different
trading platforms. They argue that – everything else being constant – all investors
benefit from faster trading through MTFs and HFT (Pagnotta and Philippon, 2012, p.
4). This argument may explain why traditional exchanges lose market share if trading is
faster and fee structures are more attractive on MTFs, particularly with the emergence
of new speed sensitive traders. Yet, they also state that different investors have different
preferences on trading speed. Accordingly, these investors must value other attributes
of a trading venue as well. Competing trading platforms may acknowledge this fact by
addressing the particular needs of different investor clientele.
Overall, there is more positive evidence which can be addressed to alternative trading
venues and HFT in a fragmented market environment. In normal market conditions,
MTF and HFT seem to actively contribute to market quality in a positive way. Yet,
markets are not always in “normal” conditions. In fact, market turmoils with increased
market and price uncertainty are as common as any other market period. It is a main
objective of this thesis to look at the relationship between traditional exchanges and
MTFs (combined with HFT activity) when trading does not exhibit a normal scenario.6
6My data sample does not allow my to identify HFT directly. Yet, from regarding existing literature, I
suppose that HFT is much more active on MTFs than on traditional exchanges. I partially base my
economical reasoning in Chapter 6 on this fact.
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Only few authors have addressed the competitive relationship between traditional ex-
changes and MTFs when market conditions deviate from a normal setup. Gomber et al.
(2012) are inspired by a crash scenario as for instance the May 2010 flash crash. They
argue that European regulated markets use circuit breakers which may ensure price
continuity and prevent potential crash scenarios.7 While circuit breaker systems have
already been implemented at European traditional exchanges, European MTFs have
yet no circuit breakers in place. The authors argue that this may induce a scenario
«[. . . ] where a single venue interrupts trading due to order imbalances but at the same time
trading at alternative venues further proceeds, thus allowing volatility to cascade onto alter-
native markets» (Gomber et al., 2012, p. 2). The authors are interested whether trading
will shift towards MTFs when it is halted at the regulated market, which might thus
pose a systemic risk to the overall European trading landscape. Their results indicate
that volatility induced trading halts in a stock on the traditional exchange trigger a sig-
nificant reduction of trading activity also on MTFs. This result reduces the fear of a
systemic risk for the European trading landscape. However, it also points out that MTF
price formation is to a large extent dependent on traditional exchanges which serve as
reference markets.
This evidence hints to the free-riding behavior of MTFs on traditional exchanges price
formation. In Chapter 6, I particularly address the competitive environment between
traditional exchange and MTF in times of increased market uncertainty. I also iden-
tify further market conditions which influence the order routing behavior of market
participants.
7A circuit breaker can be defined as a trading halt. Trading is stopped for (a) regulatory reasons, (b)
technical reasons, or (c) market-based reasons. In general, all three reasons may happen, while market-
based trading halts are amongst the most frequent ones. Usually, trading is stopped when prices dis-
rupt due to abnormal order imbalances. Gomber et al. (2012) find in their Xetra data sample 464 trading
halts in 27 stocks during 2009 (Gomber et al., 2012, p. 12).
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Data and Methodology
“Science is nothing but perception.”
Plato (369, B.C.)
Chapter Overview. In order to perceive the desired correctly, an appropriate way of ob-
serving is crucial. This chapter provides important details about the data itself and my
employed methodology. Section 4.1 addresses the selection and treatment of my data
sample. Section 4.2 consists of four subsections and presents the measures that I created
in order to analyze my presented research questions. In particular, I present measures
for market fragmentation, various market quality and trading intensity measures, and
a method for the identification of difficult market making days.
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4.1 Selection of Data
IN order to analyze the influence of increasing market fragmentation on the rela-tionship between a traditional exchange and MTFs, I concentrate on the largest
and most fragmented market within Europe. During 2009, the UK equity market ac-
counts for 29.1% of European equity trading volume. Additionally, FTSE 100 index
constituents exhibit the largest degree of fragmentation within European blue chips
(compare Section 2.2). Therefore, I regard this surrounding as most suitable for my
empirical analyses.
To address my proposed research questions, I analyze the order books of the traditional
exchange, the LSE, and the three largest European MTFs, which are Chi-X, BATS Eu-
rope, and Turquoise. During my observation period, these four trading venues account
for nearly 99.5% of the non-OTC trading volume in FTSE 100 constituents (compare
Section 2.2). The other 0.5% of non-OTC trading volume is traded mainly on Systematic
Internalizers which are on the one hand not part of my proposed analysis framework.
On the other hand, I have – unfortunately – no possibility to retrieve this kind of trade
data to incorporate it into my analysis.
Observation periods. My data sample comprises order book information of the LSE,
Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise for all FTSE 100 constituents from January 5 until Decem-
ber 30 of 2009. The overall observation period includes 244 trading days in 2009. In the
first empirical part of my thesis, I investigate
• the influence of increased market fragmentation on overall market quality and
trading intensity at the four trading venues over time, and
• intraday competition between the trading venues.
To address intraday competition, I calculate and compare intraday trading patterns on
all four trading venues for various measures. To capture the impact of increased market
fragmentation on market quality and on intraday competition over time, I select two
periods which exhibit distinct levels of market fragmentation. I select quarters Q1 from
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January 2 until March 31, 2009 and Q4 from October 1 until December 31, 2009 as they
exhibit quite distinct levels of fragmentation (see Figure 2.2). Also my fragmentation
measure indicates a continuous increase over time, as stated in Figure 4.2. A compar-
ison over time shows the different fragmentation levels. While average fragmentation
in Q1 is 28.2% (median 28.6%) it increases to 45.7% (median 46.2%) in Q4 of 2009.1
My second empirical part of this thesis is based on daily aggregates to particularly
exclude intradaily variations in my calculated measures.
Data Characteristics. For my analysis, I obtain trade and quote data for each trading
venue from the Thomson Reuters DataScope Tick History archive through the Secu-
rities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA).2 I identify all FTSE 100 con-
stituents with their Reuters Instrument Code (RIC) which serves as a unique identifier.
For each stock, I fetch data for trade prices with the associated volumes, best bid and
ask quotes with the associated volumes, and also bid and ask quotes up to three levels
behind best prices. All trades and quotes are reported in British pence and are time
stamped to the millisecond. The overall amount of trade and quote data for all four
trading venues adds up to roughly 2.71 billion data points during 2009. In Appendix
A, I display a snapshot sample of the raw trade and quote data for the LSE. The raw
data structure of all MTFs looks similarly, except for the RIC and certain – platform
specific – special qualifiers.
Filter criteria. To obtain a clean and homogeneous data set, I apply several filters to
the individual order book trade and quote data, but also to supplementary firm level
data. If a stock does not fulfill all necessary requirements with regard to data availabil-
ity, it is excluded from the sample.
Trade and quote filters:
1Please see Section 4.2.1 for a detailed explanation of my fragmentation measure.
2The accuracy of the Thomson Reuters DataScope Tick History archive is also proven by the work
and the comparison with international research databases by other scholars (e.g., Fong et al.,
2011; Brockman et al., 2009). I thank the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) and SIRCA
(http://www.sirca.org.au/) for providing access to the Thomson Reuters DataScope Tick History
archive.
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• In my analysis, I focus on continuous trading from 8:00 until 16:30 GMT. In the
raw data, all orders are time stamped to the millisecond and offer unique quali-
fiers to associate them to special market periods (e.g. opening, closing, or intraday
auctions). Trades within these periods may bias my analysis and thus have to be
excluded from the data sample. To retrieve the correct data, I use these unique
qualifiers to delete reported executions within periods which are not of interest to
my analysis.
• If a market order trades against several limit orders in one of the order books,
this creates multiple data entries in the raw data. For each individual order book
on each trading venue, I aggregate those kinds of individual orders to one single
trade and combine all buy (sell) orders in a particular stock if they are reported
within the same millisecond.
• In December 2009, the LSE was to last trading venue in my data sample to offi-
cially introduce hidden liquidity by the use of hidden limit orders (London Stock
Exchange, 2009a). This type of limit order does not appear in the order book,
however an incoming market order may be executed against it. Additionally,
these orders have to meet certain large-in-scale considerations of MiFID to be
waived from the pre-trade transparency. If a hidden limit order qualifies as such,
it provides additional liquidity to the order book and offers the investor the pos-
sibility not to reveal his intention to buy or sell a large position – at least not until
a market order is executed against it. Before the introduction of hidden liquidity
a trade was always executed against best bid or ask (or multiple levels) in case
of a (larger) sell or buy order. Now, an incoming market order may be executed
against a hidden order and thus create an inside the spread execution. Since the
LSE was the last trading venue to include these new order types at the very end
of my observation period, I exclude all inside-the-spread executions at the LSE
prior to December 2009 as these data entries are most likely data errors.
Firm level and filters:
• All selected stocks in my final data sample have to be included in the FTSE 100
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index over the entire observation period, which means they have to be part of the
index throughout 2009.
• I exclude companies with stock splits or other corporate actions. The corporate
actions are obtained from Thomson Reuters.
• I further exclude stocks with missing trade and quote data or missing data on
market capitalization.3
• Additionally, each selected stock has to be traded at least 10 times per day on
each individual trading venue, i.e., the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. This
rule is necessary to guarantee a minimum quality of the measures which I calcu-
late in the subsequent Section 4.2. At the beginning of 2009, particularly BATS
and Turquoise show infrequent trading activity in some stocks which would bias
overall estimation results and thus hinder an objective comparison.
• I also exclude nine trading days from my overall yearly sample due to infrequent
trading. These days are either holidays or daily trading activity is considerably
lower compared to the regular trading days. In the case that these days are no
holidays, they may be connected to a non-banking holiday in UK or to a holiday
abroad. For instance May 1st of 2009 is excluded, which is a typical holiday in
many other European countries. Further, January 2 and December 31 of 2009 are
excluded since they exhibit significantly smaller trading volumes which may bias
my analysis.
My final firm sample leaves me with 69 stocks that fulfill the above filter criteria. I
report my final firm sample in Appendix A where all included stocks are listed to-
gether with the LSE ticker symbol and the average daily market capitalization, as well
as the average daily trading volume across all four trading venues during 2009. HSBC
HOLDINGS is the most actively traded stock with an average daily trading volume of
64.4 mln GBP. The SAGE GROUP is least active in trading with an average daily trading
volume of only 2.5 mln GBP. However, these volumes represent averages across all four
trading venues. Trading volumes are significantly higher on the traditional exchange.
3I obtain daily market capitalization’s per stock from Bloomberg.
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For instance, HSBC HOLDINGS exhibits a daily trading volume of 182 mln GBP and
the SAGE GROUP 6 mln GBP, respectively on the LSE.
Consolidated Order Book. For several measures in my analysis, I use both, the indi-
vidual order books as well as the consolidated order book of all four trading venues.
Particularly for my empirical analysis in Chapter 6, I use several aggregated measures
which derive from the consolidated order book of the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise.
I create the consolidated order book by integrating all four individual order books into
a single order book on a per stock per millisecond base. Timestamps and RIC ticker
symbols allow me to compute the consolidated best bid and best ask across all trading
venues along with the associated volumes. Figure 4.1 demonstrates how I calculate the
consolidated order book accordingly.
  
Order Book LSE
Quote Volume
545.50 (A) 400
545.45 (A) 200
545.35 (B) 400
545.30 (B) 200
Order Book Chi-X
Quote Volume
545.50 (A) 300
545.45 (A) 250
545.40 (B) 300
545.35 (B) 250
Order Book BATS
Quote Volume
545.55 (A) 300
545.45 (A) 100
545.25 (B) 500
545.20 (B) 600
Order Book TQ
Quote Volume
545.55 (A) 100
545.50 (A) 50
545.35 (B) 150
545.30 (B) 200
Con. Order Book
Quote Volume
545.50 (A) 750
545.45 (A) 550
545.40 (B) 300
545.35 (B) 800
FIGURE 4.1: Creation of a consolidated order book. The figure exemplifies how I calculate
the consolidated order book out of the individual order books of the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and
Turquoise from ask (A) and bid (B) quotes.
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4.2 Methodology
In my empirical analyses, I focus on the influence of increasing market fragmenta-
tion on trading intensity and market quality measures at the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and
Turquoise. In order to do so, I need to set up several measures which I can compare
over time or during the trading day. In the following sections, I describe how I model
(1) market fragmentation, (2) trading intensity and market quality measures, (3) a mea-
sure that concentrates on the information contribution of a single trading venue to over-
all price discovery in a fragmented market environment, and (4) a method to identify
difficult market making days.
4.2.1 Market Fragmentation
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate how the UK equity market becomes more fragmented over
time. I model fragmentation on a per stock per day level by the MTF trading share, also
used in O’Hara and Ye (2011). It is defined as the volume share of stock i on trading
day t traded on other markets (MTFs) than the traditional exchange (LSE):
(4.1) Fragi,t = 1−
Trad.VolLSEi,t
∑
k∈K
Trad.Volki,t
where K = {LSE,ChiX, BATS, TQ} denotes trading venues accordingly. This measure
is bounded in the interval Frag ∈ [0,1], taking a minimum value of 0, if none of the
volume is traded on MTFs. I use this particular measure for my empirical analysis in
Chapter 5 to define two periods with distinct levels of fragmentation, Q1 and Q4 of
2009. In Chapter 6, I investigate several market factors that influence fragmentation
over time in a panel regression model.
Figure 4.2 shows fragmentation and the detrended fragmentation measure over 2009.
The measures are displayed as 10-days rolling means to avoid daily volatility and to
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better capture trends. From the figure it seems like the fragmentation measure is fol-
lowing an upwards trend and could thus be non-stationary (in mean). Therefore, I
control the time series for stationarity using an Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test
(Dickey and Fuller, 1981). For modeling the ADF test, I include intercept and trend
variables on the fragmentation time series, as both – intercept and trend – are clearly
visible. The number of lags is chosen by the Akaike Information Criterion AIC (Akaike,
1974).4 Results of the ADF Tests indicate that the null hypothesis β1 = 0 (unit root) may
be rejected for all tested time series which means that the time series are trend station-
ary.5
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FIGURE 4.2: 10-days moving average of fragmentation and detrended fragmentation. The fig-
ure displays the 10-days moving average of the fragmentation measure calculated according to
Equation 4.1 and the detrended 10-days moving average of this measure. I detrend fragmenta-
tion – assuming a deterministic trend – by taking the residuals from a linear regression model
on time.
Nevertheless, trends over time may influence regression results significantly. For this
4In Chapter 6, I also use market shares of the four trading venues for my regression models. As visible
in Figure 2.2, Chi-X and BATS market shares also seem to follow a similar trend as my fragmentation
measure while the LSE market share shows an inverted downward trend, respectively. I test all market
share time series for stationarity accordingly.
5See Appendix A for unit root statistics of all tested time series.
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reason, I detrend all time series (fragmentation, LSE/Chi-X/BATS/TQ market shares
and information shares) – assuming a deterministic trend – by taking the residuals from
a linear regression model of the relevant measures on time. Figure 4.2 displays the out-
come of this regression model, here exemplified for the fragmentation measure (dotted
line).
The availability of individual order book data of all four markets also enables me to
calculate market shares of each trading venue relative to the three others. Since the
four trading venues, LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise account for nearly 99.5% of non-
OTC trading volume in FTSE 100 constituents, I assume they represent the market as
a whole. If the formerly predominant market LSE loses market shares to the others,
fragmentation increases. The development of market shares delivers me thus not only
an indication of overall market fragmentation, but also a detailed view on the influence
of market fragmentation on each individual market. Market shares are calculated as
follows:
MkshareK =
Trad.VolK
∑k∈K Trad.Volk
where K = {LSE,ChiX, BATS, TQ}.
4.2.2 Trading Intensity and Market Quality
Trading intensity. To measure trading intensity, I focus on market shares, trading vol-
ume, trade count, and trade size. I calculate these measures per day and per stock for
the individual order books of the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise as well as for the
consolidated order book of all four markets.6 I aggregate the data either on 15-minute or
daily intervals, depending on the scope of my analysis. For instance, daily (15-minute)
market shares are based on daily (15-minute) trading volume of a stock (in GBP) on a
certain trading venue compared to the rest. Trade count is defined as the average num-
6Figure 4.1 explains how I create the consolidated order book.
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ber of daily (15-minute) trades per stock for each trading venue. Trade size represents
the average daily (15-minute) amount of British Pounds per trade.
Market quality. I measure market quality by calculating quoted spreads, quoted
spreads at trade, effective spreads, realized spreads (5 and 15 minutes), price impacts (5
and 15 minutes), and order book depth at best prices and three ticks behind best prices.
These measures are also calculated for the individual order books of the LSE, Chi-X,
BATS, and Turquoise as well as for the consolidated order book of all four markets.7
The most common measure for liquidity is the quoted spread. As a rule of thumb, the
wider the quoted spread, the less liquid is an instrument. Quoted spreads are calculated
as a proxy of trading costs for each trading venue on an individual order book level.
Let ai,t be the ask price for an instrument i at time t and bi,t the respective bid price. mi,t
denotes the mid quote, then the relative quoted half spread (qspreadi,t) in basis points is
calculated as follows:8
(4.2) qspreadi,t = (ai,t − bi;t)/(mi,t ∗ 2) ∗ 10,000
This measure is based on a quote-to-quote process that is characterized by every price
or volume update and each trade during the trading day. Then, quoted spreads are ag-
gregated on a daily (15-minute) per instrument basis and averaged per trading venue.
To avoid some of the noise of tick-by-tick data, all liquidity measures are winsorized at
the 1.0% level and the 99.0% level. I further calculate quoted spreads at trades, which
capture liquidity represented through the best bid and ask at the time of execution.
However, quoted spreads only serve as a liquidity proxy for relatively small order sizes.
If a comparatively larger order is executed in the market, it most likely consumes more
7Effective spreads, realized spreads, and price impacts further explain the necessity of calculating the
consolidated order book.
8The formula calculates the quoted half spread. It implies a buy or a sell of an investor instead of a
round-trip (buy and sell), i.e., an investor only has to pay half of these implicit transaction costs if he
buys or sells. The multiplier 10,000 expresses the aggregation of spreads to basis points. Please note
that 100 bps equal 1%.
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than the outstanding volume on the first level of the order book and thus the investor
will not be able to receive the best bid or ask as execution price. Therefore, I calculate
effective spreads, which measure a market participant’s actual implicit costs when his
incoming market order trades against more than one limit order.9
I use the standard Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to estimate trade direction (buy or
sell) as proposed by Bessembinder (2003).10 Using the variables from above and let pi,t
be the execution price, then the effective half spread (espreadi,t) is defined as:
(4.3) espreadi,t = Di,t ∗ ((pi,t −mi,t)/mi,t) ∗ 10,000
where Di,t denotes the trade direction with -1 for marketable sell and +1 for marketable
buy orders. Effective spreads also capture institutional features of trading venues like
hidden liquidity or market depth. For example, iceberg-orders that only display a frac-
tion of total trading volume and completely hidden limit orders are available on the
LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise.11 Effective spreads are usually equal to or larger
than the second liquidity measure, quoted spreads at trades. However, they might be
smaller if trading venues feature hidden liquidity and there are a reasonable number of
trades executed inside the spread.
I further investigate the individual components of effective spreads according to
Glosten (1987), i.e., I decompose effective spreads into realized spreads and price im-
pacts. Realized spreads can be interpreted as the gross profit of liquidity suppliers.
Price impacts represent the adverse selection component which measures the costs
of trading against a market participants with superior information (Glosten, 1987, p.
1295). The relationship between effective spread, realized spread, and price impact is
based on simple arithmetics and can be formalized as follows:
9Quoted and effective liquidity may often differentiate substantially.
10Following Lee and Ready (1991), I infer trade direction from the trade price position relative to the pre-
vailing quotes and historical prices. Basically, the algorithm checks whether a trade has been executed
above or below the midpoint of the last bid-ask quotation.
11Fully hidden orders are available at the LSE starting from December 2009. Therefore, I clean the data
for inside the spread executions before the introduction of this order type.
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(4.4) espreadi,t = rspreadi,t + pimpacti,t
In order to capture liquidity provider revenues, I assume that liquidity providers are
able to close their position at the quoted midpoint 5 minutes (15 minutes) after the
trade. Let mi,t+x denote the mid quote with x = {5, 15} minutes, then the realized half
spread is defined as:
(4.5) rspreadx,i,t = Di,t ∗ ((pi,t −mi,t+x)/mi,t) ∗ 10,000
The price impact provides an indication of the information content of a trade. It cap-
tures the costs of liquidity demanders that arise in the presence of asymmetric informa-
tion. Traders with superior information will buy when a price is set too low and sell vice
versa. Trading against an informed trader thus results in an adversely selected loss. To
compensate for informed trading, liquidity suppliers charge a fee on every transaction
which is supposed to minimize this expected loss. Using the same variables, I calculate
5-minute and 15-minute adverse selection components of effective spread as follows:
(4.6) pimpactx,i,t = Di,t ∗ ((mi,t+x −mi,t)/mi,t) ∗ 10,000
The calculation of effective spreads, realized spreads, as well as price impacts needs a ref-
erence price that is usually the midpoint of the best quoted bid and ask (see formulas
above).12 Considering these measures only in a single market is not problematic. Yet,
my analysis covers competition for order flow in four different markets. A comparison
between the four markets is only possible if I calculate the consolidated order book of
all four markets. The consolidated order book allows me to determine the midpoint of
12Barclay et al. (2003) also use the midpoint of best prices as reference price.
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the best quoted bid and ask of the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise, which serves as a
reference price.13
After all, liquidity is not only defined by narrow quoted and effective spreads which
reduce implicit trading costs. Another major market quality attribute is the “thickness”
of an order book which is related to the volume present at each level of the order book.
Therefore, I use order book depth data to compute quoted volume at different order
book levels in the individual order books. Let Bi,t be the corresponding volume at
the bid and Ai,t at the ask, then the quoted half depth (depthx,i,t) in British Pounds is
computed as follows:
(4.7) depthx,i,t =
X
∑
x=1
(Bx,i,t + Ax,i,t)/(2 ∗ 100)
where X = {1, 3} characterizes the order book level. depth1,i,t is the average half quoted
volume at the best bid and ask, while depth3,i,t incorporates the quoted volume up to
three ticks behind best prices.
4.2.3 Price Discovery
Besides liquidity and volume order book depth, there are also other important factors
that are connected to market quality. Many scholars argue that the price of a stock
itself or better said, the information of a price which is conveyed to the market, rep-
resents such an important factor of market quality. For instance, Huang (2002) points
out that «[. . . ] price leadership, or price discovery, which is accomplished by timely submis-
sion of informative quotes [. . . ]» is an important dimension of market quality. In Section
4.2.2, I presented price impacts as one indication for the information content of a trade.
But this measure is only indirectly linked to other trading venues over the calculation
of a consolidated order book. Yet, there are other models which may measure price
13By creating a consolidated order book, I assume that market participants are able to monitor quotes at
all four markets. This assumption is logical, given the modern SOR technologies that most institutional
market participants use, compare Section 3.3.
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discovery – which is the enclosure of new information into a stock price – in a more di-
rect relationship, i.e., not connected to a spread decomposition or a consolidated order
book.
With an increasing number of trading venues that form stock prices, it is of particu-
lar interest to see which trading venue conveys new information to the market first,
i.e., where prices move “first”. Hasbrouck (1995) creates a measure which investigates
price leadership – based on quote updates – of a single market in a fragmented market
environment. Several other scholars have relied on this measure to determine where
buyers and sellers contribute to efficient price discovery (Goldstein et al., 2008; Hen-
dershott and Riordan, 2009; Riordan et al., 2011).
The main idea behind this measure is based on findings of Garbade et al. (1979), Gar-
bade and Silber (1979), and Garbade and Silber (1983) who argue that prices in frag-
mented markets share a common implicit efficient price. Based on this assumption,
Hasbrouck (1995) states that actual transaction prices «[. . . ]are determined by a bid-ask
spread component or an autoregressive adjustment component. An appealing characteristic
of a common implicit efficient price is that it supports the economic intuition that, subject to
transaction costs, the securities traded in different markets are linked by arbitrage or short-term
equilibrium considerations.» (Hasbrouck, 1995, p.1176). Based on this implicit efficient
price that is common to all markets, it is of interest to identify the sources of varia-
tion in this efficient price which can be attributed to different markets. The amount of
innovation that a market contributes to overall price discovery is defined as the propor-
tion of the efficient price innovation variance, which represents the “information share” of a
market. From an econometrical perspective, the approach of Hasbrouck (1995) relies
on co-integration which is used to explain the connection of multiple price series of a
stock in various markets through the common component which they share.
Hasbrouck (1995) argues that prices of an individual stock pjt traded on multiple trading
venues j are integrated and thus non-stationary. Yet, he states that a linear combination
of these prices may be stationary. Under the assumption that all prices follow a random
walk, they are integrated of order 1 and 4pt is a stationary process. In order to model
the implicit efficient price, I use prevailing midpoints of the consolidated order book
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mt. This efficient price is influenced by price innovation updates coming from the four
different markets. Therefore, I model the current price as a combination of the implicit
efficient price and a price vector pt = [pLSEt , p
ChiX
t , p
BATS
t , p
TQ
t ]
′ where each pjt refers to
the same stock:
(4.8) pt = mt + [eLSEt ,e
ChiX
t ,e
BATS
t ,e
TQ
t ]
′
and mt is supposed to follow a random walk:
(4.9) mt = mt−1 +ωt,
where ωt follows a white noise process with E(ωt) = 0, E(ω2t ) = σ
2
t , and E(ωtωs) = 0
for t 6= s. The moving average representation for the price vector4pt can be written by
using a vector moving average (VMA) model:
(4.10) 4pt = et +∑
i
ψiet−i
et = [eLSEt ,e
ChiX
t ,e
BATS
t ,e
TQ
t ]
′ is a (4× 1) vector innovation process with E(et) = 0 and a
variance matrix Var(et) =Ω. The et components represent the new information which
is incorporated in the corresponding market (LSE,ChiX, BATS, TQ) and the et−i is a
(4× 4) matrix. This means that the (i, j)-element of et measures a one unit change of et
upon4pt, where i, j ∈ [LSE,ChiX, BATS, TQ]
In equations (4.8) and (4.9), I show that a an observed price can be decomposed into a
random walk component and a covariance-stationary error term. According to this, the
variance of the random walk component is:
(4.11) σ2t = ΨΩΨ
′
where Ω is the (n × n) covariance matrix of the innovations and Ψ is a polynomial
in the lag operator. This means that the random walk variance reflects the individual
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contributions from all four markets as follows:
(4.12) σ2t = A

σ2LSE σLSE,ChiX σLSE,BATS σLSE,TQ
σChiX,LSE σ
2
ChiX σChiX,BATS σChiX,TQ
σBATS,LSE σBATS,ChiX σ
2
BATS σBATS,TQ
σTQ,LSE σTQ,ChiX σTQ,BATS σ
2
TQ
A
′
where A = [ΨLSE,ΨChiX,ΨBATS,ΨTQ]. In case that the covariance matrix is diagonal
(when σ2i,j 6= 0) for i = j, the contribution of each market to the price discovery process
can be clearly identified. The larger the relative size of these contributions, the more
a market contributes to price discovery and is thus of higher importance with regard
to efficient prices. This contribution, known as information share of the jth market is
defined as follows:
(4.13) In f oSharej ≡
Ψ2jΩjj
ΨΩΨ′
where j ∈ {LSE,ChiX, BATS, TQ}. The contribution of market j to price discovery is
represented by Ψ2jΩjj and ΨΩΨ
′ represents the variance of the random walk compo-
nent of stock prices representing the total price discovery.14 To determine upper and
lower bounds that minimize or maximize the contribution of each trading venue in the
price discovery process, I follow Hasbrouck (1995).
I calculate information shares for each trading venue per day and per stock. In order
to determine the contribution of each trading venue to price discovery, I calculate and
compare the mean of upper and lower bounds across all four venues. By construction,
information shares sum up to 100%. Figure 4.3 displays 10-day moving averages of
information shares of the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. It is clearly visible, that
the LSE and Chi-X contribute most to efficient price discovery during 2009. However,
prices on the LSE continuously lose information shares, while Chi-X gains information
shares over the entire observation period.
14It is possible that the contemporaneous midpoint of the different trading venues can be equal, which
would mean that midpoints could be correlated. This would infer that Ω is not diagonal.
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FIGURE 4.3: Hasbrouck (1995) Information Shares. The figure displays 10-days moving
average information shares of the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. Per definition, information
shares add up to 100%.
4.2.4 Market Making
In Chapter 6, I address the changes in daily trading intensity on various trading plat-
forms in the light of technological changes and the emergence of HFT. Apparently, HFT
trading activity is particularly interesting for MTFs which try to concentrate on these
new market participants by offering various benefits, e.g. special fee models and ul-
tra fast order execution. Therefore, HFT accounts for a large share of trading volume
on MTFs. The high speed environment of MTFs allows HFT to quickly provide and
consume liquidity on various platforms almost in the same instant. This environment
is very suitable for HFT trading strategies which are often based on passive, liquidity
providing orders to manage their target inventory. HFT act thus as modern multi-venue
market makers (Menkveld, 2011b; Kirilenko et al., 2011).
However, even if HFT may act as modern market makers they do not have to comply
with the regulatory requirements such as traditional market makers, i.e., they are not
obliged to provide liquidity according to the rule book of a traditional exchange. Thus,
liquidity provision by HFT may not be granted as stable over time which apparently
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might become a problem for other market participants. In the context of my analysis
in Chapter 6, I address these issues and analyze a change in market participants’ order
routing behavior when market making becomes difficult and thus might be costly.
Similar to Boehmer et al. (2013), I create a proxy for difficult market making days which
is based on daily returns. From a market maker perspective, the job of providing liq-
uidity is easiest when buyers and sellers arrive with the same probability. The market
maker’s inventory risk is thus easy to handle. However, market makers’ inventory risk
increases substantially if a trading day becomes biased to either the buy or the sell side.
For instance, if a trading day exhibits an order imbalance towards the sell side, the
price of an instrument is most likely to fall. In this scenario, the market maker has to
buy from potential sellers which thus adds to his inventory. However, along with his
increasing inventory, the book value of its inventory decreases due to the falling price.
Typically, he would try to have a zero position at the end of the trading day. Yet, if he
decides to close his inventory position at the prevailing low price this would culminate
in realized loss. Alternatively, he may take an overnight position with the attached risk
and wait until the next day when the price might move in the other direction. Yet, his
loss increases further if the negative order imbalance prevails on the second or even
third day as well. The same accounts for a long scenario of course where the market
maker has to deal with a short inventory position.
Following this argumentation, I create a proxy for difficult market making days for each
individual stock in my sample. The proxy has either the value 1 if representing a diffi-
cult market making day or 0 otherwise. A difficult market making day is characterized
by the daily return having the same sign as the return of the previous day. I thus as-
sume that a trading day exhibits a positive or negative order imbalance. Consequently,
I identify all of these days in my sample period on each individual trading venue. Ad-
ditionally, I disregard difficult market making days which only exhibit small changes
in returns. These days probably do not cause severe problems for market makers’ liq-
uidity provision. For this reason, I only consider days where the cumulative return on
the second day exceeds the monthly average return in a stock by at least two standard
deviations.
72
Chapter 4 Data and Methodology
Table 4.1 summarizes simple statistics of difficult market making days on all trading
venues – combined and individual – for the full yearly sample as well as Q1 and Q4.
On each trading venue, I check on an individual stock level whether the return on a
trading day qualifies as my desired proxy. Since returns and volatility of a stock may
deviate on the individual trading venues this may lead to diverging dummy classifiers
on the different trading venues. For example, a trading day on Chi-X may qualify as a
difficult market making day, while on the LSE it is considered as a regular day. There-
fore, Table 4.1 displays difficult market making days on the single trading venues, as
well as combined category “All”. This category includes all dummies that have been
classified as a difficult market making day on any of the four trading venues. My over-
all sample covers 16,836 observations (244 trading days for each single stock of my 69
stock sample). Q1 and Q4 cover 4,140 (60 trading days) and 4,209 (61 trading days)
observations, respectively.
Statistics indicate that difficult market making days are on average evenly distributed
over time: In the yearly sample, roughly 3.7% of the observations on all trading venues
qualify as a difficult market making day. This ratio is quite similar for Q1 and Q4 with
3.3% and 3.6%, respectively. Over the entire year, Chi-X exhibits in sum the largest
number of difficult market making days, while in Q1 and Q4 Turquoise and the LSE
lead, respectively.
Table 4.2 displays correlation statistics for difficult market making days on the different
trading venues for the three periods. The table indicates that difficult market making
days are highly correlated on all four trading venues, in Q4 even a bit more than in
Q1. Because dummies are evenly distributed over time and highly correlated between
trading venues, I use the combined proxy – category “All” in Table 4.1 – in my empirical
analysis in Chapter 6. In total 616 trading days have been identified as difficult market
making days where consequently inventory risk is higher.
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TABLE 4.1: Descriptive statistics: Difficult market making days on the LSE, Chi-X,
BATS, and Turquoise. The table displays simple statistics of dummy variables of difficult
market making days across all stocks on the four trading venues. A trading day is considered
as a difficult market making day if the daily return of the stock has the same sign as the return
of the previous day. Additionally, the cumulative return on the second day needs to exceed the
monthly average return in a stock by at least two standard deviations. The category “All”,
includes dummy variables of all trading venues, i. e. if a trading day is identified as a difficult
market making day on any of the four platforms it is included into “All”.
Full Sample Statistics (N=16,836)
Venue Mean Sum
All 0.037 616
LSE 0.032 544
ChiX 0.032 545
BATS 0.032 533
TQ 0.032 538
Q1 Statistics (N=4,140)
Venue Mean Sum
All 0.033 137
LSE 0.026 108
ChiX 0.027 112
BATS 0.027 112
TQ 0.028 117
Q4 Statistics (N=4,209)
Venue Mean Sum
All 0.036 152
LSE 0.034 141
ChiX 0.032 136
BATS 0.031 131
TQ 0.033 138
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TABLE 4.2: Correlation: Difficult market making days on the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and
Turquoise.
Pearson correlation coefficients Full Sample
dMM_all dMM_lse dMM_chi dMM_bats dMM_tq
dMM_all 1 0.93766 0.93855 0.92782 0.93231
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
dMM_lse 1 0.92545 0.86941 0.88654
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001
dMM_chi 1 0.91741 0.87897
<.0001 <.0001
dMM_bats 1 0.85201
<.0001
dMM_tq 1
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Pearson correlation coefficients Q1
dMM_all dMM_lse dMM_chi dMM_bats dMM_tq
dMM_all 1 0.88466 0.90136 0.90136 0.92183
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
dMM_lse 1 0.92545 0.86941 0.88654
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001
dMM_chi 1 0.91741 0.87897
<.0001 <.0001
dMM_bats 1 0.85201
<.0001
dMM_tq 1
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Pearson correlation coefficients Q4
dMM_all dMM_lse dMM_chi dMM_bats dMM_tq
dMM_all 1 0.96183 0.94405 0.92596 0.95120
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
dMM_lse 1 0.94417 0.91708 0.95187
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001
dMM_chi 1 0.95763 0.93212
<.0001 <.0001
dMM_bats 1 0.91969
<.0001
dMM_tq 1
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
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Chapter 5
Market Quality & Intraday Patterns in
Fragmented Markets
“The open and the close of trading in a stock market that is open during the day and closed
overnight seem to be natural candidates for investigation. While the information on which the
asset prices are based evolves continuously over the entire period, there is an abrupt change from
a regime of continuous trading to one of zero trading. How does this affect trading behavior at
the transition points, namely open and close?”
Brock and Kleidon (1992)
Chapter Overview. This chapter empirically addresses the influence of increased order
flow fragmentation on overall market quality in the UK equity market. In a first part,
I address changes of market quality over time. The second part contains an intraday
analysis of various market quality measures that investigate the competitive behavior
of the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise within a trading day. I also compare these
intraday patterns over time to see whether there are significant changes in the patterns
themselves or in the position of a particular market.
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5.1 Introduction
THE introduction of MiFID in 2007 has significantly altered European equity mar-kets as it allowed alternative trading platforms (MTFs) to compete with tradi-
tional exchanges for equity order flow. MTFs concentrated on the heterogeneous de-
sires of investors, such as trading speed, anonymity, or alternative fee schedules. This
increased the competitive pressure on traditional national exchanges such as the Lon-
don Stock Exchange (LSE) or Deutsche Boerse. As a consequence, order flow and liq-
uidity became fragmented across trading venues. (See Chapter 2 for a detailed discus-
sion about MiFID and the UK equity market development.)
Market statistics in Section 2.2 underline this development and show that trading has
fragmented strongly since the introduction of MiFID. UK blue chip stocks are the most
fragmented European equities. For example, LSE’s market share in FTSE 100 con-
stituents decreased continuously from close to 100% in 2007 to just 43% in June 2011.1
It is important to note that there has been a real loss in market share at the LSE during
my 2009 observation period, i.e., new trading venues have not added additional trad-
ing volume to the overall market which would decrease LSE market share relatively,
but they have actually taken it away from the LSE. Overall, absolute trading volume
in all FTSE 100 constituents at the LSE decreased by roughly 45% from December 2008
(1.6 trillion GBP) to December 2009 (890 billion GBP). The number of trades decreased
during the same period by roughly 17% from 128 million to 106 million trades (London
Stock Exchange, 2009c).
The question whether order flow and liquidity should be concentrated geograph-
ically started an important debate which has been discussed in detail by various
authors empirically (e.g., Easley et al., 1996; Battalio et al., 1997) and theoretically
(e.g., Pagano, 1989b,a; Chowdhry and Nanda, 1991). Intuitively, the probability of
order execution should decline if demand and supply are separated across vari-
ous platforms which speaks against the intention of MiFID to increase competition
1For detailed statistics on European equity market fragmentation, see http://fragmentation.
fidessa.com.
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– and thus fragmentation – in European equity markets. However, increased intermar-
ket competition may reduce the monopoly power of traditional exchanges and thus
decrease transaction costs and inspire trading venues to develop new services (Euro-
pean Commission, 2010). The relationship between market fragmentation and its ef-
fects on market quality are thus ambiguous. Another aspect that mitigates potential
negative effects of market fragmentation nowadays, is connected to modern informa-
tion and communication technology. The existence of high-speed internet and smart
order routing technologies significantly reduce search and monitoring costs as they ac-
tively contribute to a virtual integration of trading venues, even if they are spatially
apart. (See Chapter 3 for a detailed literature overview which discusses the effects of
market fragmentation, intraday competition, and the influence of technology on market
quality.)
Tick-by-tick order book data of the LSE and the three largest European MTFs (Chi-X,
BATS, and Turquoise) allow me to address this complex scenario of a multiple frag-
mented trading environment from January until December 2009. I analyze the influ-
ence of market fragmentation and increased competition on trading intensity and mar-
ket quality. I deliberately investigate this relationship from two perspectives: (1) over
time and (2) intraday.
Firstly, I study changes of trading intensity and market quality measures in fragmented
markets over time. I find evidence that fragmentation increases significantly during
2009. Along with increasing fragmentation between the LSE and the three MTFs, I find
no support speaking in favor of a deterioration of market quality which would point
out that a centralization of trading is preferable. Contrarily, market quality seems to
improve on all trading venues. Especially MTFs exhibit very high liquidity measures
which emphasize the strong competition between MTFs and the traditional exchange.
Partially, effective spreads are even smaller on MTFs than on the LSE which indicates
larger liquidity on MTFs.2
Secondly, I address intraday competition between trading venues and investigate
2However, this result may stem from hidden liquidity, e.g. iceberg order or hidden limit orders, which
were available on MTFs during the whole year of 2009 while the LSE introduced hidden limit orders
not before December 2009. Please compare Section 2.2 for further details.
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whether spreads, trading volume, market shares, and informed trading concentrate on
a single platform during specific periods within a trading day.3 Overall, I observe that
intraday patterns of trading volume, market shares, quoted spreads, and price impacts
converge from Q1 to Q4 across trading venues, i.e., measures develop with a higher
similarity across trading venues over time, which indicates a maturing market. I find
that increasing market fragmentation does not significantly change intraday patterns
over time, with the exception of quoted spreads on Turquoise. Within the trading day,
my data provide evidence that market shares shift away from the regulated market to
MTFs after market opening and then back before market closing. This result suggests
that market participants route their orders preferably to the LSE in times of increased
volatility and price uncertainty (e.g., Foster and Viswanathan, 1993). Potentially, they
favor the price formation process and price quality at the regulated market during these
periods.4
Quoted spreads are predominantly crude reversed J-shaped on all trading venues
which means that liquidity increases throughout the trading day. For trading volume,
I find opposing patterns for the LSE and MTFs. While LSE trading volume follows
a U-shape, indicating already high trading intensity at market opening (in line with
e. g. , Foster and Viswanathan (1993) and Werner and Kleidon (1996)), trading volume
at MTFs starts at lower levels and increases not before the second half of the trading
day. On all trading venues, I find the inverse relationship between decreasing spreads
(increasing liquidity) and growing volume over the trading day, also documented by
McInish and Wood (1992) and Cai et al. (2004). Price impacts, which indicate informed
trading (see 4.2.2), decrease on all platforms during the trading day which might be con-
nected to a decreasing arrival of news over the trading day (Klussmann and Hautsch,
2011).
3Please refer to Section 4.1 for a detailed description of my data sample and my observation periods for
this chapter.
4I will address this relationship in my second empirical analysis in Chapter 6, to see whether this finding
is mainly an intraday effect or whether the this relationship holds also over time.
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5.2 Interday Analysis
5.2.1 Descriptive Statistics
I calculate various trading intensity and market quality measures per day and per stock
for the individual order books of the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise as well as for the
consolidated order book of all four markets, as outlined in Section 4.2.2.5
Table 5.1 reports descriptive statistics of trading intensity and market quality measures
across all 69 stocks of my sample for Q1 2009. I report standard deviations of each
measure in parenthesis. I also test mean differences between the LSE and each MTF for
statistical significance.6 Standard errors with “∗∗∗” denote statistical significance at the
1% level and “∗∗” at the 5% level, and “∗” at the 10% level. Markets are fragmented
with a LSE market share of 72.31% of total trading volume. Chi-X captures 16.74% of
trading volume, BATS 2.47%, and Turquoise 8.48%. The largest trades are executed on
the LSE with an average trade size of 10,304 GBP. Trade sizes are in general smaller on
MTFs with Turquoise showing the largest trade size with 7,000 GBP compared to Chi-X
and BATS with 6,373 GBP and 5,302 GBP, respectively.
Average daily quoted spreads at the LSE are smallest with 7.38 bps followed by Chi-
X with 9.80 bps. BATS and Turquoise show wider average daily quoted spreads with
12.91 bps and 20.22 bps. This indicates less liquidity on these two trading platforms
compared to the LSE and Chi-X. Interestingly, average daily quoted spreads at trade
are considerably smaller than daily quoted spreads on all platforms. This suggests that
market participants actively monitor quotes and tend to buy or sell when it is relatively
cheap to do so, i.e., when spreads are narrow.
Effective spreads represent the cost that is actually paid by a liquidity demander for a
transaction. On the LSE, a liquidity demander has to pay on average 4.90 bps during
Q1. Interestingly, effective spreads are smaller on Chi-X with 4.81 bps and Turquoise
5Please refer to Sections 4.1 and 4.2.2 for computational details on the consolidated order book or the
trading intensity and market quality measures.
6For the mean difference tests, I estimate standard errors by using the methodology according to Thomp-
son (2011).
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TABLE 5.1: Descriptive statistics: Trading ntensity and liquidity measures for Q1 2009.
The table presents average trading intensity and market quality measures over all 69 stocks dur-
ing Q1. Market shares are based on daily trading volume (Volume) in British Pounds (GBP).
All spread measures are reported in basis points. The Quoted Spread is calculated on a tick-
by-tick basis per stock, the Quoted Spread Trade is calculated trade-by-trade. Realized Spread
and Price Impact are reported for both 5 and 15 minute benchmarks relative to the midpoint of
the consolidated order book. Depth1 is half the quoted depth at the best bid and ask. Depth3
includes the total quoted volume three ticks behind best prices. Standard deviations are reported
in parenthesis. Mean differences between the LSE and each MTF are tested for statistical signif-
icance using Thompson (2011) standard errors with ‘***’ denoting statistical significance at the
1% level and ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level.
LSE Chi-X BATS TQ
Market Shares [%] 72.31% 16.74%∗∗∗ 2.47%∗∗∗ 8.48%∗∗∗
(7.27%) (5.32%) (1.30%) (4.72%)
Volume [1,000 GBP] 43,536 10,763∗∗∗ 1,625∗∗∗ 4,597∗∗∗
(54,029) (13,988) (2,260) (4,971)
Trade Count [No] 3,527 1,362∗∗∗ 247∗∗∗ 572∗∗∗
(2,518) (1,046) (223) (404)
Trade Size [GBP] 10,304 6,373∗∗∗ 5,302∗∗∗ 7,000∗∗∗
(5,191) (3,376) (3,012) (3,972)
Quoted Spread [bsp] 7.378 9.804∗∗∗ 12.913∗∗∗ 20.217∗∗∗
(4.162) (9.467) (24.512) (89.838)
Quoted Spread Trade [bsp] 5.625 6.232 7.695∗∗∗ 10.328∗∗∗
(3.293) (3.532) (3.977) (17.606)
Effective Spread [bsp] 4.909 4.811∗∗ 5.164∗∗∗ 4.189∗∗∗
(2.938) (2.886) (3.104) (2.9583)
Realized Spread 5 [bsp] -0.248 -0.136∗ 1.351∗∗∗ -0.280
(1.938) (2.502) (4.955) (4.327)
Realized Spread 15 [bsp] 0.183 0.127 1.044∗∗∗ -0.186∗
(3.140) (3.924) (8.952) (7.042)
Price Impact 5 [bsp] 5.190 4.955∗∗∗ 3.840∗∗∗ 4.489∗∗∗
(3.160) (3.350) (5.273) (4.328)
Price Impact 15 [bsp] 4.778 4.700 4.156∗∗∗ 4.400∗∗
(4.034) (4.611) (9.285) (7.066)
Depth1 [GBP] 29,487 29,812 20,300∗∗∗ 18,269∗∗∗
(30,674) (30,674) (21,776) (15,210)
Depth3 [GBP] 102,326 124,319∗∗ 69,358∗∗∗ 58,858∗∗∗
(133,551) (133,551) (72,050) (53,398)
with 4.18 bps. BATS shows on average the largest effective spread with 5.16 bps.
Smaller effective spreads – calculated with the midpoint from the consolidated order
book – compared to quoted spreads at trade from single order books suggest that in-
vestors could economically benefit from trading on all four venues simultaneously.
This finding is most likely an important reason for the existence of SOR technologies
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which monitor quotes and trades on different markets. Typically, effective spreads and
quoted spreads at trade are relatively close. In the case of Turquoise, I observe that av-
erage daily effective spreads are lowest compared to the LSE, Chi-X, and BATS while
Turquoise shows the largest discrepancy between effective spreads and quoted spreads
at trade among all trading venues. This result is in line with Riordan et al. (2011) who
provide evidence that Turquoise’s small effective spreads are considerably influenced
by overall market conditions and the small number of trades on Turquoise. Another
possibility of smaller effective spreads on Chi-X or Turquoise during Q1 may be con-
nected to hidden liquidity. While hidden limit orders were available on all MTFs during
the whole year of 2009, the LSE introduced hidden limit orders not before December
2009.7
5 and 15-minute realized spreads deliver mixed results across platforms. BATS is the
only trading venue where investors benefit from supplying liquidity with 1.35 bps
given that they close their position 5 minutes after the trade. For the 15-minute in-
terval, all trading venues except Turquoise show positive realized spreads, which indi-
cates that investors would benefit from supplying liquidity.
Liquidity demanders with superior price information seem to be most active on the
LSE, as 5-minute and 15-minute price impacts are highest on this platform (5.19 bps on
the LSE, compared to 4.95 bps on Chi-X, 3.84 bps on BATS, and 4.49 bps on Turquoise,
for 5-minute price impacts). Put differently, price impacts suggest that the risk of being
adversely selected from a trader with superior information is highest on the LSE for
Q1, 2009.
On the LSE, average order book depth at level one is 29,487 GBP and 102,326 GBP for
the cumulated depth three ticks behind best prices. Compared to the LSE, depth is
slightly higher on Chi-X but significantly lower on BATS and Turquoise.
7See Section 2.2 for further details.
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5.2.2 Changes over Time
I compare Q1 and Q4 of 2009 in order to analyze differences in trading intensity and
market quality measures over time and across trading venues along with the level of
market fragmentation. My regression model is defined per trading day t and per stock i
as follows:
(5.1) measurei,t = α0 + β1 quarteri,t +∑γjcontrolsi,t + ei,t
where my dependent variables measurei,t are different trading intensity and market
quality measures as introduced in Chapter 4. The variable of interest, quarteri,t, is a
dummy variable which takes the value 1 for Q4 and is 0 otherwise. It captures differ-
ences between Q1 and Q4 of 2009 which are reported by the coefficient β1. Similar to
Hendershott and Moulton (2011), I control for market conditions between both obser-
vation periods. Therefore, I include the logarithm of daily market capitalization, the
average daily realized volatility, the logarithm of daily closing prices, and firm dummy
variables. To estimate robust standard errors, I follow Thompson (2011).8
Table 5.2 depicts differences between quarters and trading venues relative to the LSE.
The first column of each trading venue (Q4 - Q1) shows differences in trading inten-
sity and market quality measures between Q1 and Q4 of 2009. The second column
(Venue - LSE) reports changes of each trading venue over time relative to the LSE,
which are obtained by combining results from the quarterly differences. I present t-
statistics below the regression estimates in italic letters. “∗∗∗” denotes significance at
the 1% level, “∗∗” at the 5% level, and “∗” at the 10% level.
As expected, my regression results confirm that the LSE market share declines signifi-
cantly by 17.48% between both observation periods. Chi-X and BATS gain significant
market shares over time, with 11.99% and 7.57%, respectively. The market share of
Turquoise decreases by 2.08% from Q1 to Q4. Trading volume and the number of trades
8Clustered standard errors according to Thompson (2011) control simultaneously for correlations in the
regression residuals across two dimensions. In my data panel, residuals might be correlated across
sample firms (firm effect) and across time (time effect). Clustering for those two dimensions allows me
thus to obtain robust standard errors. For details on the methodology, see Thompson (2011).
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decrease on the LSE and Turquoise between Q1 and Q4, while Chi-X and BATS show
an increase in trading activity. Average trade size in terms of GBP per trade increases
most significantly on the LSE with 932 GBP and slightly on Chi-X with 264 GBP. Trades
on BATS and Turquoise become smaller over time with a decrease of -614 GBP and
-2,417 GBP, respectively. I assume that this development is connected to clientele ef-
fects. MTFs offer economically more beneficial fee schedules to algorithmic and high
frequency traders who submit smaller orders at a higher frequency compared to human
traders (Hendershott and Riordan (2009)).
For my market quality measures, quoted spreads, quoted spreads at trade, and effec-
tive spreads, I find negative coefficients for all trading venues over time, i.e. liquidity
improves between Q1 and Q4 on each platform. Quoted spreads decrease between
-0.72 bps on the LSE and -5.00 bps on Turquoise. Relative to the LSE, quoted spreads
on all MTF improve more over 2009. For example, the difference in quoted spreads be-
tween the LSE and Chi-X decreases by -2.51 bps. This means that competition increases
overall market quality as MTFs are catching up with the LSE with regard to quoted
liquidity. Differences between Q1 and Q4 in effective spreads range between -0.69 bps
on Turquoise and -1.29 bps on BATS. Recall that I find even smaller effective spreads on
Chi-X and Turquoise than on the LSE during Q1 (see 5.1). Yet, Chi-X could not increase
this competitive edge further as the LSE shows a stronger decline in effective spreads
from Q1 to Q4 (-0.78 bps).
Results on realized spreads are mixed. While realized spreads decrease significantly
on BATS between Q1 and Q4, they do not change significantly on the other trading
venues. Price impacts for 5 and 15-minute benchmarks decrease significantly on almost
all platforms over time.9 Relative to the LSE, 5-minute price impacts decrease by -0.26
bps on Chi-X but significantly increase by 0.48 bps on BATS. This result may indicate
that – relative to the LSE – the number of market participants with superior information
decreases on Chi-X and increases on BATS.
9Please recall that realized spreads and price impacts are derived from effective spreads. If effective
spreads on all trading venues decrease over time, this is also connected to smaller realized spreads and
price impacts. Therefore, the relative shifts of realized spreads and price impacts between the LSE and
the MTFs are of higher interest than the absolute shifts.
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With regard to order book depth, LSE’s order book depth increases significantly by
11,695 GBP on the best bid and ask and 92,502 GBP three ticks behind best prices from
Q1 to Q4. MTFs do not exhibit a significant increase in order book depth. Indeed they
show rather a contrasting picture. Either their depths increase only little or reduce
heavily as it is the case for Turquoise which shows significantly smaller depths by -
8,717 GBP on the best level and -23.412 GBP three ticks behind. This result reveals a
very important fact which may be also connected to structural differences of the trad-
ing venues, or better said to their trading clientele. While LSE’s order book becomes
“thicker” over time, MTF order books remain as before. This may be connected to the
trading clientele on MTFs. Here, HFT is more active. These traders constantly monitor
the market, submit smaller orders in general and often cancel orders just a few millisec-
onds after they have been placed (Hendershott and Riordan, 2009; Breuer and Burghof,
2012). This dimension of liquidity thus reveals that the LSE is more capable of absorb-
ing larger market movements compared to MTFs which may help the LSE to be more
resistant for market distortion.
In general and in contrast to theoretical argumentation (Mendelson, 1987; Pagano,
1989b; Chowdhry and Nanda, 1991), I find evidence that increased market fragmen-
tation contributes positively to overall market quality. The regression results show that
liquidity measured in terms of quoted spreads and effective spreads increases consid-
erably on the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise between Q1 and Q4. My results also
indicate that market participants may benefit from using SOR technologies, as effective
spreads (from the consolidated order book) are smaller than quoted spreads at trade
(on the individual trading venues). This means that market participants could benefit
if they are able to use quotes and prices from all four trading venues. My results also
reveal that different developments in depth liquidity measures may be connected to
trading clientele effects, as for instance order book depth does not change significantly
on MTFs.
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5.3 Intraday Analysis
Differences in trading intensity and market quality between trading venues may not
only differ over time but may also exhibit intraday variations. By analyzing the latter,
I gain insights into the behavior of market participants on each platform. Specifically,
I focus on intraday patterns of trading volume, market shares, quoted spreads, and
5-minute price impacts. Following Abhyankar et al. (1997) and Cai et al. (2004), I use
15-minute intraday averages and obtain 34 intervals across the trading day. 15-minute
snapshots are small enough to capture intraday effects but at the same time level volatil-
ity of the trading process.
For trading volume, I multiply the traded quantity with the corresponding execution
price and obtain the sum for each 15-minute interval per trading venue across stocks.
Market shares are the fraction of total trading volume for each platform on a 15-minute
basis. Quoted spreads and 5-minute price impacts are calculated as presented in Section
4.2 and averaged for each 15-minute interval and per stock.
To analyze intraday patterns of each variable, I rely on two methods. First, I graph-
ically evaluate daily variations of each variable for both observation periods, Q1 and
Q4. Second, to test for statistical significance of intraday changes, I use the following
regression model similar to Cai et al. (2004):
(5.2) measurei,t = α0 +
16
∑
j=1
β jDi,t,j +
34
∑
j=18
β jDi,t,j +∑γjcontrolsi,t + ei,t
where measurei,t,j represents my variables of interest, namely trading volume, market
shares, quoted spreads, or 5-minute price impacts of stock i during the 15-minute in-
terval j on trading day t. Dummy variables for each 15-minute interval of the trading
day take the value 1 for an observation within this interval and 0 otherwise. I omit
the midday interval, the 17th interval of the trading day from 12:00 to 12:15 which is
my reference interval. Thus, all coefficients β j measure the difference relative to this
reference interval. I include firm and day dummy variables as controls and use robust
clustered standard errors according to Thompson (2011) as in my previous regression
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model.
5.3.1 Trading Intensity
Trading Volume Figure 5.1 depicts average trading volume on the LSE, Chi-X, BATS
and Turquoise for each 15-minute interval during Q1 and Q4 of 2009. For all intervals,
the largest amount of volume is traded on the LSE. However, as stated in Section 5.2.2,
it is also visible that trading volume shifts from the LSE towards the MTFs between Q1
and Q4, i.e. market fragmentation increases over time.
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Chapter 5 Market Quality & Intraday Patterns in Fragmented Markets
In Q1, Chi-X depicts the highest intraday trading volume among MTFs closely followed
by Turquoise and BATS. The intraday patterns of the LSE and the three MTFs obviously
differ. Trading volume on the LSE resembles a crude U-shaped pattern starting with
average volumes of nearly 1,800,000 GBP per stock in the first 15-minutes of the trading
day. Volume then decreases close to 800,000 GBP until 13:30 and rises to nearly 3,200,000
GBP in the last interval before market closing. This means that trading activity already
peaks at market opening on the LSE. Compared to the LSE, trading volume on MTFs
starts at lower levels ranging from 258,000 GBP (per stock) on Chi-X to 89,000 GBP
on Turquoise down to 34,000 GBP on BATS during the first 15-minute interval. MTFs
also show no distinct peak as the LSE does. In contrast to BATS and Turquoise, which
depict continuously flat volume lines across the day, trading volume on Chi-X rises
after 13:00 up to 643,000 GBP during the last intraday interval. I attribute the 13:00 co-
movement in trading volume on the LSE and Chi-X to the US market opening.10 The
inter-connectivity of global markets may force investors to adopt their strategies to new
information coming from the U.S. market.
In Q4, trading volume on Chi-X and BATS is generally higher compared to Q1 while
trading on Turquoise is less active. The LSE still resembles a crude U-shape in trading
volume while MTFs show no major volume changes from market opening until 13:00.
All MTFs, particularly Chi-X, depict increasing trading volumes and an approaching
co-movement to the LSE after 13:00. This result suggests that the market matures and
grows closer together over time. My results depict for all venues, but particularly the
LSE and Chi-X, a strong increase in trading volume within the last five intraday inter-
vals in both quarters which may be connected to portfolio rebalancing activities before
market closing.
Regression results in Table 5.3 confirm my graphically observed intraday patterns of
trading volume. The reported coefficients show the difference of each 15-minute in-
terval relative to the midday interval (Intercept) from 12:00 to 12:15.11 I report robust
10US trading starts at 14:30 GMT, however, new market information is disseminated much earlier, often
starting from 13:00 GMT.
11The regression coefficients slightly differ from the numbers in my figures, since the regression model
controls for firm and time specific effects.
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standard errors following Thompson (2011), t-statistics are presented in italic letters.
“∗∗∗” denotes significance at the 1% level, “∗∗” at the 5% level, and “∗” at the 10%
level.
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TABLE 5.3: Intraday regression results: Trading volume. I compare 69 FTSE100 stocks
traded on the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise between January 5 to March 31, 2009 (Q1)
and October 1 to December 30, 2009 (Q4). I use the regression model presented in Equation
5.2. I report robust standard errors following Thompson (2011), t-statistics are presented in
italic letters. ‘***’ denotes significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10%
level.
January to March 2009
LSE t-stat. Chi-X t-stat. BATS t-stat. TQ t-stat.
Intercept 2,525.81 35.84∗∗∗ 425.01 25.10∗∗∗ 60.89 67.30∗∗∗ 157.41 7.45∗∗∗
8:00 756.73 3.91∗∗∗ 46.86 2.66∗∗∗ 2.42 0.84 -50.72 -5.97∗∗∗
8:15 462.87 4.20∗∗∗ 60.80 3.07∗∗∗ 3.61 1.26 -24.51 -2.95∗∗∗
8:30 296.16 3.89∗∗∗ 36.89 2.27∗∗ 3.91 1.31 -25.34 -3.71∗∗∗
8:45 242.61 3.56∗∗∗ 20.96 1.53 0.63 0.32 1.56 0.27
9:00 302.04 4.54∗∗∗ 51.07 3.45∗∗∗ 9.03 2.92∗∗∗ 5.79 1.03
9:15 122.81 2.50∗∗ 16.32 1.45 0.23 0.12 3.17 0.56
9:30 173.29 3.20∗∗∗ 25.55 2.20∗∗ 0.19 0.09 13.03 1.98∗∗
9:45 119.08 2.19∗∗ 20.89 1.83∗ -0.62 -0.35 23.65 3.42∗∗∗
10:00 109.12 1.89∗ 21.87 1.78∗ -0.28 -0.13 38.02 4.01∗∗∗
10:15 197.94 1.41 8.39 0.72 0.74 0.30 23.94 3.06∗∗∗
10:30 -35.37 -0.79 -8.35 -0.94 -1.53 -0.77 9.07 1.69∗
10:45 -1.61 -0.02 -1.87 -0.13 -0.73 -0.25 9.95 1.46
11:00 -28.97 -0.59 -7.23 -0.67 -2.69 -1.46 9.41 1.40
11:15 -68.77 -1.45 -11.41 -1.11 -2.73 -1.57 6.06 1.07
11:30 -88.61 -1.74∗ -4.98 -0.47 -1.50 -0.88 10.05 1.59
11:45 -92.61 -2.55∗∗ -10.06 -1.50 -0.44 -0.30 7.53 1.61
12:15 -224.72 -4.26∗∗∗ -33.69 -3.94∗∗∗ -4.50 -3.33∗∗∗ -9.10 -1.93∗∗
12:30 -162.69 -2.91∗∗∗ -11.18 -1.13 -0.78 -0.41 -13.83 -2.77∗∗∗
12:45 -222.82 -3.64∗∗∗ -29.23 -3.46∗∗∗ -3.55 -2.07∗∗ -11.71 -2.27∗∗
13:00 -183.66 -3.27∗∗∗ -12.25 -1.54 0.14 0.06 -20.38 -3.68∗∗∗
13:15 -62.99 -1.17 24.11 2.02∗∗ 6.17 3.07∗∗∗ -15.08 -2.32∗∗
13:30 414.52 4.28∗∗∗ 169.29 4.63∗∗∗ 25.35 4.99∗∗∗ 9.73 1.32
13:45 206.61 2.78∗∗∗ 95.87 3.72∗∗∗ 15.78 4.24∗∗∗ -11.11 -1.54
14:00 335.18 3.80∗∗∗ 141.72 4.36∗∗∗ 27.43 4.88∗∗∗ -19.62 -2.63∗∗∗
14:15 220.64 3.43∗∗∗ 117.93 4.51∗∗∗ 22.43 6.01∗∗∗ -38.21 -4.47∗∗∗
14:30 951.36 6.10∗∗∗ 351.77 5.67∗∗∗ 55.86 7.40∗∗∗ -1.16 -0.16
14:45 974.95 6.93∗∗∗ 341.29 6.43∗∗∗ 56.64 7.56∗∗∗ 17.38 2.37∗∗
15:00 1,117.31 6.77∗∗∗ 392.62 6.38∗∗∗ 59.63 7.25∗∗∗ -0.62 -0.09
15:15 956.12 7.31∗∗∗ 327.71 6.70∗∗∗ 52.30 7.40∗∗∗ -18.28 -2.17∗∗
15:30 1,059.27 7.36∗∗∗ 330.98 6.94∗∗∗ 54.48 7.20∗∗∗ -26.49 -3.00∗∗∗
15:45 1,143.36 7.70∗∗∗ 334.33 7.30∗∗∗ 57.72 7.41∗∗∗ -30.60 -3.57∗∗∗
16:00 1,385.05 7.90∗∗∗ 374.32 7.33∗∗∗ 63.68 7.69∗∗∗ -22.32 -2.38∗∗
16:15 2,090.52 8.83∗∗∗ 409.74 7.56∗∗∗ 74.75 8.05∗∗∗ -33.32 -3.60∗∗∗
Obs. 141,671 141,671 141,671 141,671
R2 48.37% 55.97% 36.79% 52.10%
continued on the next page. . .
92
Chapter 5 Market Quality & Intraday Patterns in Fragmented Markets
. . . continued from Table 5.3
October to December 2009
LSE t-stat. Chi-X t-stat. BATS t-stat. TQ t-stat.
Intercept 1,909.26 18.91∗∗∗ 1022.79 21.43∗∗∗ 270.82 14.96∗∗∗ 76.64 8.30∗∗∗
8:00 796.55 4.89∗∗∗ 53.12 1.49 -20.53 -2.19∗∗ 79.02 5.70∗∗∗
8:15 465.41 3.83∗∗∗ 74.97 2.04∗∗ -7.88 -0.80 40.93 3.70∗∗∗
8:30 353.92 3.55∗∗∗ 81.51 2.39∗∗ -9.53 -1.11 35.26 3.68∗∗∗
8:45 218.41 2.86∗∗∗ 28.16 1.05 -15.24 -2.02∗∗ 23.09 2.95∗∗∗
9:00 184.84 2.63∗∗∗ 36.44 1.36 -5.12 -0.61 25.97 3.63∗∗∗
9:15 122.97 1.90∗ 10.42 0.39 -1.66 -0.19 16.93 2.48∗∗
9:30 157.22 2.41∗∗ 43.79 1.53 6.72 0.84 18.55 2.60∗∗∗
9:45 126.86 1.98∗∗ 31.66 1.25 3.39 0.43 14.67 2.28∗∗
10:00 59.42 0.99 23.72 0.94 3.65 0.50 12.28 1.86∗
10:15 527.12 1.87∗ 29.79 1.32 2.11 0.30 38.89 1.32
10:30 -58.91 -1.10 -41.09 -1.94∗ -14.04 -2.05∗∗ -6.34 -1.34
10:45 -12.71 -0.18 -27.99 -1.23 -11.10 -1.62 -2.42 -0.55
11:00 -23.27 -0.45 -17.91 -0.79 -9.24 -1.38 0.42 0.08
11:15 -144.05 -2.59∗∗∗ -68.93 -3.07∗∗∗ -21.15 -3.04∗∗∗ -10.05 -1.97∗∗
11:30 -89.77 -1.79∗ -31.25 -1.41 -11.48 -1.87∗ -3.92 -0.77
11:45 -94.17 -2.07∗∗ -9.88 -0.46 -3.38 -0.58 -5.17 -1.25
12:15 -179.56 -3.74∗∗∗ -68.52 -3.59∗∗∗ -18.67 -3.10∗∗∗ -15.03 -3.40∗∗∗
12:30 -133.02 -2.16∗∗∗ -44.74 -1.58 -13.56 -1.54 -10.61 -1.67∗
12:45 -206.09 -3.52∗∗∗ -83.07 -3.45∗∗∗ -23.97 -3.31∗∗∗ -18.74 -3.54∗∗∗
13:00 -107.08 -1.77∗ -41.57 -1.79∗ -6.49 -0.88 -11.71 -2.18∗∗
13:15 -74.17 -1.18 6.11 0.24 20.53 2.58∗∗∗ -3.89 -0.68
13:30 301.37 2.35∗∗ 252.75 3.68∗∗∗ 113.01 4.37∗∗∗ 38.80 3.12∗∗∗
13:45 10.06 0.13 51.27 1.32 36.33 2.59∗∗∗ 5.97 0.83
14:00 110.82 1.31 121.90 2.60∗∗∗ 63.52 3.74∗∗∗ 14.47 1.75∗
14:15 12.60 0.18 58.67 1.82∗ 43.87 3.82∗∗∗ 11.07 1.62
14:30 872.23 6.40∗∗∗ 635.61 6.39∗∗∗ 269.62 6.57∗∗∗ 109.64 7.86∗∗∗
14:45 741.65 5.87∗∗∗ 553.04 6.23∗∗∗ 243.93 6.50∗∗∗ 92.71 6.90∗∗∗
15:00 884.10 6.06∗∗∗ 644.68 6.36∗∗∗ 274.08 6.48∗∗∗ 104.03 6.85∗∗∗
15:15 567.08 5.87∗∗∗ 387.52 6.48∗∗∗ 192.10 7.13∗∗∗ 71.00 6.89∗∗∗
15:30 708.68 5.98∗∗∗ 467.72 6.42∗∗∗ 229.82 6.90∗∗∗ 91.76 7.20∗∗∗
15:45 812.66 6.17∗∗∗ 472.81 6.54∗∗∗ 229.77 7.04∗∗∗ 92.87 7.44∗∗∗
16:00 947.53 7.32∗∗∗ 568.72 7.14∗∗∗ 262.93 7.48∗∗∗ 117.47 7.77∗∗∗
16:15 1,377.17 8.36∗∗∗ 668.49 8.11∗∗∗ 268.69 8.81∗∗∗ 115.30 7.48∗∗∗
Obs. 142,534 142,534 142,534 142,534
R2 36.55% 50.82% 44.42% 36.29%
For the LSE, my findings of a crude U-shape in trading volume are consistent with the
theoretical predictions of Brock and Kleidon (1992) who argue that trading volume is
concentrated at market opening and closing. Investors react on new information at the
beginning of a trading day and adapt their holdings for an overnight position before
market closing. Similar to Abhyankar et al. (1997) and Cai et al. (2004), I find an increase
in trading volume before U.S. market opening on the LSE and Chi-X in Q1 and on all
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venues in Q4. In addition, my findings confirm an increase in trading volume on the
LSE and Chi-X in Q1 and on all platforms in Q4 during the last trading hour of a trading
day, potentially due to portfolio rebalancing for the overnight period. Intraday trading
volume also shows that Chi-X is the only MTF that follows a similar pattern as the LSE,
at least during the second part of the trading day.
Market Shares Figure 5.2 depicts intraday patterns of market shares for all four trad-
ing venues. The LSE is the largest trading venue with highest traded volumes over
both quarters. However, the figure also displays a shift in market shares away from the
LSE towards the MTFs from Q1 to Q4.
In Q1, the LSE dominates Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise as the most active platform
throughout the trading day. LSE’s market share follows a clear U-shape during the
trading day with a peak at around 80.0% at market opening and closing. During the
trading day, LSE’s share in trading volume drops by about 10.0 percentage points. In
contrast to the LSE, Chi-X and Turquoise depict an inverted U-shape with Turquoise
gaining more market share at the beginning and Chi-X at the end of the trading day.
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In Q4, the LSE again exhibits an U-shape, however with a slighter increase in trading
activity during the second half of the trading day. Chi-X still leads the MTFs as most
active trading platform in Q4. Intraday market shares increase on both MTFs, Chi-
X and BATS, until 15:00. Afterwards, trading activity slowly shifts back to the LSE.
Particularly during the last 15 minutes of the trading day, I observe a strong increase of
4.0 percentage points in Q1 on the LSE relative to the three MTFs, and 4.1 percentage
points in Q4. In Q4, Turquoise does not resemble an inverted U-shape anymore but
loses market shares from an initial high at the beginning of the trading day until the
end.
My regression results in Table 5.4 confirm my graphical findings for both quarters. The
shifts in intraday trading activity between the regulated market and MTFs may indicate
that investors put more trust in the price formation process of the LSE during market
opening and closing. Foster and Viswanathan (1993) emphasize a positive relationship
between higher volatility, i.e., price uncertainty, at the market opening and closing and
an increased adverse selection risk. Intuitively, investors prefer the most liquid and
stable market under such circumstances, especially when they have an increased de-
sire to trade in these periods due to portfolio rebalancing (Brock and Kleidon (1992)).
Investors even seem to be willing to accept the price premium at the LSE during such
market conditions since explicit transaction costs on MTFs are lower (compare Section
2.2). Thus, my findings accentuate the importance of traditional exchanges in the price
formation process in an increasingly fragmented European market environment.
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TABLE 5.4: Intraday regression results: Market shares. I compare 69 FTSE100 stocks
traded on the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise between January 5 to March 31, 2009 (1st quar-
ter) and October 1 to December 30, 2009 (4th quarter). I use the regression model presented in
equation 5.2 I report robust standard errors following Thompson (2011), t-statistics are pre-
sented in italic letters. ‘***’ denotes significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at
the 10% level.
January to March 2009
LSE t-stat. Chi-X t-stat. BATS t-stat. TQ t-stat.
Intercept 74.00% 156.36∗∗∗ 17.37% 82.45∗∗∗ 2.47% 35.24∗∗∗ 6.16% 51.25∗∗∗
8:00 8.76% 11.69∗∗∗ -2.43% -5.20∗∗∗ -0.82% -7.42∗∗∗ -5.50% -10.23∗∗∗
8:15 6.08% 9.20∗∗∗ -1.22% -2.97∗∗∗ -0.60% -5.50∗∗∗ -4.26% -8.52∗∗∗
8:30 5.61% 9.62∗∗∗ -1.33% -3.27∗∗∗ -0.44% -4.46∗∗∗ -3.84% -8.85∗∗∗
8:45 4.27% 7.61∗∗∗ -1.97% -5.22∗∗∗ -0.53% -5.87∗∗∗ -1.78% -4.95∗∗∗
9:00 3.85% 6.20∗∗∗ -1.53% -3.89∗∗∗ -0.33% -3.51∗∗∗ -1.99% -6.02∗∗∗
9:15 2.54% 4.92∗∗∗ -1.31% -3.76∗∗∗ -0.46% -4.75∗∗∗ -0.77% -2.61∗∗∗
9:30 2.09% 3.96∗∗∗ -1.15% -3.44∗∗∗ -0.49% -6.00∗∗∗ -0.45% -1.40
9:45 1.46% 3.18∗∗∗ -1.18% -4.11∗∗∗ -0.44% -4.97∗∗∗ 0.16% 0.53
10:00 0.45% 0.80 -1.21% -3.97∗∗∗ -0.51% -4.87∗∗∗ 1.27% 3.84∗∗∗
10:15 1.01% 1.71∗ -1.46% -3.63∗∗∗ -0.44% -4.38∗∗∗ 0.89% 3.10∗∗∗
10:30 0.44% 0.92 -0.94% -3.22∗∗∗ -0.31% -3.22∗∗∗ 0.82% 2.73∗∗∗
10:45 0.40% 0.88 -0.92% -3.01∗∗∗ -0.28% -3.12∗∗∗ 0.79% 2.84∗∗∗
11:00 0.17% 0.33 -0.77% -2.66∗∗∗ -0.26% -3.07∗∗∗ 0.86% 2.78∗∗∗
11:15 0.18% 0.38 -0.53% -1.86∗ -0.19% -2.16∗∗ 0.54% 2.07∗∗
11:30 -0.74% -1.75∗ -0.17% -0.69 -0.04% -0.64 0.96% 3.54∗∗∗
11:45 -0.88% -2.29∗∗ -0.25% -1.25 0.06% 0.85 1.07% 4.50∗∗∗
12:15 -1.41% -3.81∗∗∗ -0.01% -0.03 0.06% 0.96 1.35% 5.81∗∗∗
12:30 -0.83% -1.98∗∗ 0.34% 1.23 0.16% 2.65∗∗∗ 0.33% 1.37
12:45 -1.22% -3.18∗∗∗ 0.40% 1.65∗ 0.16% 1.90∗ 0.65% 2.57∗∗
13:00 -0.77% -1.84∗ 0.91% 3.55∗∗∗ 0.34% 3.76∗∗∗ -0.49% -2.00∗∗
13:15 -0.29% -0.66 1.27% 4.14∗∗∗ 0.45% 5.17∗∗∗ -1.44% -5.35∗∗∗
13:30 0.47% 0.99 2.19% 6.74∗∗∗ 0.44% 4.63∗∗∗ -3.10% -9.01∗∗∗
13:45 1.08% 2.38∗∗ 1.55% 4.91∗∗∗ 0.35% 4.46∗∗∗ -2.97% -8.59∗∗∗
14:00 1.13% 2.37∗∗ 2.38% 7.00∗∗∗ 0.66% 7.20∗∗∗ -4.17% -10.94∗∗∗
14:15 1.25% 2.41∗∗ 2.88% 9.26∗∗∗ 0.97% 8.94∗∗∗ -5.10% -10.77∗∗∗
14:30 0.99% 1.66∗ 4.30% 12.00∗∗∗ 1.00% 8.56∗∗∗ -6.29% -11.86∗∗∗
14:45 1.27% 2.28∗∗ 3.65% 10.96∗∗∗ 0.93% 8.16∗∗∗ -5.84% -11.51∗∗∗
15:00 1.60% 2.65∗∗∗ 4.19% 10.96∗∗∗ 0.88% 7.50∗∗∗ -6.68% -12.11∗∗∗
15:15 2.26% 3.83∗∗∗ 3.83% 9.68∗∗∗ 0.82% 6.83∗∗∗ -6.90% -12.19∗∗∗
15:30 3.22% 4.88∗∗∗ 3.47% 8.42∗∗∗ 0.80% 6.69∗∗∗ -7.49% -12.33∗∗∗
15:45 3.93% 5.62∗∗∗ 3.05% 8.05∗∗∗ 0.81% 6.21∗∗∗ -7.80% -12.16∗∗∗
16:00 4.55% 6.35∗∗∗ 2.51% 6.15∗∗∗ 0.81% 6.20∗∗∗ -7.87% -12.52∗∗∗
16:15 8.71% 12.33∗∗∗ -0.01% -0.02 0.49% 4.29∗∗∗ -9.19% -13.98∗∗∗
Obs. 141,668 141,668 141,668 141,668
R2 22.15% 28.30% 13.94% 36.76%
continued on the next page. . .
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. . . continued from Table 5.4
October to December 2009
LSE t-stat. Chi-X t-stat. BATS t-stat. TQ t-stat.
Intercept 56.34% 79.17∗∗∗ 32.84% 67.97∗∗∗ 8.47% 45.68∗∗∗ 2.35% 22.30∗∗∗
8:00 13.62% 14.15∗∗∗ -10.88% -16.16∗∗∗ -5.01% -12.70∗∗∗ 2.28% 5.58∗∗∗
8:15 8.21% 8.93∗∗∗ -5.98% -8.73∗∗∗ -3.53% -9.44∗∗∗ 1.29% 3.28∗∗∗
8:30 6.36% 7.38∗∗∗ -4.24% -7.13∗∗∗ -2.90% -8.89∗∗∗ 0.78% 2.48∗∗
8:45 5.97% 7.15∗∗∗ -4.06% -6.84∗∗∗ -2.49% -8.25∗∗∗ 0.58% 2.21∗∗
9:00 5.49% 6.72∗∗∗ -4.03% -7.26∗∗∗ -2.17% -8.03∗∗∗ 0.71% 2.76∗∗∗
9:15 5.04% 6.55∗∗∗ -3.99% -8.03∗∗∗ -1.64% -5.90∗∗∗ 0.59% 2.59∗∗∗
9:30 3.84% 4.82∗∗∗ -2.97% -5.76∗∗∗ -1.14% -4.04∗∗∗ 0.28% 1.12
9:45 3.82% 4.87∗∗∗ -2.83% -5.62∗∗∗ -1.15% -4.28∗∗∗ 0.16% 0.71
10:00 2.68% 3.71∗∗∗ -1.98% -4.39∗∗∗ -0.99% -3.75∗∗∗ 0.30% 1.47
10:15 3.71% 3.70∗∗∗ -3.15% -5.80∗∗∗ -1.28% -4.87∗∗∗ 0.72% 0.95
10:30 2.08% 4.37∗∗∗ -1.89% -5.28∗∗∗ -0.53% -2.72∗∗∗ 0.33% 1.76∗
10:45 1.82% 3.47∗∗∗ -1.79% -5.00∗∗∗ -0.45% -2.68∗∗∗ 0.42% 2.21∗∗
11:00 1.83% 4.18∗∗∗ -1.37% -4.53∗∗∗ -0.70% -4.23∗∗∗ 0.24% 1.41
11:15 1.22% 2.80∗∗∗ -1.30% -3.42∗∗∗ -0.29% -1.78∗ 0.36% 2.69∗∗∗
11:30 0.55% 1.30 -0.69% -2.15∗∗ -0.25% -1.54 0.39% 2.27∗∗
11:45 0.33% 0.90 -0.51% -1.73∗ -0.03% -0.25 0.20% 1.47
12:15 -0.11% -0.24 -0.31% -0.98 0.11% 0.59 0.31% 1.83∗
12:30 0.38% 0.74 -0.43% -1.39 -0.09% -0.38 0.14% 0.78
12:45 0.39% 0.57 -0.58% -1.40 0.11% 0.46 0.08% 0.44
13:00 0.03% 0.03 -0.72% -1.41 0.68% 2.28∗∗ 0.02% 0.10
13:15 -0.69% -0.65 -0.53% -0.78 1.46% 4.94∗∗∗ -0.24% -1.01
13:30 -1.99% -1.78∗ 0.19% 0.27 1.88% 5.50∗∗∗ -0.08% -0.38
13:45 -1.06% -0.93 -0.90% -1.22 1.76% 4.89∗∗∗ 0.21% 0.86
14:00 -1.19% -1.32 -0.46% -0.76 1.83% 6.11∗∗∗ -0.17% -0.84
14:15 -1.30% -1.40 -0.95% -1.55 1.98% 5.97∗∗∗ 0.27% 1.24
14:30 -1.86% -2.02∗∗ -0.01% -0.01 2.15% 6.61∗∗∗ -0.28% -1.23
14:45 -2.87% -3.38∗∗∗ 0.63% 1.14 2.64% 8.28∗∗∗ -0.40% -2.02∗∗
15:00 -2.88% -3.49∗∗∗ 1.05% 1.92∗ 2.45% 7.84∗∗∗ -0.62% -3.31∗∗∗
15:15 -1.64% -1.93∗ -0.62% -1.09 2.69% 8.36∗∗∗ -0.43% -2.05∗∗
15:30 -1.99% -2.55∗∗ -0.56% -1.03 2.88% 8.90∗∗∗ -0.34% -1.72∗
15:45 -1.12% -1.32 -1.27% -2.28∗∗ 2.79% 8.49∗∗∗ -0.40% -1.90∗
16:00 -1.26% -1.77∗ -1.04% -2.11∗∗ 2.65% 8.82∗∗∗ -0.34% -1.61
16:15 2.75% 3.47∗∗∗ -2.73% -4.82∗∗∗ 1.34% 4.07∗∗∗ -1.36% -5.33∗∗∗
Obs. 142,480 142,480 142,480 142,480
R2 15.89% 12.94% 24.10% 12.42%
5.3.2 Liquidity
Figure 5.3 reports intraday patterns of quoted spreads for all four trading venues. In
line with my interday analysis, I find that quoted spreads decrease for every 15-minute
interval on each platform from Q1 to Q4. I observe that quoted spreads on MTFs ap-
98
Chapter 5 Market Quality & Intraday Patterns in Fragmented Markets
proach the LSE level and show a stronger co-movement with the regulated market over
time.
In Q1, the LSE shows the smallest quoted spreads for each 15-minute interval compared
to the other platforms. Spreads on Chi-X follow very closely the liquidity patterns on
the LSE. BATS and Turquoise exhibit larger and more volatile spreads over the trad-
ing day. On all platforms, spreads are relatively large at market opening and narrow
quickly during the first 75 minutes of the trading day. During this period, spreads on
the LSE drop by -52.5%, on Chi-X by -65.6%, on BATS by -57.6%, and on Turquoise by
-32.7% compared to the first 15-minute interval. In the last half hour of the trading day,
quoted spreads increase on all venues. This increase is stronger on MTFs with 3.5% on
Chi-X, 4.0% on BATS, and 2,3% on Turquoise, compared to 0.2% on the LSE. On the
LSE, Chi-X and BATS quoted spreads thus follow a (crude) reversed J-shaped pattern.
Spreads on Turquoise exhibit a differing pattern, which resembles a crude U-shape.
They narrow after market opening until 10:00 but then start a slight but steady increase
until market closing.
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In Q4, quoted spreads on all trading venues are of similar magnitude and exhibit a
strong co-movement over the day. Again, liquidity decreases quickly during the first
75 minutes of the trading day. Afterwards, spreads slowly narrow during the remaining
trading day, again resembling a reversed J-shape. There is an exception at 13:30 were
spreads on all venues widen for one 15-minute interval.12 I attribute this spread in-
crease to higher uncertainty due to new information arrival from the U.S. market open-
ing. Compared to Q1, spreads on the LSE, Chi-X, and BATS do not widen shortly before
market closing. Turquoise is the only platform, which exhibits increasing spreads in the
last 30 minutes of the trading day in Q4. My regression results support my graphical
findings, with the exception of the 13:30 spread increase. Regression results only docu-
ment a highly significant increase on the LSE during this period.
The (crude) reversed J-shaped pattern of quoted spreads which I find on the LSE,
Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise in Q4 is also documented by McInish and Wood (1992),
Abhyankar et al. (1997), and Cai et al. (2004). The crude U-shape on Turquoise and
the slight spread increases at the end of the trading day on the LSE, Chi-X, and BATS
in Q1 are in line with theoretical predictions of Brock and Kleidon (1992). Looking at
the relationship between trading volume and quoted spreads, my findings document a
negative correlation on all MTFs. This indicates that liquidity on MTFs increases over
the day along with decreasing spreads. McInish and Wood (1992), Kleidon and Werner
(1993), and Cai et al. (2004) also document this intuitively expected relationship. On
the LSE, I do not find this inverse relationship within the trading day. In contrast to
the MTFs, trading volume on the LSE is high while quoted spreads are wide during
the first hour of the trading day. This finding again indicates the important function of
the regulated market in a fragmented European market environment. Investors seem
to accept higher implicit transaction costs on the LSE relative to MTFs in order to profit
from price discovery on the traditional exchange during market opening.
12In Q1, I find a similar increase in quoted spreads on the LSE, Chi-X, and BATS.
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TABLE 5.5: Intraday regression results: Quoted spreads. I compare 69 FTSE100 stocks
traded on the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise between January 5 to March 31, 2009 (1st quar-
ter) and October 1 to December 30, 2009 (4th quarter). I use the regression model presented in
equation 5.2 I report robust standard errors following Thompson (2011), t-statistics are pre-
sented in italic letters. ‘***’ denotes significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at
the 10% level.
January to March 2009
LSE t-stat. Chi-X t-stat. BATS t-stat. TQ t-stat.
Intercept 6.096 63.94∗∗∗ 6.253 51.31∗∗∗ 10.700 43.61∗∗∗ 19.375 46.72∗∗∗
8:00 8.997 11.55∗∗∗ 18.044 11.99∗∗∗ 17.778 11.72∗∗∗ 8.276 2.23∗∗
8:15 3.845 9.91∗∗∗ 6.251 9.49∗∗∗ 7.796 8.56∗∗∗ 2.429 0.71
8:30 2.491 8.86∗∗∗ 4.082 8.98∗∗∗ 5.037 7.43∗∗∗ 1.080 0.35
8:45 1.725 8.27∗∗∗ 2.838 8.57∗∗∗ 3.005 5.94∗∗∗ 0.744 0.41
9:00 0.922 6.78∗∗∗ 1.069 5.90∗∗∗ 0.371 0.82 0.160 0.11
9:15 0.745 6.71∗∗∗ 0.811 5.20∗∗∗ 0.879 1.84∗ -0.499 -0.38
9:30 0.664 6.18∗∗∗ 0.795 4.92∗∗∗ 1.484 3.06∗∗∗ -1.051 -0.64
9:45 0.533 5.66∗∗∗ 0.572 4.59∗∗∗ 0.722 1.53 -0.862 -0.60
10:00 0.467 5.37∗∗∗ 0.711 4.79∗∗∗ 1.963 3.66∗∗∗ -2.270 -0.95
10:15 0.288 3.42∗∗∗ 0.581 3.76∗∗∗ 0.875 2.06∗∗ -0.756 -0.86
10:30 0.038 0.56 0.115 1.15 0.103 0.25 -1.133 -1.15
10:45 0.007 0.11 0.039 0.44 0.131 0.30 -0.446 -1.18
11:00 0.046 0.80 0.125 1.61 0.155 0.72 -0.288 -0.68
11:15 -0.030 -0.52 0.063 0.89 -0.087 -0.42 -0.143 0.54
11:30 0.044 0.61 0.091 1.12 0.058 0.41 0.310 1.24
11:45 -0.066 -1.43 -0.063 -1.32 -0.038 -0.21 0.497 0.75
12:15 -0.132 -3.71∗∗∗ -0.126 -3.25∗∗∗ -0.618 -1.67∗ 0.096 0.27
12:30 -0.064 -1.13 -0.045 -0.63 -0.425 -1.17 0.215 0.32
12:45 -0.161 -2.92∗∗∗ -0.142 -2.26∗∗ -0.642 -1.71∗ -0.327 -0.96
13:00 -0.255 -4.52∗∗∗ -0.214 -2.96∗∗∗ -1.020 -3.01∗∗∗ 0.745 1.39
13:15 -0.183 -2.62∗∗∗ -0.165 -1.43 -0.927 -2.39∗∗ 1.154 0.62
13:30 0.240 2.30∗∗ 0.037 0.27 -0.395 -1.07 2.172 3.39∗∗∗
13:45 -0.084 -1.04 -0.118 -0.97 -0.922 -2.40∗∗ 1.937 3.28∗∗∗
14:00 -0.286 -3.17∗∗∗ -0.517 -4.39∗∗∗ -2.179 -4.07∗∗∗ 2.334 4.85∗∗∗
14:15 -0.458 -5.67∗∗∗ -0.724 -5.26∗∗∗ -2.634 -4.45∗∗∗ 3.166 3.45∗∗∗
14:30 -0.440 -4.76∗∗∗ -0.841 -5.33∗∗∗ -2.907 -4.62∗∗∗ 2.720 3.67∗∗∗
14:45 -0.551 -5.73∗∗∗ -0.995 -5.68∗∗∗ -2.996 -5.07∗∗∗ 2.878 3.51∗∗∗
15:00 -0.549 -5.54∗∗∗ -1.050 -5.94∗∗∗ -2.835 -5.27∗∗∗ 4.189 2.94∗∗∗
15:15 -0.655 -6.42∗∗∗ -1.192 -7.60∗∗∗ -2.992 -4.73∗∗∗ 3.612 3.42∗∗∗
15:30 -0.812 -7.86∗∗∗ -1.250 -8.09∗∗∗ -2.994 -5.02∗∗∗ 3.563 4.21∗∗∗
15:45 -0.850 -8.40∗∗∗ -1.233 -8.07∗∗∗ -2.988 -4.87∗∗∗ 3.244 4.41∗∗∗
16:00 -0.942 -8.95∗∗∗ -1.260 -8.00∗∗∗ -3.095 -4.82∗∗∗ 4.384 3.34∗∗∗
16:15 -0.842 -9.36∗∗∗ -0.910 -6.41∗∗∗ -2.642 -4.36∗∗∗ 5.603 7.09∗∗∗
Obs. 141,671 141,671 141,671 141,671
R2 71.07% 53.81% 16.93% 13.55%
continued on the next page. . .
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. . . continued from Table 5.5
October to December 2009
LSE t-stat. Chi-X t-stat. BATS t-stat. TQ t-stat.
Intercept 5.317 84.59∗∗∗ 5.486 78.11∗∗∗ 6.619 23.34∗∗∗ 10.646 20.08∗∗∗
8:00 6.657 16.85∗∗∗ 8.720 16.13∗∗∗ 11.926 15.57∗∗∗ 8.157 13.67∗∗∗
8:15 2.428 13.72∗∗∗ 2.456 9.55∗∗∗ 4.003 8.43∗∗∗ 2.573 6.67∗∗∗
8:30 1.553 11.82∗∗∗ 1.431 6.87∗∗∗ 2.388 6.13∗∗∗ 1.515 4.27∗∗∗
8:45 1.080 10.17∗∗∗ 1.020 5.22∗∗∗ 1.670 4.36∗∗∗ 0.796 2.33∗∗
9:00 0.805 8.45∗∗∗ 0.709 3.87∗∗∗ 1.048 2.91∗∗∗ 0.367 1.11
9:15 0.619 6.62∗∗∗ 0.554 3.14∗∗∗ 0.769 2.20∗∗ 0.261 0.79
9:30 0.496 5.80∗∗∗ 0.336 2.00∗∗ 0.584 1.71∗ 0.205 0.64
9:45 0.338 4.17∗∗∗ 0.210 1.27 0.385 1.16 0.067 0.20
10:00 0.297 3.03∗∗∗ 0.334 1.81∗ 0.421 1.26 0.322 0.90
10:15 0.209 2.54∗∗ 0.116 0.70 0.244 0.73 -0.013 -0.04
10:30 -0.007 -0.11 -0.005 -0.04 0.027 0.10 -0.181 -0.73
10:45 -0.078 -1.53 0.055 1.77∗ 0.167 2.24∗∗ -0.086 -0.92
11:00 -0.033 -0.70 0.045 1.13 0.089 1.20 -0.028 -0.42
11:15 -0.157 -3.00∗∗∗ -0.033 -1.16 -0.069 -0.78 -0.117 -1.66∗
11:30 -0.131 -2.99∗∗∗ -0.063 -2.32∗∗ -0.150 -1.41 -0.088 -1.64
11:45 -0.084 -2.74∗∗∗ -0.047 -2.19∗∗ -0.147 -1.60 -0.047 -1.06
12:15 -0.168 -4.20∗∗∗ -0.109 -5.27∗∗∗ -0.116 -3.35∗∗∗ -0.134 -3.07∗∗∗
12:30 -0.086 -1.52 -0.094 -2.66∗∗∗ -0.146 -2.78∗∗∗ -0.067 -1.12
12:45 -0.190 -4.20∗∗∗ -0.173 -3.42∗∗∗ -0.184 -3.57∗∗∗ -0.113 -2.18∗∗
13:00 -0.222 -4.03∗∗∗ -0.223 -3.95∗∗∗ -0.395 -4.21∗∗∗ -0.220 -3.62∗∗∗
13:15 -0.140 -2.09∗∗ -0.286 -3.96∗∗∗ -0.522 -3.92∗∗∗ -0.156 -1.37
13:30 0.440 2.95∗∗∗ -0.017 -0.18 -0.186 -1.25 0.361 1.90∗
13:45 -0.276 -3.15∗∗∗ -0.265 -4.87∗∗∗ -0.550 -4.23∗∗∗ -0.463 -3.10∗∗∗
14:00 -0.226 -2.72∗∗∗ -0.408 -2.74∗∗∗ -0.833 -2.84∗∗∗ -0.575 -2.10∗∗
14:15 -0.387 -5.30∗∗∗ -0.504 -3.20∗∗∗ -1.018 -3.27∗∗∗ -0.704 -2.48∗∗
14:30 -0.011 -0.18 -0.391 -2.47∗∗ -0.846 -2.69∗∗∗ -0.431 -1.52
14:45 0.034 0.50 -0.348 -2.31∗∗ -0.771 -2.58∗∗∗ -0.238 -0.87
15:00 0.149 1.51 -0.322 -2.14∗∗ -0.688 -2.34∗∗ 0.002 0.01
15:15 -0.309 -4.40∗∗∗ -0.461 -3.36∗∗∗ -0.936 -3.43∗∗∗ -0.579 -2.22∗∗
15:30 -0.360 -4.87∗∗∗ -0.531 -4.13∗∗∗ -1.080 -4.22∗∗∗ -0.702 -2.81∗∗∗
15:45 -0.430 -5.39∗∗∗ -0.563 -4.70∗∗∗ -1.102 -4.62∗∗∗ -0.742 -3.25∗∗∗
16:00 -0.673 -8.55∗∗∗ -0.663 -5.77∗∗∗ -1.303 -5.63∗∗∗ -0.919 -4.21∗∗∗
16:15 -0.741 -9.26∗∗∗ -0.659 -5.76∗∗∗ -1.313 -5.71∗∗∗ -0.469 -1.85∗
Obs. 142,534 142,534 142,534 142,534
R2 69.80% 67.84% 50.85% 52.38%
5.3.3 Informed Trading
Figure 5.4 depicts intraday patterns of 5-minute price impacts on the LSE, Chi-X, BATS
and Turquoise. The figure shows that price impacts decrease for each 15-minute inter-
val on all venues from Q1 to Q4. Similar to my findings on intraday quoted spreads,
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price impacts move more closely and show less variation over time. The highest frac-
tion of informed trades takes place at the LSE in both quarters during most time of the
trading day. However, intraday patterns of price impacts are very close across trading
venues (even in Q1) compared to the previous measures.
In Q1, price impacts on all platforms decrease throughout the trading day, more quickly
during the first hour of trading and then modestly for the rest of time. During the
first hour of the trading day price impacts decrease by -31,2% on the LSE, by -25.8%
on Chi-X, by -38.0% on BATS, and by -23.3% on Turquoise. As a consequence, trades
convey most information during market opening and lose information content over the
trading day. Investors on the LSE and Chi-X seem more informed than on BATS and
Turquoise.
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In Q4, price impacts on all platforms show a strong co-movement and still a continu-
ing decrease over the trading day. Again, the largest decrease in price impacts can be
attributed to the first trading hour. My regression results confirm the statistical signifi-
cance of all presented developments.
Similar to McInish and Wood (1992), I find a positive relationship between this adverse
selection risk measure (price impact) and quoted spreads. This contradicts the findings
of Foster and Viswanathan (1993) who report increased adverse selection at both, mar-
ket opening and closing. My results are rather in line with other market microstructure
models that address the relationship of informed trading and liquidity (e.g., Glosten
and Milgrom, 1985). They find that quoted spreads widen when the amount of infor-
mation based trading increases. My results may indicate that informed traders benefit
most from their informational advantage at market opening while the rest of the market
is still relatively uninformed. Higher price uncertainty may thus represent a favorable
opportunity for informed traders to act in order to conceal their superior knowledge.
Klussmann and Hautsch (2011) deliver another explanation. They show that the arrival
of intraday news releases is clustered in the first half of the trading day and contributes
to higher market uncertainty at market opening. While news releases peak at market
opening they decrease gradually during the rest of the trading day (Klussmann and
Hautsch, 2011, p. 324). This finding may also be connected to my intraday findings of
price impacts. Apparently, the decrease of informed trading as presented in Figure 5.4
may result from a decreasing news arrival over the trading day.
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TABLE 5.6: Intraday regression results: Price impacts. I compare 69 FTSE100 stocks
traded on the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise between January 5 to March 31, 2009 (1st quar-
ter) and October 1 to December 30, 2009 (4th quarter). I use the regression model presented in
equation 5.2 I report robust standard errors following Thompson (2011), t-statistics are pre-
sented in italic letters. ‘***’ denotes significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at
the 10% level.
January to March 2009
LSE t-stat. Chi-X t-stat. BATS t-stat. TQ t-stat.
Intercept 4.970 21.74∗∗∗ 4.359 16.27∗∗∗ 2.868 5.26∗∗∗ 2.979 8.48∗∗∗
8:00 3.951 8.48∗∗∗ 2.784 4.63∗∗∗ 4.302 4.16∗∗∗ 2.872 5.22∗∗∗
8:15 1.969 5.64∗∗∗ 1.468 3.40∗∗∗ 1.965 2.14∗∗ 1.578 2.89∗∗∗
8:30 1.543 3.64∗∗∗ 1.177 2.42∗∗ 2.755 4.03∗∗∗ 1.493 2.59∗∗∗
8:45 1.206 3.13∗∗∗ 1.010 2.74∗∗∗ 1.302 1.83∗ 1.545 2.61∗∗∗
9:00 0.918 2.80∗∗∗ 0.705 1.81∗ 1.512 3.03∗∗∗ 1.221 2.27∗∗
9:15 0.429 1.36 0.230 0.69 0.958 1.75∗ 0.780 1.97∗
9:30 0.549 1.94∗ 0.568 1.90∗ 1.777 3.26∗∗∗ 1.139 2.81∗∗∗
9:45 0.526 1.65∗ 0.624 1.73c 1.500 2.50∗∗ 1.236 3.27∗∗∗
10:00 0.289 0.95 0.178 0.61 1.559 1.95∗ 0.581 1.29
10:15 0.018 0.07 0.510 1.50 1.524 2.81∗∗∗ 0.711 1.77∗
10:30 -0.115 -0.41 0.260 0.94 1.388 2.28∗∗ -0.057 -0.14
10:45 -0.561 -2.03∗∗ -0.040 -0.12 1.242 1.93∗ 0.343 0.73
11:00 -0.239 -0.81 0.094 0.28 0.712 1.36 0.713 1.55
11:15 0.040 0.14 0.153 0.47 0.997 1.59 0.344 0.75
11:30 -0.354 -1.46 -0.251 -0.77 0.557 0.98 0.229 0.50
11:45 -0.294 -1.18 -0.354 -1.08 1.096 2.13∗∗ -0.347 -0.76
12:15 -0.149 -0.63 -0.099 -0.33 0.413 0.78 0.037 0.10
12:30 -0.387 -1.51 -0.326 -1.02 0.941 1.90∗ -0.021 -0.05
12:45 -0.284 -1.19 -0.259 -0.92 0.373 0.82 0.087 0.24
13:00 -0.254 -1.19 -0.499 -1.60 0.375 0.65 0.026 0.07
13:15 -0.580 -2.18∗∗ -0.247 -0.72 0.258 0.47 0.154 0.29
13:30 -0.050 -0.18 -0.358 -1.18 0.155 0.31 -0.038 -0.08
13:45 -0.343 -1.09 -0.179 -0.48 0.099 0.17 0.541 1.08
14:00 -0.428 -1.37 -0.060 -0.19 0.852 1.62 0.038 0.09
14:15 -1.100 -4.42∗∗∗ -0.816 -2.90∗∗∗ -0.016 -0.03 -0.636 -1.14
14:30 -1.220 -3.48∗∗∗ -0.651 -1.76∗ -0.179 -0.32 -0.510 -1.18
14:45 -0.588 -2.05∗∗ -0.556 -1.64 0.941 1.71∗ -0.135 -0.28
15:00 -1.224 -4.55∗∗∗ -0.875 -2.51∗∗ 0.159 0.31 -0.513 -1.16
15:15 -1.069 -4.23∗∗∗ -0.596 -1.88∗ 0.704 1.45 -0.379 -1.00
15:30 -0.914 -3.52∗∗∗ -0.259 -0.82 -0.189 -0.32 -0.453 -0.83
15:45 -1.509 -5.09∗∗∗ -0.930 -3.19∗∗∗ 0.088 0.18 -0.758 -1.60
16:00 -1.423 -5.00∗∗∗ -1.000 -2.85∗∗∗ -0.701 -1.36 -0.331 -0.74
16:15 -1.615 -5.42∗∗∗ -1.340 -4.38∗∗∗ -0.600 -1.31 -1.633 -4.06∗∗∗
Obs. 114,910 114,910 114,910 114,910
R2 11.48% 5.30% 1.37% 1.48%
continued on the next page. . .
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. . . continued from Table 5.6
October to December 2009
LSE t-stat. Chi-X t-stat. BATS t-stat. TQ t-stat.
Intercept 3.199 22.12∗∗∗ 3.486 30.38∗∗∗ 3.146 21.86∗∗∗ 2.815 16.37∗∗∗
8:00 3.580 10.93∗∗∗ 3.159 11.27∗∗∗ 3.015 8.82∗∗∗ 2.812 9.56∗∗∗
8:15 2.424 8.61∗∗∗ 1.934 9.31∗∗∗ 1.957 7.51∗∗∗ 1.521 8.00∗∗∗
8:30 1.529 6.58∗∗∗ 1.232 6.08∗∗∗ 1.218 4.43∗∗∗ 0.978 4.06∗∗∗
8:45 1.111 5.72∗∗∗ 0.985 7.46∗∗∗ 0.901 4.25∗∗∗ 0.828 4.21∗∗∗
9:00 0.895 4.35∗∗∗ 0.885 4.67∗∗∗ 0.811 3.67∗∗∗ 0.600 2.34∗∗
9:15 0.519 2.91∗∗∗ 0.479 3.01∗∗∗ 0.515 2.90∗∗∗ 0.408 1.80∗
9:30 0.446 2.21∗∗ 0.409 2.78∗∗∗ 0.405 1.86∗ 0.410 1.81∗
9:45 0.386 2.18∗∗ 0.350 2.29∗∗ 0.306 1.69∗ 0.477 2.34∗∗
10:00 0.331 1.42 0.306 1.86∗ 0.169 0.70 0.085 0.39
10:15 0.106 0.63 0.136 1.02 0.094 0.70 0.250 1.19
10:30 0.133 0.74 0.220 1.40 0.134 0.66 0.317 1.63
10:45 0.093 0.64 0.059 0.52 -0.068 -0.44 0.320 1.85∗
11:00 0.048 0.29 -0.045 -0.37 -0.031 -0.22 0.057 0.34
11:15 -0.090 -0.61 -0.103 -0.87 -0.282 -1.87∗ 0.007 0.04
11:30 0.154 0.96 0.057 0.47 0.090 0.50 0.126 0.55
11:45 0.063 0.35 0.084 0.56 -0.141 -0.83 0.083 0.39
12:15 -0.003 -0.02 -0.142 -1.15 -0.164 -1.25 0.029 0.17
12:30 -0.013 -0.07 -0.038 -0.29 -0.124 -0.75 0.089 0.44
12:45 0.054 0.35 -0.036 -0.27 -0.041 -0.24 0.199 0.96
13:00 -0.266 -1.95∗ -0.181 -1.65∗ -0.252 -1.66∗ -0.173 -1.00
13:15 -0.614 -2.39∗∗ -0.324 -1.70∗ -0.607 -3.20∗∗∗ -0.198 -0.74
13:30 -0.545 -2.57∗∗ -0.296 -1.51 -0.714 -4.27∗∗∗ -0.682 -2.76∗∗∗
13:45 -0.075 -0.37 -0.044 -0.27 -0.097 -0.55 0.087 0.36
14:00 -0.183 -1.04 -0.126 -0.88 -0.403 -2.45∗∗ -0.257 -1.27
14:15 -0.602 -3.66∗∗∗ -0.445 -3.38∗∗∗ -0.515 -2.82∗∗∗ -0.499 -2.70∗∗∗
14:30 -0.743 -4.37∗∗∗ -0.364 -2.48∗∗ -0.497 -3.19∗∗∗ -0.458 -2.08∗∗
14:45 -1.075 -5.29∗∗∗ -0.512 -3.45∗∗∗ -0.660 -3.76∗∗∗ -0.779 -3.63∗∗∗
15:00 -0.699 -3.96∗∗∗ -0.431 -2.96∗∗∗ -0.519 -3.51∗∗∗ -0.767 -3.61∗∗∗
15:15 -0.870 -4.51∗∗∗ -0.434 -2.70∗∗∗ -0.635 -3.61∗∗∗ -0.571 -2.79∗∗∗
15:30 -0.897 -5.34∗∗∗ -0.484 -3.73∗∗∗ -0.653 -3.78∗∗∗ -0.670 -3.45∗∗∗
15:45 -0.921 -5.59∗∗∗ -0.450 -3.07∗∗∗ -0.722 -4.02∗∗∗ -0.498 -2.48∗∗
16:00 -0.964 -6.07∗∗∗ -0.621 -4.64∗∗∗ -0.784 -4.35∗∗∗ -0.562 -2.66∗∗∗
16:15 -1.069 -5.43∗∗∗ -0.851 -5.76∗∗∗ -1.040 -5.81∗∗∗ -0.820 -3.94∗∗∗
Obs. 136,382 136,382 136,382 136,382
R2 10.33% 8.80% 3.77% 2.94%
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5.4 Conclusion
MTFs have successfully captured a large fraction of European equity trading volume,
especially in the UK. The market share of the LSE in blue chips decreased from almost
100.0% in 2007 to less than 60.0% at the end of 2009. I study the influence of increased
market fragmentation on trading intensity and market quality under the Markets in
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) over time and from an intraday perspective.
My sample comprises 69 FTSE 100 stocks traded on the regulated market, the LSE, and
the three largest MTFs, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise, between January and December
2009.
Over 2009, competition between the LSE and MTFs increases significantly as trading
volume becomes more dispersed. Market shares strongly move away from the LSE
which loses -17.2% to MTFs. Particularly Chi-X and BATS gain market shares during
my observation period. Despite this increase in order flow fragmentation, I find im-
proving market quality on all trading venues. Quoted and effective spreads decrease
on all platforms during my observation period. This result suggests an increase in
overall liquidity. Also other trading intensity and market quality measures indicate an
improvement of overall market quality.
Order book depth increases significantly on the LSE while it remains unchanged on
MTFs. This result may be connected to a stronger HFT activity on MTFs (Menkveld,
2011b). These market participants often cancel their limit orders immediately after
placement to reduce associated economic risks. As a consequence, MTF order books
are not as thick and may thus be more sensitive to sudden market distortions.
I obtain further insights into investor behavior by analyzing intraday patterns of trad-
ing volume, market shares, quoted spreads, and price impacts. To evaluate the impact
of increased fragmentation on changes in intraday patterns over time, I focus on the
first (Q1) and last quarter (Q4) of 2009. I find that intraday patterns for each analyzed
measure converge across platforms from Q1 to Q4. This finding indicates that the mar-
ket matures and grows closer together.
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Intraday patterns of trading volume differ between the LSE and MTFs during both
quarters. The LSE resembles a crude U-shape which is in line with theoretical predic-
tions of Brock and Kleidon (1992) and empirical findings of other authors (e.g., Werner
and Kleidon, 1996), while MTFs show increasing trading volume only in the second half
of the trading day.13 Trading volume increases in the afternoon on all venues which can
be associated to the U.S. market opening. The analysis of intraday market shares reveals
the importance of traditional exchanges in a fragmented market environment. My data
suggests that investors prefer to trade on the regulated market at opening and closing,
whereas trading switches to MTFs during the trading day. This result may indicate that
market participants rely on the price formation process of regulated markets in periods
of increased volatility and price uncertainty.
In contrast to theoretical predictions of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Brock and
Kleidon (1992) who expect U-shaped patterns for quoted spreads, my results indicate a
reversed J-shape, i.e. increasing liquidity over the trading day which is also in line with
other empirical studies (e.g., Cai et al., 2004). The underlying market structures may
be one explanation for differences between theoretical and empirical evidence. The
aforementioned theoretical models are based on quote-driven markets while I analyze
order-driven markets. Intraday results for price impacts are in line with theoretical pre-
dictions of informed trading and liquidity (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). My data
suggest that the information content of trades declines quickly during the first trading
hour and then falls continuously for the rest of the trading day. The decreasing infor-
mation content of trades could also be attributed to a continuous decrease in intraday
news arrival (Klussmann and Hautsch, 2011).
Overall, the results of this chapter may mitigate concerns of detrimental effects on mar-
ket quality caused by increasing levels of order flow fragmentation. Yet, they also reveal
that investors seem to have clear preferences on the choice of a trading venue depend-
ing on the market situation. Increased trading activity on the LSE at market opening
and closing could be connected to increased price uncertainty. However, this could also
be connected to market participants who are obliged to open or close their position at
13See Figure 3.1 for an overview of related empirical findings.
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a regulated market (e.g., mutual funds, insurance companies, etc). To control for such
a potential intradaily bias in trading activity triggered by certain market participants,
I elaborate on this question in the next chapter from a more general perspective. I use
a daily panel regression analysis to investigate whether there is an influence of price
uncertainty on the order routing behavior of market participants.
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Back to the Roots - Market Fragmentation
and Order Routing
“Technological innovations that enable high-speed, low-cost electronic trading systems are dra-
matically changing the structure of financial markets”
Barclay et al. (2003)
Chapter Overview. This chapter addresses empirically certain market conditions which
may influence order routing behavior of market participants in a fragmented market
environment. I also address the influence of order routing behavior on the information
contribution of the four trading platforms to efficient prices.
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6.1 Introduction
BEFORE the digitalization of equity trading, the predominant idea of how to orga-nize an exchange was to centralize trading as much as possible. One important
reason for this centralization were high search costs due to expensive information and
communication technology. Intuitively, the idea of centralization seems logical in or-
der to improve market quality by concentrating liquidity on one trading venue. This
phenomenon is described by positive network externalities (Pagano, 1989b). The com-
bination of high search costs and positive network externalities created high market
entrance barriers for competitors.
This old-fashioned trading landscape changed quickly with the proliferation of elec-
tronic trading and regulatory changes. Today, a combination of computer algorithms
and high speed internet connects trading venues worldwide within milliseconds.
Prices on competing markets can be monitored and compared real-time and this at
much lower costs compared to previous decades (Menkveld, 2011a). Along with regu-
latory changes, modern information and communication technology lead to the emer-
gence of new fully electronic trading venues, so-called Multilateral Trading Facilities
(MTFs). While traditional trading venues had to adapt to the digitalization of equity
trading, MTFs were constructed from scratch to cope with this new era of electronic
trading. Quickly, they have captured a significant share in European equity trading
and pushed forward market fragmentation. The equity trading landscape in the UK
has experienced increased competition from MTFs as one of the first within Europe.
Until today, the FTSE 100 exhibits the largest level of fragmentation of all major Euro-
pean stock indices.1
Figure 2.1 displays the monthly share of electronic order book trading turnover of the
LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise from 2008 to 2012. The figure marks a continuous loss
in turnover of the LSE, formerly Europe’s largest trading venue also compared to other
national exchanges.2 According to the Federation of European Securities Exchanges
1See http://fragmentation.fidessa.com/europe/ for an overview of fragmentation of Euro-
pean equity markets.
2See http://www.fese.be/en/.
113
Chapter 6 Back to the Roots - Market Fragmentation and Order Routing
(FESE), Chi-X captured the position as Europe’s largest trading venue – including tra-
ditional exchanges – for the first time in August 2011.
Yet, the continuous fragmentation is reconsolidated by the emergence of a new group of
market participants who emerged along with technological innovations and regulatory
changes in equity trading. Algorithmic trading (AT), which can be defined as «the use of
computer algorithms to automatically make certain trading decisions, submit orders, and man-
age those orders after submission» (Hendershott et al., 2011, p. 1) and in particular high
frequency trading (HFT) which the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) refers
to as «...professional traders acting in a proprietary capacity that engage in strategies that gen-
erate a large number of trades on a daily basis[...]characteristics often attributed to proprietary
firms engaged in HFT are[...]the use of extraordinarily high-speed and sophisticated computer
programs for generating, routing, and executing orders [...]very short time-frames for establish-
ing and liquidating positions[...]ending the trading day in as close to a flat position as possible»
connect the fragmented markets (U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, 2010, p. 45).
In combination with the use of smart order routing technologies, particularly HFT links
markets via trades and quote updates within milliseconds.
Several scholars attribute many positive effects to the new trading platforms and mar-
ket participants and their influence on overall market quality. Menkveld (2011b) argues
that HFT are particularly active on MTFs. Through their trading strategies they act as
new multi-venue market makers. He analyzes the introduction of Chi-X on the Dutch
equity market where the MTF competes for market share against the traditional trading
venue NYSE Euronext. He finds that HFT is active in both markets, but HFT accounts
for the largest trading share on Chi-X. According to his paper, MTFs are particularly
attractive to HFT for various reasons. On the one hand, HFT can act as multi-venue
market makers due to speed sensitive environments which MTFs provide. On the other
hand, MTFs offer lower fee structures. He argues that the emergence of HFT and MTFs
create price pressure on traditional trading venues and the increased competition trig-
gers positive welfare effects as for instance bid-ask spreads are reduced. Also Kirilenko
et al. (2011) find that HFT account for a significant share of market making activity due
to their trading strategies. They often use passive, liquidity providing orders to manage
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their target inventory levels (Kirilenko et al., 2011, p. 23).
Pagnotta and Philippon (2012) argue that – everything else being constant – all investors
benefit from from faster trading through MTFs and HFT. Yet, they also state that differ-
ent investors have different preferences on trading speed. Accordingly, these investors
must value other attributes of a trading venue as well. Competing trading platforms
may acknowledge this fact by addressing the particular needs of different trading clien-
tele.
Other studies do not directly address HFT in their data sets but investigate the infor-
mation contribution of MTFs to price efficiency compared to the traditional exchange.
For example, Riordan et al. (2011) as well as Jung and Katzschner (2012) find in their
UK and German data sets, respectively, that MTFs lead in price discovery. This indi-
cates more informed trading on those venues. Also Hoffmann (2010) states that MTFs
exhibit a significant higher share of private information compared to the traditional
trading venues. These positive information effects on MTF price efficiency – and thus
market quality – could be attributed to the increased HFT activity on MTFs. Foucault
et al. (2012) also underline this idea in their findings. They argue that adverse selection
is stronger when informed investors have a speed advantage because they can buy just
in advance of positive news and sell in advance of negative news. MTFs clearly offer
HFT the surrounding for the creation of speed advantages.
While several scholars argue that the appearance of MTFs and HFT have contributed to
increased general market quality, there are also concerns. There is, for instance, an on-
going debate in the academic and finance world of how much trading speed is actually
necessary and helpful (e.g., Bunge, 2011). Connected to alternative trading platforms
and HFT, new events such as flash crashes or fake liquidity raise questions whether
positive effects of MTFs and their HFT clientele are sustainable and helpful to the over-
all efficiency of a market. Most research papers address the influence of MTFs and HFT
on market quality during normal market conditions. However, it is of great importance
to investigate whether market services of a trading venue also function in periods of
distress. A robust market structure should offer fair and orderly services at all times to
market participants. In this respect, especially the sustainability of trading activity on
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MTFs and finally their service provision in abnormal market conditions is of my major
interest in this chapter.
Also other researchers point out that market participants may favor the traditional ex-
change over MTFs under certain market conditions. Storkenmaier et al. (2012) study the
impact of public information on trading and market fragmentation in FTSE 100 stocks
on the LSE and on Chi-X. They find that increased volatility attributed to increased
public information release affects Chi-X market shares negatively, i.e., investors prefer
to trade over the LSE during these periods.
Another important aspect which I address in this chapter is connected to the prevalent
opinion of many practitioners, who argue that MTFs predominantly free-ride on the
price formation of traditional exchanges. Also academic scholars provide evidence that
MTF price formation may be heavily dependent on traditional exchanges. For instance,
Gomber et al. (2012) analyze the effect of trading halts in DAX 30 constituents on the
regulated market (Xetra) and an MTF (Chi-X). They state that the risk of missing circuit
breakers on MTFs, which is due to regulatory difference between regulated markets
and MTFs, represent a systemic risk to the market. They argue that in case of a trading
halt at the traditional exchange, volatility may cascade to MTFs where it may trigger a
flash crash like scenario. Yet, Gomber et al. (2012) find that if trading is halted on the
regulated market, this is directly connected to an overall reduction of trading activity on
the MTF. Their findings support the dependency of MTF price formation on regulated
market prices.
Inspired through my findings in Section 5.3.1 and the concerns presented above, I an-
alyze market conditions that may effect order routing and trading behavior of market
participants in a fragmented market environment. As indicated in Figure 5.2, market
participants seem to prefer trading on the traditional exchange at market opening and
closing. These trading periods typically exhibit increased price uncertainty (e.g., Foster
and Viswanathan, 1993) which might influence the investors’ order routing. From an
economic perspective, increased adverse selection risk on MTFs may be an explanation.
As stated above, MTFs exhibit a significant higher share of traders with superior knowl-
edge (Hoffmann, 2010; Riordan et al., 2011; Jung and Katzschner, 2012; Foucault et al.,
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2012). The risk of being adversely selected increases in periods of high market uncer-
tainty (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988). Therefore, uninformed traders might preferably
trade over the LSE and route their orders there when uncertainty about a stock price is
high. In turn, informed traders may follow the uninformed which might thus lead to
increased price discovery on the LSE – relative to MTFs – and a defragmentation of the
market in general.
I am also interested in HFT market making activity or – put differently – periods that
may be connected to it (Menkveld, 2011b). The periods of my interest are typically con-
nected to increased inventory risk which makes it uncomfortable for market makers
to comply with their duty. HFT may act as market makers but they do not follow the
regulatory requirements such as traditional market makers, i.e. they are not obliged to
provide liquidity according to the rule book of a traditional exchange. Also regulators
point out concerns that liquidity provision by HFT may not be granted as stable over
time (U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, 2010, p. 50). For this reason, I explore
trading activity on the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise when market making becomes
difficult. Unfortunately, my data set does not allow me to directly measure HFT (mar-
ket making) activity on any trading venue. However, if HFT preferably trade on MTFs,
market share of those trading platforms should significant decline when market mak-
ing becomes generally more difficult as HFT can just drop out of the market.
For the empirical analysis in this part of my thesis, I calculate the consolidated or-
der book of all four trading venues according to the methodology laid out in Section
4.1 during January 2 and December 31, 2009. The consolidated order book basically
represents overall market activity since all four trading venues combined account for
nearly 100% of non-OTC trading volume in FTSE 100 constituents. The final result is a
stock-day panel from which I calculate all necessary variables which are explained in
Section 4.2.
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6.2 Volatility and intraday market shares
The intraday results in section 5.3.1 present a first indication that market participants
seem to favor trading on the LSE during market opening and closing. These periods
are typically characterized by an increased price uncertainty. Building on this first in-
dication, I derive further graphical evidence to support this idea. Therefore, I look at
the intraday market shares, which have been calculated in section 5.3. For all trading
venues I calculate intraday 15-minute market shares per stock for the ten highest and
ten lowest volatility days of 2009.3 To identify the above mentioned specific volatil-
ity days, I use stock price volatility from the consolidated order book. Consequently, I
compare market shares of each trading venue on these high/low volatility days with
the the full sample market shares over 2009.
There are various ways how to calculate intraday volatility in a stock. Following Patton
(2011), I briefly point out the three most common measures which are
1. squared daily returns,
2. the realized volatility measure, and
3. the intra-daily range.
The easiest and most intuitive way to calculate intraday volatility are squared returns.
However, a significant shortcoming of this measure is that intraday price variation is
neglected. Thus, an equity which exhibits large intraday price movements but closes
with a similar price as the opening price would falsely exhibit a low volatility estimate.
The two concepts of realized volatility and intra-daily range represent better alterna-
tives which address the shortcoming of squared daily returns. Both measures have
been intensively discussed and analyzed in market microstructure research. Realized
volatility which is defined as
(6.1) RVt =
n
∑
i=1
r2i,t ,
3Individual market shares represent the portion of trading volume on trading venue j compared to the
overall trading volume of the consolidated market during each 15-minute interval.
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i.e., the sum of n squared returns r of stock t computed from intraday transaction prices.
It has been effectively used in academic research and Andersen et al. (2003) formally
justify this measure. Its main advantage is that it is a more efficient estimator of the
true volatility and has a lower variance compared to the squared daily returns.
Alizadeh et al. (2002) discuss in detail the advantages and disadvantages of realized
volatility compared to the intra-daily range. They find that the realized volatility esti-
mator becomes close to the true volatility if the sample of transaction prices is detailed
enough, which indicates the necessity of intraday data. However, the main drawback
of this volatility measure is its sensitivity to market microstructure noise. Due to the so
called bid-ask bounce, the observed price is noisier than the true price. While the true
price is the midpoint of the bid-ask spread, the observed price jumps up and down the
midpoint by the half-spread depending on whether a trade is a buy or a sell. Thus, the
realized volatility measure overestimates true volatility in the presence of transaction
prices which are based on bid-ask spreads (Alizadeh et al., 2002).
Therefore, I choose the scaled intra-daily range (IDR) as presented by Patton (2011) for
calculating price uncertainty.
(6.2) IDRt =
1
2
√
(ln(2)
ln
(
max(pi)
min(pi)
)
A large advantage of this measure is connected to its calculation method. I only need
two prices, the highest and the lowest of a trading day. Further, the IDR captures true
volatility compared to the mean variance of a stock price. This measure has been widely
used in finance literature for many years and was first presented by Parkinson (1980).
The scaling factor ( 1
2
√
(ln(2)
) assures the unbiasedness given a Brownian motion of stock
prices (Patton, 2011, pp.4-5). By choosing the IDR, I calculate an unbiased estimator of
true volatility.4
Figures 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 reveal that the LSE exhibits a larger intraday market share
on high volatility days. Consequently, LSE’s market share is lower on trading days
with less price uncertainty, i.e., regular or low volatility days. In comparison to the
4For robustness, I also calculate volatility days for all trading venues by using realized volatility. Results
are identical to the IDR volatility measure for both quarters.
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LSE, the three MTFs show a reciprocal picture. Apparently, market participants seem
to be more active on these platforms when price uncertainty is lower. On high volatility
days MTF market share decreases. This pattern is clearly visible for Chi-X and BATS.
Turquoise shows a different picture. Surprisingly, Turquoise shows a similar pattern
than the LSE for intraday market shares until 13:00. One possibility for this finding
might be the merger of LSE’s dark pool activity with Turquoise during 2009. Yet, this is
merely speculation.
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FIGURE 6.1: Intraday market shares of the LSE, for regular, high, and low volatility
days in 2009. I calculate intraday 15-minute market shares per stock according to Section 4.2.2
for the 10 highest and 10 lowest volatility days of 2009. I compare these graphical results with
the regular average 15-minute market shares per stock of the overall sample of 244 trading days.
FIGURE 6.2: Intraday market shares of Chi-X, for regular, high, and low volatility days
in 2009. I calculate intraday 15-minute market shares per stock according to Section 4.2.2 for
the 10 highest and 10 lowest volatility days of 2009. I compare these graphical results with the
regular average 15-minute market shares per stock of the overall sample of 244 trading days.
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FIGURE 6.3: Intraday market shares of BATS, for regular, high, and low volatility days
in 2009. I calculate intraday 15-minute market shares per stock according to Section 4.2.2 for
the 10 highest and 10 lowest volatility days of 2009. I compare these graphical results with the
regular average 15-minute market shares per stock of the overall sample of 244 trading days.
FIGURE 6.4: Intraday market shares of Turquoise, for regular, high, and low volatility
days in 2009. I calculate intraday 15-minute market shares per stock according to Section 4.2.2
for the 10 highest and 10 lowest volatility days of 2009. I compare these graphical results with
the regular average 15-minute market shares per stock of the overall sample of 244 trading days.
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6.3 Econometric Modeling
Apparently, market participant’s uncertainty about stock prices seems to have an effect
on their order routing behavior. Besides graphical evidence, I deliver first econometri-
cal proof from an intraday perspective in Section 5.3.1. Here, my results indicate that
market participants seem to trade more actively on the LSE at market opening and
closing, which are typically associated with higher price uncertainty due to new infor-
mation arrival or portfolio rebalancing. Yet, these results may be influenced by various
other factors as for instance the need of certain market participants to close their books
with reference prices coming from a regulated market. Therefore, I develop economet-
ric models which analyze these relations rather over time instead of intraday. My goal
is to find out whether high price uncertainty of market participants influences market
fragmentation negatively. Connected to this, I also investigate the effect of increased
price uncertainty on price discovery. For this, I model price discovery of each trad-
ing venue via information shares according to Hasbrouck (1995) as outlined in Section
4.2.3.
Besides price uncertainty, I investigate further effects and market conditions which may
influence market fragmentation and thus the order routing behavior of market partic-
ipants. Therefore, I control on an individual stock level for several other potential fac-
tors such as liquidity, trading volume, market capitalization, and the average price of
a stock. Additionally, I create a proxy for difficult market making days as outlined in
Section 4.2.4. I expect MTF trading activity to be considerably lower on these days, due
to a potential withdrawal from HFT.
The use of smart order routing technologies enable market participants to trade on all
four trading venues in parallel. For this reason, I derive overall trading volume in a
stock, effective spreads, and the average price for a stock from the consolidated order
book which I create from all four single order books.5
I develop two OLS regression models with robust clustered standard errors, according
5See Section 4.1 for details about the creation of the consolidated order book.
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to Thompson (2011)6. The first model measures the influence of the above outlined
factors on (a) market fragmentation or (b) individual market shares of the LSE, Chi-X,
BATS, and Turquoise. I model market fragmentation as the volume share of stock i
on day t traded on other markets (MTFs) than the traditional exchange (LSE), i.e., it
represents the relative MTF trading share.7
Regression Model I:
measurei,t/j = α0 + β1HighVola(C)i,t + β2MarketMakingi,t + β3Eff.Spr(C)i,t
+ β4ln Vol(C)i,t + β5ln Mcapi,t + β6ln Avg Pr(C)i,t + ei,t(6.3)
where measurei,t/j represents either (a) the MTF traded volume share of a stock i on day
t (given that the measure represents fragmentation) or (b) the market share of stock i on
day t on trading venue j.8 These measures are modeled as a function which includes:
• the dummy variable HighVola(C)i,t which is 1 if a stock’s price uncertainty mea-
sured by the intra-daily volatility range belongs to the highest 1, 3, or 5% volatility
days of the consolidated order book and 0 otherwise,9
• the dummy variable MarketMakingi,t which is 1 if a trading day t has been classi-
fied as a difficult market making day on any of the trading venues as explained
in Section 4.2.4 and 0 otherwise, and
• other market (control) factors: The effective spread Eff.Spr(C)i,t as a measures of
overall market liquidity, the logarithm of daily trading volume ln Vol(C)i,t, the
6Clustered standard errors according to Thompson (2011) control simultaneously for correlations in the
regression residuals across two dimensions. In my data panel, residuals might be correlated across
sample firms (firm effect) and across time (time effect). Clustering for those two dimensions allows me
thus to obtain robust standard errors. For details on the methodology, see Thompson (2011).
7Compare Section 4.2.1.
8I run the regression model separately for LSE, Chi-X, BATS, or Turquoise market shares or the fragmen-
tation variable.
9I deliberately select the intra-daily range to capture the full range of daily volatility in a stock rather
than the standard deviation around mean prices, see also Section 6.2. To check for robustness, I also
estimate the regression model with other volatility indicators. Firstly, I use realized volatility on the
individual stock level which delivers identical results as the IDR. Secondly, I estimate the model with
the VFTSE as an indicator of overall market uncertainty on a macro level. The VFTSE index captures
implied volatility embedded in prices of FTSE 100 options and serves thus as a perfect indicator for
overall expected market uncertainty. The results of overall market uncertainty are similar to the results
of price uncertainty on the stock level. Therefore, I do not discuss these results in detail.
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logarithm of a stock’s market capitalization ln Mcapi,t, and the logarithm of the
daily average price of a stock ln Avg Pr(C)i,t (“C” stands for the consolidated order
book).
Descriptive statistics in Section 6.4.1 indicate a positive relationship between market
capitalization and fragmentation, which means that higher market cap stocks are being
traded more actively on MTFs. Therefore, I run a separate regression as a robustness
variation of Regression Model I, where I replace the market capitalization variable with
dummy variables for highest and lowest market cap quintiles.
Several scholars have outlined that MTFs lead in price discovery (e.g., Riordan et al.,
2011; Jung and Katzschner, 2012). Therefore, my second regression model measures the
influence of price uncertainty and the other above outlined factors on Hasbrouck (1995)
information shares.
Regression Model II:
measurei,t,j = α0 + β1HighVola(C)i,t + β2MarketMakingi,t + β3Eff.Spr(C)i,t
+ β4ln Vol(C)i,t + β5ln Mcapi,t + β6ln Avg Pr(C)i,t + ei,t(6.4)
where measurei,t,j represents detrended Hasbrouck (1995) information shares of stock i
on day t on trading venue j.10 All other components of the regression model are equal
to Regression Model I.
10Also information shares of the LSE and Chi-X seem to follow a trend over time (see Figure 4.3). While
the LSE exhibits a higher contribution to price efficiency at the beginning of 2009 this share decreases
over time while Chi-X and TQ information shares increase (see Table 6.1). Therefore, I also detrend
trading venues’ information shares – assuming a deterministic trend – by taking the residuals from a
linear regession model of the relevant measures on time.
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6.4 Regression Results
6.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
I present descriptive statistics for endogenous and exogenous variables of Regression
Models I and II in Table 6.1 over the full data sample as well as during Q1 and Q4 to
get an idea how the variables developed over time. The table lists averages across all
stocks for the endogenous variables fragmentation (Frag) and Hasbrouck (1995) infor-
mation shares of each trading venue (e. g. , InfoShare LSE). The table also includes aver-
ages across all stocks for the exogenous variables volatility (IDR(C)), effective spreads
(Eff.Spread(C)), trading volume (Trad.Vol.(C)), market capitalization (Mcap), and the av-
erage price (Avg.Price(C)).11
As presented in the previous chapter, fragmentation increases over time along with
liquidity. While trading in UK equities was fragmented on average by 28.2% in Q1 this
ration increased to 45.7% in Q4. Effective Spreads decrease by roughly 2 bps from Q1
to Q4. Price uncertainty was higher in Q1 with a mean intraday volatility of 3.4% (1.6%
in Q4). A first glance on the trading venues information shares (full sample) reveals
that Chi-X on average seems to contribute most to overall price discovery with 52.4%.
While MTF information shares seem to grow over time, e. g. , Chi-X from 41% in Q1 to
60.2% in Q4, LSE’s contribution to price discovery decreases from Q1 to merely 26.9%
in Q4.12 This finding is in line with other studies who argue that prices often “move
first” on MTFs (e.g., Riordan et al., 2011).
Table 6.2 presents first descriptive insights into the correlation of various parameters of
Regression Models I and II over the full sample period. The table hints to a negative
correlation between overall market fragmentation and volatility (IDR) as well as effec-
tive spreads. This on the one hand, may point to a reduction of MTF trading activity
11For the descriptive statistics part, I use regular intra-daily volatility (IDR) as proposed in Section 6.2
instead of dummy variables for the highest 1%, 3%, or 5% volatility days (HighVola). I also use actual
instead of logarithmic values for trading volumes, market caps and average prices. For brevity, I do
not list individual market shares of the four trading venues as they have already been discussed in
detail in Section 5.2. (C) indicates that this measures has been created from the the consolidated order
book.
12See also Figure 4.3 for a graphical overview of information shares during 2009.
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TABLE 6.1: Descriptive statistics: Variables of regression model I & II The table presents
endogenuous and exogenuous variables of Regression Model I & II. For descriptive statistics, I
use regular intra-daily volatility as proposed in Section 6.2 instead of dummy variables for the
highest 1%, 3%, or 5% volatility days. I also use actual instead of logarithmic values for trading
volumes, market caps and average prices. For brevity, I do not list individual market shares of
the four trading venues as they have already been discussed in detail in Section 5.2. Dummy
variables for difficult market making days are not included in this table. (C) indicates that this
measures has been created from the the consolidated order book.
Full (16,836 Obs.) Q1 (4,140 Obs.) Q4 (4,209 Obs.)
Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev
Frag 0.367 0.074 0.282 0.022 0.457 0.031
InfoShare LSE 0.361 0.151 0.480 0.156 0.269 0.121
InfoShare ChiX 0.524 0.165 0.410 0.181 0.602 0.139
InfoShare BATS 0.068 0.065 0.082 0.074 0.081 0.060
InfoShare TQ 0.049 0.054 0.029 0.043 0.049 0.044
IDR(C) 0.023 0.021 0.034 0.029 0.016 0.009
Eff.Spread(C) [bsp] 3.609 2.004 4.841 2.901 2.806 1.068
Trad.Vol.(C) [in kGBP] 5,449 6,304 5,499 6,560 5,753 6,295
Mcap [in kGBP] 19,343 26,719 16,430 23,885 22,610 30,399
Avg. Price(C) [GBP] 780.62 667.81 674.93 582.39 909.12 761.34
once volatility increases, while fragmentation on the other hand seems to foster overall
liquidity.
In the regressions, I also control for market capitalization and the average price. With
regard to market capitalization, I am particularly interested whether fragmentation af-
fects different sized companies in the same way. The correlation coefficients indicate
that market fragmentation is positively associated with market capitalization of a stock.
This might indicate that large cap stocks are preferably traded over MTFs.
Table 6.2 reveals a further interesting insight with regard to the trading venues infor-
mation contribution to efficient prices. The correlation between LSE information shares
and volatility is positive. Contrarily, the information shares of all MTFs show negative
correlations with volatility. This preliminary finding may support the idea that trad-
ing activity concentrates at the traditional exchange particularly in abnormal market
situations.
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6.4.2 Regression Results
In the following section, I present the results of my Regression Models I and II. For
both models, I use detrended endogenous variables as explained in Section 4.2.1 and
I use logarithmic values of trading volumes, market capitalizations, and average stock
prices. I also calculate robust clustered standard errors according to Thompson (2011)
for both models.
Price Uncertainty and Market Fragmentation I use the volatility of the consolidated
order book – measured by the IDR – to represent market participants’ price uncertainty
of a stock. My intention is to analyze the order routing behavior of market participants
under abnormal market conditions. Therefore, I create dummy variables for the highest
1%, 3%, and 5% of all volatility observations of my IDR measure (HighVola(C)). Table 6.3
displays results of Regression Model I for all three volatility categories – Panel A (1%),
Panel B (3%), and Panel C (5%) – from the yearly sample with a total of 16,836 observa-
tions.13 I find a significant negative relationship between market fragmentation (Fragi,t)
and increased price uncertainty (HighVola(C)) for the 1% and 3% of the highest volatil-
ity observations. This evidence clearly indicates decreasing MTF trading volumes with
increasing price uncertainty.
The table also shows the impact of price uncertainty on individual market shares of
the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. I find a significant positive relationship be-
tween price uncertainty and LSE market shares for the highest 1% and 3% volatility
observations. All MTFs exhibit negative coefficients for the 1% dummy where BATS
and Turquoise coefficients are highly significant. This shows on a more detailed level
that market participants preferably route their orders to the LSE in trading periods
of increased price uncertainty while MTFs lose order flow under such circumstances.
While BATS and Turquoise experience significant losses in market shares with increas-
ing volatility, the effect on Chi-X seems not as evident. Chi-X exhibits no significant
losses for any of the three volatility categories. In general, the effect is less evident
13I also run the regression for over Q1 and Q4 as a robustness check. Results for these periods are similar
to the yearly sample and thus confirm the robustness of my model over time.
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for all trading venues for lower volatility categories, i.e., the 3% and 5% IDR dummy.
In other words, if trading conditions normalize, fragmentation increases and trading
activity spreads to MTFs.
Overall, these results confirm my intraday findings of Chapter 5. Trading activity does
concentrate on the traditional exchange when price uncertainty is high (e.g., at market
opening or closing). As potential causes for the intraday patterns I envision: (a) the
need of certain market participants to open and close their positions on a regulated
market due to regulatory requirements (e.g., mutual funds) or (b) increased adverse
selection risk on MTFs which drives investors to route their orders to the LSE during
these periods.
The results of this chapter deliberately neglect intradaily variations of trading activ-
ity but still find a negative relationship between volatility and market fragmentation.
This points thus rather to option (b). It seems that a concentration of trading activ-
ity on a single trading venue – no matter if intraday or interday – is more influenced
by adverse selection. Several scholars state that investors trading on MTFs exhibit a
higher degree of private information or react quicker upon public information (e.g.,
Hoffmann, 2010; Riordan et al., 2011). Additionally, scholars state that the adverse se-
lection risk increases when informed traders have a speed advantage (Foucault et al.,
2012). Both findings point to higher adverse selection risk at MTFs. Increased volatility
widens the informational gap between informed and uninformed traders even further
and trading on MTFs may thus become particularly unpleasant for market participants.
This may explain potential shifts in market particiants’ order routing towards the tra-
ditional exchange. Further reasons may be given through the complementary services
that the traditional exchange offers – besides a less speed-sensitive environment. Mar-
ket participants may value additional services of traditional exchanges, such as circuit
breakers, real market makers, or an independent market surveillance, as particularly
important during abnormal trading periods.
Liquidity and Market Fragmentation I measure a stock’s market wide liquidity by
effective spreads of the consolidated order book (Eff. Spread(C)). I find a significant
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negative relationship between effective spreads and fragmentation as stated in Table
6.3. This reveals that liquidity and fragmentation are positively connected. Contrarily,
increasing spreads (decreasing liquidity) lead to a reduction in MTF trading volume.
Put differently, in normal market conditions when overall trading activity is high, mar-
ket participants are more willing to route their orders to MTFs. This finding can be ex-
plained by network externalities, as shown by Pagano (1989a). He states that network
externalities may cause a liquidity spiral. MTFs may be able to absorb more liquidity
with an overall rising level of trading activity. Market participants who choose to trade
over the LSE due to insufficient liquidity on MTFs will potentially re-route their orders
with rising market liquidity.
Table 6.3 indicates that Chi-X is the only MTF that significantly benefits from rising
liquidity levels. The LSE exhibits a significant positive relationship between effective
spreads and its market share. This means that the LSE is the only trading venue that
attracts increasing trading volume if overall liquidity drops. Market participants thus
seem to favor the LSE given a lower liquidity trading environment.
Trading Volume, Market Capitalization, and Market Fragmentation Table 6.3 re-
veals a significant negative relationship between the daily traded volume of a stock
(Ln Vol(C)) and market fragmentation. With regard to individual market shares, I
find significant negative relationships between daily traded volume and MTF market
shares, while the LSE shows a significant positive relation. These findings may be ex-
plained by the risk of an adverse price change on a market with little – or less – power
to absorb large orders (Pagano, 1989a). If a trader has a large order, or a large position,
to place in the market, he will always choose the “thickest” market, according to order
book depth.14 The order can thus be executed at a better price and with a lower risk of
an adverse price change. As indicated in the table, market participants route large trad-
ing volumes preferably to the LSE. In Chapter 5, I pointed out that depth on the LSE
may be less sensitive to unexpected market deteriorations as its order book is thicker
14My results do not take into account different order size categories. Yet, larger daily trading volume
is correlated with large order sizes. However, a refinement of this variable with different order size
categories, may be an interesting step for future research.
133
Chapter 6 Back to the Roots - Market Fragmentation and Order Routing
(See also Table 5.2). Another reason for the routing of larger volumes to the LSE may
be that LSE’s liquidity provision is more reliable. Due to ultra fast order submissions
and cancellations of HFT, liquidity levels on MTFs may not be as stable compared to
the traditional exchange.
Market Capitalization. The results of table 6.3 clearly indicate a positive relationship be-
tween market capitalization (Ln Mcap) and market fragmentation. For individual mar-
ket shares, market capitalization shows a significantly positive correlation with Chi-X
as well as Turquoise and a negative correlation with LSE market shares. To analyze
this relationship in more detail, I create two additional dummy variables by cluster-
ing market capitalization into quintiles. I replace the market capitalization variable in
Regression Model I with two market capitalization dummies, (a) representing the low-
est and (b) representing the highest market capitalization quintile. Table 6.4 presents
results for the two market capitalization dummies on individual market shares.15
As already expected from the general market capitalization coefficient in Table 6.2, there
is a difference between trading activity of large and small cap stocks on MTFs and the
LSE. Large cap stocks seem to be preferably traded on MTFs. The high market cap
dummy coefficients are positive for all three MTFs while the LSE market shares exhibits
a significant negative relationship to large cap stocks. However – not as significant –
the table shows a reciprocal picture for small cap stocks. These findings are particularly
interesting because they add to the institutional differences between the LSE and MTFs.
Usually, large cap stocks exhibit high liquidity levels which can be traded without addi-
tional liquidity provision over the electronic limit order books. Small cap stocks, how-
ever, are often less liquid and the supplementary liquidity provision of a (LSE) market
maker may come in handy, if necessary.
MTFs do not offer supplementary liquidity provision through market makers. Yet, sev-
eral scholars argue that HFT may take over these market making activities on MTFs
by instantly providing liquidity via their limit order strategies (e.g., Menkveld, 2011b;
Kirilenko et al., 2011). Others support this view and argue that HFT particularly pro-
15Results of other coefficients are identical to Regression Model I. Therefore, I only present coefficients for
the two market cap quintiles.
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TABLE 6.4: Regression Model I: Market capitalization. I compare 69 FTSE 100 stocks
traded on the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise between January 5 to December 30, 2009. I use
the regression model presented in equation 6.3 with detrended endogenuous variables (per stock
i and day t) and logarithmic values of trading volumes, market capitalizations, and average stock
prices. However, for the results of this table, I replace the market cap variable of equation 6.3
with two dummy variables for the (a) lowest quintile and (b) highest quintile of all market cap
observations. Results of other coefficients are identical to Regression Model I. Therefore, I only
present coefficients for the two market cap dummies. I report robust standard errors following
Thompson (2011), t-statistics are presented below the regression coefficients in italics. ‘***’
denotes significance at the 1% level, ‘**’ at the 5% level, and ‘*’ at the 10% level.
2009 Full Sample
(a) Mcap low (b) Mcap high
MkShare LSEi,j 0.0032 -0.0066 ***
1.51 -2.75
MkShare ChiXi,j -0.0018 0.0050 ***
-1.38 3.07
MkShare BATSi,j -0.0005 0.0014
-0.70 1.60
MkShare TQi,j -0.0019 * 0.0030 **
-1.79 2.39
vides liquidity when it is expensive, i.e., when spreads are wide and therefore needed
(Hendershott and Riordan, 2009, p. 4).
However, even if these supplementary functions may be provided by HFT, this does
not imply that they can be counted on in any circumstances. One of my major research
questions addresses the reliability of HFT liquidity provision in a fragmented market
environment. Institutional differences between a traditional exchange and MTFs in the
service provision may herein play an important role. While HFT may instantly decide
to halt liquidity provision, traditional market makers are obliged to continue their duty
according to the exchange’s rules and requirements.
Market Making and Market Fragmentation To test the reliability of HFT mar-
ket making strategies, I address a scenario that poses serious problems to liquidity
providers. I create dummy variables for trading days which can be considered as dif-
ficult in terms of market making. These days are typically characterized by a long or
short bias of market participants. Once a trading day exhibits continuously increasing
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or decreasing stock prices, it is harder for market makers to control their inventory. A
major goal for a market maker is to close his book with a zero position in order to not
face any overnight exposure. The same accounts for most HFT trading strategies (Bro-
gaard et al., 2012). Thus, long or short biased trading days are associated with higher
inventory risk and thus potential trading losses. Typically, HFT is not required to pro-
vide liquidity by a regulated market’s rule book. Therefore, I expect HFT activity to
be considerably lower during these days. Since HFT accounts for a large share of MTF
trading volume, I consequently expect the associated trading volume on MTFs to be
significantly lower during these difficult market making days.
Table 6.3 displays regression results of my difficult market making dummies (Market
Making). As expected, I find a significant negative relationship between difficult mar-
ket making days and market fragmentation. In particular, on difficult market making
days, market shares are lower on Chi-X and BATS while they positively contribute to
LSE’s market share. My findings support the idea that HFT market making activity is
negatively influenced as soon as it becomes difficult to control inventory risk. Unfortu-
nately, my data set does not allow me to actually distinguish between HFT and regular
market participants. It would be of particular interest to see how HFT trading strategies
change under such circumstances. I leave this for future research.
Price Discovery, Price uncertainty, and Fragmentation Besides liquidity and order
book depth, there are other important factors of market quality. The information con-
tent of a price represents such an important indicator which is directly connected to
market efficiency. Several scholars argue that quote driven price information on MTFs
have become even more efficient and informative than on traditional exchanges (e.g.,
Riordan et al., 2011; Jung and Katzschner, 2012). They contradict the argumentation
of many practitioners who claim that MTFs would free-ride on the price formation of
traditional exchanges. Yet, an important aspect of high market quality is not only to
lead in certain market quality measures but to provide high quality services during
any market condition, particularly in short periods of possible intense distress.
Table 6.5 displays regression results of Regression Model II, where I concentrate on
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the influence of increased price uncertainty on Hasbrouck (1995) information shares.16
The exogenous variables are the same as in Regression Model I. However, I am mainly
interested in the influence of volatility on the information contribution of each single
trading platform to efficient prices. The rest of the variables serve as controls. Results
indicate that increased volatility leads to an increase of LSE’s information shares while
MTF information shares decrease. Only the LSE and Chi-X exhibit significant results in
this respect. Yet, these are also the two major markets that contribute to price discov-
ery.17 The influence of volatility on information shares is highly significant not only for
the top 1.0% of highest volatility observations but also for the 3.0% and 5.0%.
From an economic perspective, this finding may be connected to results of Regression
Model I. When price uncertainty grows, the risk of being adversely selected increases
over proportionally on MTFs. Market participants seem to be aware of this fact and
therefore, route their orders preferably to the LSE during these periods. Informed
traders usually try to conceal their superior knowledge in periods of high trading ac-
tivity (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988). Yet, if trading activity on MTFs reduces, informed
traders may be forced to follow other market participants to the LSE. This in turn leads
to an increase in LSE’s contribution to price discovery and – vice versa – a decrease in
Chi-X’s price discovery.
16As outlined in Section 4.2.3, information shares measure where prices “move first”.
17See also Figure 4.3.
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6.5 Conclusion
MTFs have captured a significant share of trading volume from traditional exchanges
over the recent years. The main drivers for this development is their focus on high-
speed trading technology and innovative fee models. This change within the European
trading landscape went hand in hand with the appearance of a new trader clientele
which fits perfectly to the institutional setup that MTFs provide. Speed sensitive in-
vestors, known as HFT, are today responsible for 40% to 60% of daily trading volume
in European blue chip indices.18 Through SOR technology, HFT is able to place orders
on different trading venues within milliseconds in order to gain trading profits. These
trading strategies connect markets instantly and further lead to a quasi multi-venue
market making activity of HFT. Several scholars argue that these activities positively in-
fluence overall market quality (e.g., Menkveld, 2011b; Kirilenko et al., 2011). They also
argue that MTF transaction price pressure on traditional exchanges triggers positive
welfare effects for the market in general. Others claim that MTFs are in the meantime
ahead in price discovery compared to traditional exchanges and that MTFs incorporate
a higher degree of information based trading (e.g., Hoffmann, 2010; Riordan et al., 2011;
Jung and Katzschner, 2012).
Yet, an important aspect of market quality is the provision of high quality services dur-
ing any market condition, but particularly in periods of possibly intense distress. MTFs
may grant these high quality services in times of severe market turmoil, but they also
depend on active market participants who trade during these periods in order to keep
up high market quality. Especially with regard to HFT activity, which is stronger on
MTFs, questions arise whether market quality on these trading venues is reliable also
in difficult market situations.
This chapter addresses the influence of increased price uncertainty and other market
conditions on order routing differences of market participants between the LSE, Chi-
X, BATS, and Turquoise. My results suggest that market participants prefer to trade on
the LSE when price uncertainty is high. This result may stem from an over-proportional
18See http://hft.thomsonreuters.com/
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adverse selection risk on MTFs during periods of high price uncertainty. Others have
found that the share of informed trading is higher on MTFs and thus is the risk of being
adversely selected, particularly when price uncertainty increases. Connected to this
finding is my evidence that suggests a decreasing information content of MTF prices
when price uncertainty increases. As market participants seem to be aware of the in-
creased adverse selection risk on MTFs during periods of high market distress, they
choose to trade over the LSE or they reduce their trading activity generally. Informed
market participants may potentially follow the uninformed ones to the LSE, as my re-
sults suggest a strong increase in LSE’s price discovery in periods of increased market
uncertainty. I also find a significant drop in MTF trading activity on trading days which
are associated with difficult market making. As HFT can choose when to provide liq-
uidity or not, I explain this finding with a reduction of HFT market making activity
– via limit order submission – as soon as market making becomes difficult and thus
costly.
In general, the findings of this chapter point to the trust of market participants in the
price formation process of the LSE, particularly in periods of severe distress. This trust
may also be connected to a superior service provision which is not only focused on
speed, but also on other important factors, e. g. , real market makers, circuit breakers,
an independent market surveillance unit, etc. It shows that not all market participants
are equally speed sensitive and therefore, traders may have heterogeneous preferences
about speed and the location of order execution, accordingly (Pagnotta and Philippon,
2012).
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Conclusion
“Regulators’ task has been to facilitate an appropriately balanced market structure that promotes
competition among markets, while minimizing the potentially adverse effects of fragmentation
[. . . ] Given the complexity of this task, there clearly is room for reasonable disagreement as to
whether the market structure at any particular time is, in fact, achieving an appropriate balance
of these multiple objectives. Accordingly, [. . . ] it is important to monitor these issues and,
periodically, give the public, including the full range of investors and other market participants,
an opportunity to submit their views on the matter.”
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2013)
Chapter Overview. This chapter of the thesis contains two sections. Section 7.1 summa-
rizes the main findings of my empirical research. Section 7.2 provides an outlook with
regard to future research questions which are connected to the fragmented European
equity trading environment.
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7.1 Summary
THE trading landscape of European equity markets has changed tremendouslysince the introduction of MiFID in November 2007. This European Directive
allowed new alternative trading venues to compete for equity order flow and particu-
larly MTFs have captured a significant share of it. Consequently, the quasi-monopoly
of traditional exchanges ended and order flow and liquidity have become fragmented
ever since. Along with fragmentation, questions arise about the economic effects of
this regulatory change. One the one hand, there might be negative effects associated to
market fragmentation, as it seems intuitive to concentrate trading as much as possible
at one trading venue in order to increase the probability of order execution. Addition-
ally, market fragmentation may decrease transparency and lead to increasing search
costs for market participants. On the other hand, market participants may benefit from
order flow competition as it is connected to competition in transaction fees and to the
proliferation of new services that are meant to attract investors.
This thesis provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of trading venue competition
in Europe’s most fragmented equity market, the UK. In particular it addresses the influ-
ence of increased fragmentation and competition on market quality in FTSE 100 stocks
during 2009. Tick-size order book data of the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise, with a
total of 2.72 billion data points, reveal various interesting results with regard to market
quality and the order routing behavior of market participants.
The results of Chapter 5 clearly indicate that MTFs are able to capture a significant
share of trading volume and thus play an important role in UK equity trading. Their
focus on low-latency technology and innovative fee models has granted them increas-
ing trading activity of market participants. This increased competitive pressure leads
to an improvement of overall market quality. Liquidity, measured by quoted and ef-
fective spreads, increases at all four trading venues along with market fragmentation
during the observation period. Chapter 5 also addresses the relationship between or-
der flow and liquidity in a multi-market intraday analysis during Q1 and Q4 of 2009.
The results show that MTF intraday patterns of liquidity and trading intensity measure
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converge with LSE intraday patterns from Q1 to Q4. This indicates maturing market
quality on MTFs over time. A direct comparison of individual intraday patterns re-
veals that particularly Chi-X exhibits market quality levels comparable of those of the
LSE. Chapter 5 also shows that market participants prefer to trade on the LSE at market
opening and closing, which are typically associated with increased price uncertainty.
This points to potential changes in the order routing behavior of market participants
depending on certain market situations. But increased intraday trading activity on the
LSE may also be biased by market participants who need to open or close their position
on a regulated market due to regulatory requirements (e. g. , mutual funds, insurance
companies, etc.).
Chapter 6 elaborates on this question by studying the influence of abnormal market
conditions on the order routing behavior of market particiants over time rather than
intraday. The results of this chapter contradict findings of other scholars in several
respects. Since the introduction of MiFID an increasing number of scholars have ad-
dressed the competitive relationship between MTFs and traditional exchanges. Many
attribute mainly positive effects to this competitive relationship as for instance in-
creased overall market quality, a higher degree of information based trading on MTFs
or a greater contribution to efficient prices by MTFs.1 However, most authors con-
sider merely normal market conditions and exclude periods of market distress. Yet,
an important attribute of a functioning market structure is to usually withstand rela-
tively brief periods of serious stress to grant market participants high-quality services
throughout all market conditions. The results of this chapter do not show that MTFs of-
fer inferior services during such periods but they reveal another even more convincing
finding that speaks in favor of the LSE market structure especially during periods of
market distress. Market participants prefer trading on the traditional exchange when
price uncertainty is high or when overall market liquidity is lower. This finding can
most likely be attributed to increased adverse selection risk on MTFs.
Other scholars state that MTFs show a higher degree of informed trading (Hoffmann,
2010; Riordan et al., 2011; Jung and Katzschner, 2012). My results also support this
1Please see Chapter 3 for details.
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idea, as for instance Chi-X price impacts – a measure for the information content of a
trade – are comparable (or even larger in certain periods) to price impacts on the LSE.
Additionally, Chi-X has captured the lead of offering the fastest quote-based price up-
dates within all four markets. This means that tradeable quotes on Chi-X move before
quotes of any other of the four competing trading venues. In line with these findings
are further results, which point to a changing information contribution of the trading
venues to efficient stock prices. Once price uncertainty is high, the information share
of the LSE increases while MTF information shares decrease. Consequently, the LSE
contributes much more to price discovery and their quotes are updated much quicker
compared to MTFs in periods of distress.
Chapter 6 also reveals that MTF market shares decrease significantly on days connected
to difficult market making and thus increased inventory risk. This result can be at-
tributed to higher HFT activity on MTFs. These speed sensitive traders seem to reduce
their trading activity significantly as soon as inventory control risk increases. Under
normal market conditions, i.e., when overall liquidity increases and price uncertainty
is low, MTFs gain market shares. They also exhibit a significant higher market share in
large cap stocks which is connected to the increased liquidity levels of such stocks.
After all, this thesis reveals the importance of the fact that competing trading venues
have acknowledged the particular needs of different trading clientele. MTFs have fo-
cused on technological developments or new services, such as alternative fee structures,
which increased the competitive pressure on traditional exchanges and thus lead to an
improvement of overall market quality. Yet this thesis shows, that investors may as well
value other attributes of a market model than just the pure “need for speed”. With its
market model, the LSE fulfills supplementary functions and services (e.g., true market
making, circuit breakers, independent market surveillance or the listing of new prod-
ucts). These services may be costly but they are also the reason for positively affecting
investor confidence in periods of market distress and thus guarantee trading after all.
Finally, MTFs have started to acknowledge that these supplementary services are im-
portant to gain investors’ trust. It seems that they strive to reach the regulatory status
of their traditional competitors. In May 2013, BATS Chi-X Europe announced that the
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U.K. Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) approved BATS Chi-X Europe’s application
for Recognised Investment Exchange (RIE) status (BATS Chi-X Europe, 2013). This change
in status will provide them access to a greater number of investors that are obligated to
send client orders for stocks to an RIE or an equivalent. At the same time it is a commit-
ment to further invest into risk management, market surveillance and other regulatory
tools and resources that will raise the former MTF on a regulated market level.
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7.2 Outlook
This thesis addresses important questions regarding increased fragmentation of order
flow after the introduction of MiFID. Yet, the current level playing field between regu-
lated markets and MTFs – also with a focus on HFT trading activity – leaves room for
further research.
Enlargement of the level playing field of regulated markets and MTFs MTFs seem
to benefit from their regulatory status that enables them to exclude several important
and costly services from their market models. These services, however, play an impor-
tant role and guarantee usually stable equity trading in all market situations. Future
research could contribute to a re-thinking of a greater level playing field between regu-
lated markets and MTFs. This seems adequate since MTFs have captured a significant
market share and their role in financial markets with regard to price and market influ-
ence is of great importance. To study competition effects of these trading venues with
a special focus on market surveillance differences or volatility interruptions seems in-
teresting.
The role of HFT and algorithmic traders in a fragmented market environment The
importance of HFT and algorithmic trading activity which currently accounts for
roughly 40% to 60% of trading volume in European blue chip indices is enormous.2
Unfortunately, this thesis could only approximate the trading activity of these market
participants because a specific data set which clearly identifies these traders is unavail-
able. Flagged algorithmic or HFT data from trading venues or broker level data di-
rectly would allow a detailed analysis of trading strategies and market making activity
of these market participants. Also the research of new safeguards for the market in
the light of HFT activities seems necessary with a particular focus on the real economic
benefits of HFT.
2See http://hft.thomsonreuters.com/
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Secondary effects of market fragmentation on market quality Scholarly results, as
well as my findings indicate an increase in overall market quality along with raising
fragmentation levels. However, my analysis also highlights that this is predominately
the case for normal market conditions, mainly large cap stocks, or market participants
that have access to smart order routing technologies.
Besides abnormal market conditions, other secondary effects of market fragmentation
have been widely neglected and may deliver interesting research insights. Firstly, the
scattering of liquidity might lead to a situation where several market participants (e.g.
mutual funds, investment funds) are forced to withdraw from trading in particular
stocks that do not exhibit a satisfying liquidity level on the regulated market as they
are traded mainly on alternative trading platforms. These market participants are reg-
ulated not to invest into stocks with insufficient liquidity levels. A common measure
for satisfying liquidity levels is a stock’s trading share on a regulated market.
Secondly, connected to liquidity fragmentation is the dilution of index weights of a
stock. As part of an index – no matter if blue chip or small cap – it does not matter for a
stock whether it is frequently traded on alternative trading platforms. Merely trading
activity on the regulated market that hosts the index accounts for the calculation of the
stocks index weight. This increases the risk of an index drop-out for stocks that are
infrequently traded on the regulated market. Contrarily, it hinders the chances of a
stock to move up the index ladder, which would be quite beneficial as it is connected
with increased transparency.
Overall, there are still many promising topics to be covered and especially the updated
version of MiFID will bring up new and interesting research topics once it will be im-
plemented in 2015.
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Appendix A
Complementary Statistics & Further
Information
A.1 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests for Stationarity
Number of lags in the Unit Root tests was selected by the AIC information criterion.
A.1.1 ADF Tests for Fragmentation Time Series
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests for Fragementation time Series
Type Lags Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau F Pr > F
Zero Mean 1 -132.998 0.0001 -8.14 <.0001
2 -78.8555 <.0001 -6.25 <.0001
3 -55.0224 <.0001 -5.21 <.0001
4 -39.4289 <.0001 -4.4 <.0001
5 -31.7689 <.0001 -3.94 <.0001
Single Mean 1 -2337.54 0.0001 -34.19 <.0001 584.5 0.001
2 -1507.67 0.0001 -26.86 <.0001 360.8 0.001
3 -1106.71 0.0001 -22.78 <.0001 259.55 0.001
4 -820.05 0.0001 -19.55 <.0001 191.06 0.001
5 -679.367 0.0001 -17.73 <.0001 157.12 0.001
Trend 1 -2343.28 0.0001 -34.23 <.0001 585.88 0.001
2 -1511.69 0.0001 -26.9 <.0001 361.69 0.001
3 -1109.81 0.0001 -22.81 <.0001 260.21 0.001
4 -822.384 0.0001 -19.57 <.0001 191.55 0.001
5 -681.349 0.0001 -17.75 <.0001 157.53 0.001
TABLE A.1: ADF tests: Fragmentation time series.
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A.1.2 ADF Tests for LSE Market Share Time Series
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests for LSE Market Shares
Type Lags Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau F Pr > F
Zero Mean 1 -47.0606 <.0001 -4.87 <.0001
2 -28.0457 <.0001 -3.76 0.0002
3 -19.6902 0.0019 -3.16 0.0016
4 -14.3063 0.0086 -2.71 0.0067
5 -11.6205 0.0179 -2.45 0.0141
Single Mean 1 -2337.54 0.0001 -34.19 <.0001 584.5 0.001
2 -1507.67 0.0001 -26.86 <.0001 360.8 0.001
3 -1106.71 0.0001 -22.78 <.0001 259.55 0.001
4 -820.05 0.0001 -19.55 <.0001 191.06 0.001
5 -679.367 0.0001 -17.73 <.0001 157.12 0.001
Trend 1 -2343.28 0.0001 -34.23 <.0001 585.88 0.001
2 -1511.69 0.0001 -26.9 <.0001 361.69 0.001
3 -1109.81 0.0001 -22.81 <.0001 260.21 0.001
4 -822.384 0.0001 -19.57 <.0001 191.55 0.001
5 -681.349 0.0001 -17.75 <.0001 157.53 0.001
TABLE A.2: ADF tests: LSE market shares.
A.1.3 ADF Tests for CHI-X Market Share Time Series
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests for Chi-X Market Shares
Type Lags Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau F Pr > F
Zero Mean 1 -161.182 0.0001 -8.96 <.0001
2 -95.4744 <.0001 -6.88 <.0001
3 -67.4084 <.0001 -5.77 <.0001
4 -50.4709 <.0001 -4.98 <.0001
5 -40.3141 <.0001 -4.44 <.0001
Single Mean 1 -2413.68 0.0001 -34.75 <.0001 603.62 0.001
2 -1557.02 0.0001 -27.28 <.0001 372.08 0.001
3 -1158.57 0.0001 -23.28 <.0001 270.87 0.001
4 -900.832 0.0001 -20.41 <.0001 208.34 0.001
5 -740.97 0.0001 -18.44 <.0001 170.06 0.001
Trend 1 -2424.07 0.0001 -34.82 <.0001 606.15 0.001
2 -1564.33 0.0001 -27.34 <.0001 373.72 0.001
3 -1164.32 0.0001 -23.33 <.0001 272.12 0.001
4 -905.446 0.0001 -20.46 <.0001 209.32 0.001
5 -744.876 0.0001 -18.49 <.0001 170.88 0.001
TABLE A.3: ADF tests: Chi-X market shares.
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A.1.4 ADF Tests for BATS Market Share Time Series
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests for BATS Market Shares
Type Lags Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau F Pr > F
Zero Mean 1 -483.372 0.0001 -15.53 <.0001
2 -293.832 0.0001 -12.04 <.0001
3 -202.342 0.0001 -9.97 <.0001
4 -160.119 0.0001 -8.85 <.0001
5 -138.695 0.0001 -8.22 <.0001
Single Mean 1 -1773.45 0.0001 -29.78 <.0001 443.31 0.001
2 -1132.76 0.0001 -23.4 <.0001 273.89 0.001
3 -802.5 0.0001 -19.56 <.0001 191.36 0.001
4 -649.388 0.0001 -17.51 <.0001 153.38 0.001
5 -574.154 0.0001 -16.39 <.0001 134.29 0.001
Trend 1 -1774.02 0.0001 -29.78 <.0001 443.42 0.001
2 -1133.14 0.0001 -23.41 <.0001 273.96 0.001
3 -802.784 0.0001 -19.57 <.0001 191.42 0.001
4 -649.619 0.0001 -17.52 <.0001 153.42 0.001
5 -574.36 0.0001 -16.39 <.0001 134.33 0.001
TABLE A.4: ADF tests: BATS market shares.
A.1.5 ADF Tests for Turquoise Market Share Time Series
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests for Turquoise Market Shares
Type Lags Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau F Pr > F
Zero Mean 1 -519.641 0.0001 -16.12 <.0001
2 -323.28 0.0001 -12.66 <.0001
3 -225.94 0.0001 -10.56 <.0001
4 -159.617 0.0001 -8.87 <.0001
5 -131.196 0.0001 -8.04 <.0001
Single Mean 1 -3505.14 0.0001 -41.86 <.0001 876.11 0.001
2 -2450.74 0.0001 -33.79 <.0001 570.94 0.001
3 -1838.65 0.0001 -28.78 <.0001 414.22 0.001
4 -1351.6 0.0001 -24.55 <.0001 301.39 0.001
5 -1154.85 0.0001 -22.52 <.0001 253.67 0.001
Trend 1 -3505.27 0.0001 -41.86 <.0001 876.1 0.001
2 -2450.85 0.0001 -33.79 <.0001 570.93 0.001
3 -1838.75 0.0001 -28.78 <.0001 414.21 0.001
4 -1351.67 0.0001 -24.55 <.0001 301.4 0.001
5 -1154.92 0.0001 -22.52 <.0001 253.67 0.001
TABLE A.5: ADF tests: Turquoise market hares.
IV
Appendix A Complementary Statistics & Further Information
A.2 Selected Companies
TABLE A.6: Company sample list of FTSE 100 constituents. This table contains all stocks
that fulfill the filter criteria outlined in Section 4.1. The list contains the company names,
their official ticker symbol, their average daily market capitalization as well as the average daily
trading volume on all four trading venues.
Name Ticker Symbol MCAP (mGBP) Trading Volume (kGBP)
HSBC HOLDINGS HSBA 95233.18 64365.20
BP BP 96693.11 53679.91
BHP BILLITON BLT 93968.62 51553.35
RIO TINTO RIO 48215.07 49588.63
VODAFONE GROUP VOD 67639.27 42724.11
BARCLAYS BARC 26385.62 39438.36
ANGLO AMERICAN AAL 23711.60 32729.43
GLAXOSMITHKLINE GSK 60249.21 31334.97
XSTRATA XTA 20076.37 30763.92
ASTRAZENECA AZN 38382.84 29372.62
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL B RDSb 103763.27 24853.99
BG GROUP BG 35537.24 22192.08
STANDARD CHARTERED STAN 23913.67 21476.55
BRIT AM TOBACCO BATS 36049.98 21036.13
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL A RDSa 103763.27 19412.70
TESCO TSCO 29212.67 18703.96
LLOYDS BANKING GROUP LLOY 19410.61 18404.69
DIAGEO DGE 22781.75 15608.92
UNILEVER ULVR 47860.66 14991.42
RECKIT BENCKISER GROUP RB 20214.32 13609.18
BAE SYSTEMS BAES 12151.11 13080.46
IMPERIAL TOBACCO IMT 17404.02 12965.21
PRUDENTIAL PRU 11533.06 12470.73
SABMILLER PLC SAB 20744.70 11095.89
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND RBS 19816.78 10954.66
NATIONAL GRID NG 14512.22 10007.88
AVIVA AV 9456.02 9955.95
CADBURY CBRY 8526.47 9770.82
CENTRICA CNA 12570.70 9238.03
REED ELSEVIER REL 5566.21 9038.19
WPP PLC WPP 5911.84 8741.97
BT GROUP BT 8855.64 8547.76
MARKS & SPENCER GROUP MKS 5032.95 8355.31
VEDANTA RESOURCES VED 4079.08 8341.78
ROLLS ROYCE RR 7178.85 7834.07
continued on the next page. . .
V
Appendix A Complementary Statistics & Further Information
. . . continued from Table A.6
Name Ticker Symbol MCAP (mGBP) Trading Volume (kGBP)
COMPASS GROUP CPG 6532.35 7786.64
SCOTTISH & SOUTHERN ENERGY SSE 10363.90 7476.43
TULLOW OIL TLW 7776.81 7211.82
PEARSON PSON 5788.18 7208.44
MORRISON SUPERMARKETS MRW 6947.64 7050.38
KAZAKHMYS KAZ 4050.48 6996.84
BRITISH SKY BROADCASTING BSY 8712.18 6960.20
NEXT NXT 3102.30 6921.55
KINGFISHER KGF 4447.44 6836.32
BRITISH LAND COMPANY BLND 3467.37 6543.83
ANTOFAGASTA ANTO 6539.71 6521.49
LAND SECURITIES GROUP LAND 4032.81 6282.55
MAN GROUP EMG 4544.06 6225.73
CARNIVAL CCL 14231.54 5656.88
SAINSBURY(J) SBRY 5814.70 5493.62
INTERNATIONAL POWER IPR 3934.73 5341.32
BRITISH AIRWAYS BAY 1936.66 4997.90
CABLE & WIRELESS CW 3645.82 4711.40
SMITH & NEPHEW SN 4451.38 4691.37
LEGAL & GENERAL LGEN 3787.24 4603.33
AUTONOMY CORPORATION AUTN 3198.89 4587.83
UNITED UTILITIES GROUP UU 3370.91 4150.12
EXPERIAN EXPN 5019.49 4051.30
OLD MUTUAL OML 4251.65 3951.90
RSA INSURANCE GROUP RSA 4259.86 3681.97
INTERCONTINENTAL HOTELS IHG 1948.42 3479.64
CAPITA GROUP CPI 4382.56 3419.63
HAMMERSON HMSO 2209.14 3415.13
SMITHS GROUP SMIN 3186.34 3304.18
REXAM PLC REX 2079.48 3263.85
SEVERN TRENT SVT 2459.34 3228.72
JOHNSON MATTHEY JMAT 2709.00 2612.40
ICAP PLC IAP 2478.77 2494.10
SAGE GROUP SGE 2580.82 2483.41
A.3 Sample of Trade and Quote Data
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